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ABSTRACT
AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL INQUIRY INTO THE INCORPORATION OF
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT CONCEPT IN THE HOMELAND SECURITY
WITH A POST-DISASTER SECURITY CENTRIC FOCUS
Mehmet Secilmis
Old Dominion University, 2013
Director: Dr. Adrian V. Gheorghe

The historical roots of the Emergency Management concept in the U.S. date back
to 19th century. As disasters occurred, policies relating to disaster response have been
developed, and many statuary provisions, including several Federal Disaster Relief Acts,
conceptually established the framework of Emergency Management. In 1979, with the
foundation o f the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), disaster relief
efforts were finally institutionalized, and the federal government acknowledged that
Emergency Management included mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery
activities as abbreviated 'M PRR.'
However, after 2000, the U.S. experienced two milestone events - the September
11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Following the foundation of
the Department o f Homeland Security (DHS) in 2002, the definitional context of
Emergency Management and its phases/components, simply its essence, evolved and was
incorporated into many official documents differently, creating contextual
inconsistencies. Recent key official documents embody epistemological problems that
have the potential to traumatize the coherence o f the Homeland Security contextual
framework as well as to impose challenges theoretically to the education and training of
Homeland Security/Emergency Management stakeholders. Furthermore, the conceptual

design o f the Emergency Support Functions (ESF) which have been defined within the
context o f the National Response Framework (NRF) displays similar problematic
symptoms, and existing urban area Public Safety and Security planning processes have
also not been supported by methodologies that are aligned with the post-disaster security
requirements.
To that end, the conceptual framework of Emergency Management and its
incorporation in the Homeland Security global architecture should be revised and
redefined to enhance coherence and reliability. Coherence in the contextual structure
directly links to the system's organizational structure and its viability functions. Also,
holistic multi-dimensional system representations/abstractions, which would support
appreciation of the system's complex context, should be incorporated in policy
documents to be utilized to educate the relevant stakeholders (individuals, teams, etc.)
during the training/orientation programs.
In addition, the NRF and its ESFs should be reviewed through a post-disaster
security centric focus, since the post-disaster environment has unique characteristics that
should be addressed by different approaches. In that sense, this dissertation develops a
Post-Disaster Security Index (PDSI) Model that provides valuable insights for security
agents and other Emergency Management and Homeland Security stakeholders.
Keywords: Emergency Management, Homeland Security, National Response Framework,
Public Safety and Security, Post-Disaster Urban Security, Law Enforcement, Hurricane
Katrina, Systems Thinking, Multi-Criteria Decision Making.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1

Background
Emergent threats, like natural and man-made disasters (including acts of

terrorism), have the potential to bring uncertainty and complexity to the security o f urban
environments, while the requirement for resiliency and emergency preparedness is
increasing in the context o f Homeland Security. As Little (2004) has discussed “we find
ourselves in a time where former contexts o f threat, vulnerability, and target have all
changed and continue to do so” (p. 57).
Against this threat spectrum, which is getting more challenging every day,
Emergency Management has been the focal point of local and federal authorities for
framing disaster response activities in the U.S. Since the 1800s, exhaustive efforts have
been rendered to cope with the hard times o f post-disaster periods while many disaster
policies and statuary provisions have been promulgated to coordinate the decentralized
initiatives scattered around the country. During the time represented in Figure 1, the
disaster response framework at federal level was institutionalized with the foundation of
FEMA in 1979, and the federal government acknowledged the four major components mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery (MPRR) - o f Emergency Management.
1800$
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Since 1979, studies to enhance preparedness and resiliency against different types
o f disasters have increased. In the last decade, after the terrorist acts o f 9/11, parallel with
the increase in the vulnerability o f urban areas, myriad efforts, including public, state or
private initiatives (policy/strategy development, legislation, academic research and
activities, administrative regulations, exercises, etc.) have been put in place to enhance
the national preparedness. These studies which are mostly under the oversight of the
Homeland Security enterprise have incorporated the essence o f the Emergency
Management concept differently, and it is assumed that all those efforts performed in
some partially decentralized networked groups have ended with some epistemological
inconsistencies regarding the Homeland Security contextual domain, which comprises
diverse contextual, structural and functional complex systems and sub-systems. Due to
overwhelming complexity and epistemological problems, the outstanding initiatives in
different scales and scopes which aimed to sustain a high level of resiliency against all
types o f threats, have consequently created some more contextual inconsistency.
However, the initiatives were supposed to be controlled, coordinated and unified with a
common terminology as it required by the recent Presidential Policy Directive o f
National Preparedness (2011).
The official capstone documents that identify the boundaries o f the Homeland
Security enterprise are depicted in Figure 2. The concept o f Emergency Management,
which can be traced back to the 19th century with the beginning of disaster response
activities, was incorporated in these documents after 2000, following the establishment of
the DHS, and Emergency Management continued to evolve during this time in line with
the development o f Homeland Security context.
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DHS Capstone Documents

To some extent, the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and NRF,
which are the core mandates o f the Homeland Security response/recovery architecture,
have adapted the essence o f Emergency Management. NIMS “works hand in hand with
NRF and provides the template for the management of incidents, while the NRF provides
the structure and mechanisms for national-level policy for incident management”
(National Incident Management System, 2008, p. 1). NRF “specifies incident manage
ment roles and responsibilities, including emergency support functions designed to
expedite the flow of resources and program support to the incident area” (National
Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2009, p. 78).
However, when all the documents illustrated in Figure 2 are reviewed from a
holistic perspective (as they are specified in the next chapters), serious contextual
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inconsistencies are revealed regarding the theoretical mission areas, functions and
definitions o f Emergency Management, Homeland Security, and their major components.
In a similar vein, two of the fifteen support functions within the NRF, Emergency
Management Support Function (ESF-5) and Public Safety and Security Support Function
(ESF-13) have links to the problem domain identified in this dissertation. Their design in
the existing framework requires further analysis to minimize the collateral deficiencies.

1.2

Problem Domain
In the U.S., before DHS, disaster response activities were coordinated within the

context o f Emergency Management. During the period theoretically starting from
September 11, DHS has been the single authority for the coordination o f all response
missions. Following its establishment in 2002, DHS has overseen the development and
evolution o f Emergency Management in line with the development o f the Homeland
Security contextual framework. However, the incorporation o f the definitional context of
Emergency Management and its phases/components within the official documents
(contextual structure) o f Homeland Security indicates serious epistemological problems.
In addition, the official documents addressing both the Homeland Security
enterprise and Emergency Management (which should be a process or function within
Homeland Security) lack o f figurative top-down holistic, multi-dimensional system
representations/abstractions. These should have depicted the contextual structure (of all
levels) o f the system holistically for the situational awareness and training o f
individuals/leaders and other system stakeholders.

5

The aforementioned epistemological problems have also negatively affected the
conceptual design o f the ESFs defined within the context of NRF. Although Emergency
Management Support Function (ESF-5) should be an overarching function or process to
lead, coordinate and synchronize the other functions that use the Public Safety and
Security Support Function (ESF-13) as a base platform, all the support functions are
depicted as independent. In addition, the interaction and interdependency among them
have not been delineated clearly throughout the texts.
Furthermore, regarding Public Safety and Security of an urban environment in a
post-disaster state, new criticality and vulnerability assessment tools/models should be
developed to better support the security planning process, since security and public order
in a post-disaster urban environment play a significant role for the execution o f other
follow-up response and recovery missions as it was evidenced during Hurricane Katrina.
The lack o f law enforcement and public security during the first week after Hurricane
Katrina seriously hurt the execution o f other Emergency Management missions in
coherence, completely halting some of the response efforts in some places.

1.3

Purpose and Anticipated Significance of the Dissertation
The dissertation includes two separate major components, which theoretically stay

in the contextual framework o f U.S. Homeland Security, and have an inextricable link to
each other, as depicted in Figure 3. The focal discussions o f these components follow:
•

An epistemological inquiry (questioning the contextual consistency) o f the
incorporation o f Emergency Management concept within the Homeland
Security contextual structure.
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•

Discussion that highlights the requirement for post-disaster security centric
planning approach within the NRF.

Analysis of Homeland Security
Contextual Structure

NIMS

D evelopm ent of PDSI
Model

E m ergency Support F unctions

Public S a fety and Security

Figure 3

Major Components o f the Dissertation

In line with these topics, the purpose o f the dissertation is to contribute to existing
literature providing some factual inferences (articulated as Conclusions and
Recommendations in Chapter 5) by achieving the following goals;
•

Analyze the U.S. Homeland Security contextual structure underlining the
significance of:
Contextual coherence in a complex system,
-

Utilization of common terms, taxonomies and figurative top-down
holistic multi-dimensional system representations/abstractions,
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Public Safety and Security within the National Response Framework.
•

Develop a vulnerability assessment model which can be utilized to address
tactical level post-disaster urban area security requirements, promoting the
post-disaster security centric planning perspective as well as providing
generalizable indices for the high level (operational or strategic) security
planning purposes.

Pursuant to significance of the dissertation, Chapter 3 clarifies and underlines the
potential implications o f contextual inconsistency upon the organizational and functional
structures of the systems, and upon Public Safety and Security. This chapter includes a
contextual analysis supported by an extensive literature review through a unique
methodology culminating with critical conclusions specified in Chapter 5.
Chapter 4 introduces a unique prescriptive vulnerability assessment model - PostDisaster Security Index (PDSI) Model, which would support post-disaster security
planning o f urban areas. The concept design o f the PDSI Model is a combination o f the
epistemological perspective o f modeling, Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM), and
relevant aspects o f the military literature, including Military Decision Making Process
(MDMP). The variables used in the model have been developed to specifically address
the post-disaster security requirements.
The vulnerability index (PDSI), to be obtained through the use o f the PDSI
Model, not only provides a prioritization index for the criticality and vulnerability
assessment but also gives valuable insights for post-disaster force tailoring, unit
positioning and the determination of the possible security operations techniques to be
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implemented in a jurisdiction. If the PDSI Model is implemented in a broad area of
responsibility at state or federal level by the lead o f a central authority, it would also be
possible to derive operational and strategic level inferences o f the higher level decision
making processes, as specified in Chapter 5.
Furthermore, this dissertation explores today's security environment and the
philosophical paradigms from the perspective o f modeling, and promotes the systems
thinking and top-down multi-dimensional holistic system representation.

1.4

Research Methodology
While the research methodology principally relies on literature review, the phases

adopted in the continuum o f the research - which are facilitated in a non-linear approach have been depicted in Figure 4. Generally mixed methods have been utilized during the
research. The dissertation content, which has been addressed by both quantitative and
qualitative research characteristics, includes two major components. One o f the
components (Chapter 3) analyzes the problem domain with a descriptive methodology,
while the other (Chapter 4) focuses on the PDSI Model development with a prescriptive
approach. Both deductive logic and inductive reasoning methods have been applied
during the analysis.
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1.5

Research Methodology

Hypotheses
A research hypothesis is a proposed statement, which includes predictions or

explanations that should be proven through various methods. In that sense, the following
hypotheses would be proven through the analysis and model development to achieve the
dissertation goals outlined in Chapter 1.3;
•

The complex system's contextual structure (which utilizes common terms
and taxonomies, as well as content knowledge that epistemologically
complies with the historical development of the conceptual framework)
requires coherence to optimize the system's organizational structure and let
its viability functions run properly.
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•

Figurative top-down multi-dimensional system representations or
abstractions that delineate the system architecture holistically at all levels
play a key role in maintaining the situational awareness o f relevant
stakeholders.

•

Redefining the ESF-5 as overarching and the ESF-13 in a backdrop role
(since maintaining public safety and security, including law enforcement,
seriously affects the other response/recovery missions to be executed in
harmony) would enhance the resiliency of the NRF.

1.6

Limitations and Delimitations of the Study

1.6.1

Limitations
•

The fuzzy matrix conceptual design in the PDSI Model provides a unique

approach for vulnerability assessments of key assets; however, the measurement
matrixes and variables are subject to change/modification in the future based on
the feedback to be provided through extensive empirical studies.
•

In the dissertation, post-disaster urban environment security requirements

have been exemplified only with the Hurricane Katrina case.

1.6.2

Delimitations
•

The research analysis scope is limited to the U.S. Emergency Management

context.
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•

Contextual analysis primarily addresses the incorporation o f the Emergency

Management definition and its phases/components in the official capstone DHS
references. Full context analysis is beyond the scope o f this dissertation.
•

Chapter 4 delineates the conceptual design and step-wise algorithm of the

PDSI Model. However, a software program supported by Geographic Information
Systems (GIS) should be developed in future for the practical use o f the model.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
As discussed in Chapter 1, major components of the dissertation focus on the
analysis o f the Homeland Security contextual structure (theoretical content created by
referential documents) regarding the incorporation o f the Emergency Management
concept - its definition, phases/components, etc., and the development o f a vulnerability
assessment model to support Public Safety and Security planning with a post-disaster
security centric focus.
The literature review is organized under six main titles. The conceptual design of
the literature review has been depicted in Figure 5.

AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL INQUIRY INTO THE INCORPORATION OF
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After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, following the foundation o f DHS, all internal
security, including Emergency Management activities, came to be overseen by DHS.
During this time, DHS evolved into a complex system with numerous entities and a broad
context, mainly comprised o f the key mandates promulgated by the government. To
explore the aforementioned discussions, Chapter 2.1 and Chapter 2.2 review 'Today's
Security Environment' and 'Homeland Security and Key Mandates', respectively.
This research adopts a post-disaster security centric focus for both the analysis of
the Homeland Security contextual structure and PDSI Model development with the aim
o f promoting the significance o f the Public Safety and Security function (including
security, public order, law enforcement, etc.) within the NRF. Since the Hurricane
Katrina case embodies many lessons learned regarding post-disaster security and law
enforcement failures, its forensic history is included in Chapter 2.3 to materialize the
assumptions.
Since the contextual analysis is addressing a complex system with numerous
functions and entities, Chapter 2.4 reviews 'Systems Thinking and Complexity'
discussions to highlight the scholarly aspects o f existing knowledge.
Finally, to support the conceptual framework o f the PDSI Model delineated in
Chapter 4, 'Epistemology and Philosophical Perspective o f Modeling' and 'Multi-Criteria
Decision Making (MCDM)' topics have been explored in Chapter 2.5 and Chapter 2.6.

2.1

Today's Security Environment
Human beings have been exposed to a vast number o f natural and man-made

disasters or threats since the creation o f the earth in the universe. The foremost types of
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disasters humanity has suffered include: hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, tsunamis,
wildfires, radiological or hazardous material releases, acts of terrorism, and wars.
However, “the threats to the people and the people's interests have shifted
dramatically in the last 20 years” (National Security Strategy, 2010, p. 17), and now “we
find ourselves in a time where former contexts of threat, vulnerability, and target have all
changed and continue to do so” (Little, 2004, p. 57). Today, threats resulting from the
catastrophic impacts o f natural and man-made disasters, especially from asymmetric
terrorist acts, continue to impose great challenges to people who live in urban areas.

2.1.1

Urban Environment
Manning (2012) discusses “for the first time in history, the majority o f the human

race lives in cities” (p. 12). “The world is undergoing a massive urbanization” (Urban
Operations, 2006, p.1-1). “An overall trend o f migration from rural to urban areas is
occurring throughout the globe” which is creating “massive urban areas that hold the
centers o f population, government, and economics in their respective regions” (Urban
operations, 2006, p.1-1).
Hidek (2010) contends the revolution o f security affairs today makes the analysis
o f urban security policy a complex endeavor, stating that “it is a story of a machine with
countless moving parts, only some o f which operate in public view” (p. 43). As Kiefer
(2001) has discussed, it is extremely challenging to strengthen the potential targets in
urban areas, although we have more capabilities in terms of effective physical security
and technological countermeasures today.
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Desch (2001) notes the problems that urbanization poses for political leaders
which include “untrammeled growth, overcrowding, pressures on urban services, the
growth o f slums and other poor areas, transportation bottle-necks, atomization o f society,
unemployment, racial and/or ethnic conflict, pollution, loss o f agricultural areas, and
increased adverse consequences of natural or man-made disasters” (p. 5).
The urban environment “is made up of adaptive systems with a wide range of
structures, processes, and functions that have evolved to sustain concentrated human
societies in confined space” (Joint Urban Operations, 2009, p. II-2). “Each system has a
critical role in the smooth functioning o f the urban area; whether they are simple or
complex, all systems fit into six broad categories” as it is depicted in Figure 6 (Urban
operations, 2006, p. 2-19).

C o m m u n ica tio n s
a nd
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Cultural

Economics
and
Commerce
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Transportation
and
Distribution

Urban Area Systems (Urban Operations, 2006, p. 2-19)

Urban areas “present an extraordinary blend o f horizontal, vertical, interior,
exterior, and subterranean forms superimposed on the natural relief, drainage, and
vegetation” (Urban operations, 2006. p. 2-2). “They present the most complex
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environment for military operations. This complexity is derived from numerous factors
such as location, history, economic development, climate, available building materials,
the natural terrain, the cultures o f their inhabitants, and many other factors” (Joint Urban
Operations, 2009, p. VII).
Regarding the development of a successful strategy for urban security, Little
(2004) discusses that the interactions between all involved stakeholders should be
understood and enabled. He further contends that “robust and effective security will
require that dialogues be initiated and sustained between and among the various
stakeholders using terms o f reference that all can relate to and act upon” (p. 56).

2.1.2

Risk and Vulnerability
Risk is the “potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from an incident, event,

or occurrence, as determined by its likelihood and the associated consequences”
(National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2009, p. 27). It is the “expected magnitude of
loss due to a terrorist attack, natural disaster, or other incident, along with the likelihood
o f such an event occurring and causing that loss” (National Infrastructure Protection Plan,
2006, p. 104).
In the context o f Homeland Security, the National Infrastructure Protection Plan
(NIPP) Framework assesses the risk as a function o f consequence, vulnerability, and
threat (National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2006). In a similar way, Bridging the Gap
(2010) defines the risk assessment as a comprehensive process:
Risk assessment is the comprehensive process for the identification and
characterization of threat, consequences, and vulnerabilities. While each
element is important for capabilities based planning and national
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preparedness, determinations of vulnerability are important because they
include an assessment o f exposure, sensitivity, and resilience, (p.l 11)

Johansson (2010) defines the vulnerability as “the consequences that arise when a
system is exposed to a strain o f a given type and magnitude” (p. 19). Vulnerability is a
“weakness in the design, implementation, or operation of an asset, system, or network
that can be exploited by an adversary, or disrupted by a natural hazard or technological
failure” (National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2006, p. 105). It is “a state inherent in
the manifestation o f physical, organizational, and cultural properties o f a system that can
result in damage if attacked by an adversary or subjected to a natural disaster or some
other form o f threat” (Bridging the Gap, 2010, p.l 12).
Vulnerabilities are “gaps in the assets’ protection; they are identified by
considering the tactics associated with the threat and the levels of protection that are
associated with those tactics” (Physical Security, 2001, p. 2-4). National Infrastructure
Protection Plan (2006) provides a further definition for vulnerabilities:
Vulnerabilities are the characteristics of an asset, system, or network’s
design, location, security posture, process, or operation that render it
susceptible to destruction, incapacitation, or exploitation by mechanical
failures, natural hazards, terrorist attacks, or other malicious acts. They
identify areas o f weakness that could result in consequences o f concern;
taking into account intrinsic structural weaknesses, protective measures,
resiliency, and redundancies, (p.38)

Vulnerability assessment is a “process to identify physical, organizational, or
cultural characteristics or procedures that render populations, assets, areas, or special
events susceptible to a specific hazard or set o f hazards” (Bridging the Gap, 2010, p. 112).
Vulnerability articulates the relationship between the set o f initiating events and the set of
outcomes as shown in Figure 7.
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2.1.3

Vulnerability

Consequence

Vulnerability Mapping (McGill, 2008, p. 9)

Threat Spectrum
The National Security Strategy (2010) underlines the change in the threat

spectrum, which has shifted dramatically in the last 20 years, as “the post-9/11 era has
yielded to a low level, but persistent terrorist threat, more focused to date on U.S.
interests abroad than on the homeland, which is likely to persist to 2030” (Manning,
2012, p.l 1).
Threat is an “indication of possible violence, harm, or danger dividing it into three
different types: Natural, Technological and Human-caused threats” (Fundamentals o f
Emergency Management, 2011, p.2-13). The threats are “unpredictable and the full range
o f threats probably unknowable” (Little, 2004, p.57), and “geopolitical uncertainty will
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be a feature o f the coming two decades” (Manning, 2012, p.l 1). Figure 8 depicts a visual
representation o f different sources o f threat.
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Sources of Threat (Emergency Services Sector, 2010, p. 43)

2.2

Homeland Security and Key Mandates

2.2.1

Homeland Security
Homeland Security “describes the intersection of evolving threats and hazards

with traditional governmental and civic responsibilities for civil defense, emergency
response, law enforcement, customs, border control, and immigration” (Quadrennial
Report, 2010, p. viii). Homeland Security is a “complex challenge that demands
significant investment; collaboration among local, state, and federal governments; and
integration with the private sector” (A Governor’s Guide, 2002, p.6). Homeland Security
is a “concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce
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America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks
that do occur” (National Strategy for Homeland Security, 2007, p.3).
After the September 11 terrorist attacks, the federal government passed the
Homeland Security Act o f 2002, “which called for the development o f a consistent
infrastructure protection methodology that would be applied to guide the federal
government’s efforts and established Department of Homeland Security (DHS)” (Hidek,
2010, p. 109).
The DHS “has been developed to pull together many agencies that already existed
in the government and to coordinate with local and state authorities for the protection of
the nation” (Oscar, 2006, p. 12); and in January 2003, FEMA was subsumed under the
DHS. McEntire (n. d.) further discusses the emergence o f DHS:
DHS is the result o f the most sweeping governmental reform since World
War II and it performs many functions such as intelligence and warning,
border and transportation security, domestic counter-terrorism, critical
infrastructure and key asset protection, defense against catastrophic threat,
and emergency preparedness and response, (p. 15)

The Quadrennial Report (2010) contends “although the integrated concept of
Homeland Security arose at the turn o f the 21st century, Homeland Security traces its
roots to concepts that originated with the founding o f the Republic” (p. 14). While
'Disaster Response' and 'Emergency Management' have been the principal terms to
define the disaster response activities since the 1800s until September 11, after the
foundation o f DHS, the 'Homeland Security' enterprise has assumed an overarching role
to oversee all security missions, including the one against terrorist attacks. National
Strategy for Homeland Security (2007) points out the evolution of Homeland Security
concept:
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The understanding o f homeland security continued to evolve after
September 11, adapting to new realities and threats. The human suffering
and staggering physical destruction caused by Hurricane Katrina was a
reminder that threats come not only from terrorism, but also from nature, (p.
3)

Considering the National Strategy for Homeland Security (2002) - the first
Homeland Security Strategy - as the starting point, the historical evolution of the
Homeland Security concept could be theoretically divided into three subsequent periods:
•

2002-2007, the period which is defined by the National Strategy fo r
Homeland Security o f 2002.

•

2007-2010, the period which is defined by the National Strategy fo r
Homeland Security o f 2007.

•

Post 2010, the period which is defined by the Quadrennial Homeland
Security Review Report (QHSR) o f 2010.

Although the Quadrennial Report (2010) states “the documents such as NIPP and
NRF, as well as documents produced by the National Counterterrorism Center, spell out
roles and responsibilities for various aspects o f Homeland Security” (p. A -l), it is
difficult to frame the contextual boundaries o f Homeland Security within existing content
knowledge incorporated in the official documents.

2.2.2

National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP)
As one of the critical Homeland Security mandates, the NIPP (2009) “provides

the unifying structure for the integration of existing and future Critical Infrastructure and
Key Resources (CIKR) protection efforts and resiliency strategies into a single national
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program to achieve the overarching goal of the NIPP” (p. 1). It “sets forth a
comprehensive risk management framework and clearly defined roles and responsibilities
for the Department o f Homeland Security; Federal Sector-Specific Agencies; and other
Federal, State, regional, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners implementing
the NIPP” (p. i). It further discusses the framework:
The NIPP framework supports the prioritization o f protection and resiliency
initiatives and investments across sectors to ensure that government and
private sector resources are applied where they offer the most benefit for
mitigating risk by lessening vulnerabilities, deterring threats, and
minimizing the consequences of terrorist attacks and other manmade and
natural disasters. (National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2009, p. 1)

The CIKR Support Annex (2008) states “the NIPP and its associated CIKR
Sector-Specific Plans (SSPs) work in conjunction with the NRF and its supporting
annexes to provide a foundation for CIKR preparedness, protection, response, and
recovery efforts in an all-hazards context” (p. 3). The CIKR Sectors and responsible
sector-specific agencies are included in Table 1. The list o f CIKR which was first
developed with the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7), has
established a framework for the security stakeholders to identify, prioritize, and protect
the critical assets in their jurisdictions.
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Table 1

Sector-Specific Agencies and CIKR Sectors (National Infrastructure
Protection Plan, 2009)

Critical Infrastructure and Key
Resources Sector

No

Department of Agriculture
Department o f Health and Human
Services

1

Agriculture and Food

Department o f Defense

2

Defense Industrial Base

Department o f Energy

3

Energy

Department o f Health and Human
Services

4

Healthcare and Public Health

Department o f Interior

5

National Monuments and Icons

Department of Treasury

6

Banking and Finance

Environmental Protection Agency

7

Water

Office of Infrastructure
Protection

8
9
10
11
12
13

Chemical
Commercial Facilities
Critical Manufacturing
Dams
Emergency Services
Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste

14

Information Technology

15

Communications

16

Postal and Shipping

17

Transportation Systems

18

Government Facilities

Department of Homeland Security

Sector-Specific Agency

Office o f Cyber-security
and Communications
Transportation Security
Administration
Transportation Security
Administration
United States Coast Guard
Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Federal
Protective Service
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2.2.3

National Incident Management System (NIMS)
Origination o f NIMS dates back to 2003. In 2003, “Homeland Security

Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) - Management o f Domestic Incidents directed the
Secretary o f Homeland Security to develop and administer a National Incident
Management System” (Fundamentals of Emergency Management, 2011, p. 2-6). The
NIMS document was originally published in 2004 and revised in 2008 to reflect
contributions from stakeholders and lessons learned during recent incidents. The NIMS
framework “sets forth the comprehensive national approach” (National Incident
Management System, 2008, p.5).
NIMS “is not an operational incident management or resource allocation plan;
NIMS represents a core set o f doctrines, concepts, principles, terminology, and
organizational processes that enables effective, efficient, and collaborative incident
management” (National Incident Management System, 2008, p. 3). “The incident
management systems described in the NIMS is the foundation for the additional response
procedures described in the NRF” (Civil Support Operations, 2010, p.2-1). Fundamentals
o f Emergency Management (2011) underlines the significance of NIMS as a common
template:
NIMS provides a consistent nationwide template to enable Federal, State,
Tribal, and local governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
and the private sector to work together to prevent, protect against, respond
to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of incidents, regardless of cause,
size, location, or complexity, (p. 2-6)

The Incident Command System (ICS), Multiagency Coordination System
(MACS), and Public Information were introduced in NIMS (2008) as the fundamental
elements o f incident management. NIMS (2008) states “these elements provide

25

standardization through consistent terminology and established organizational structures”
(p.45). ICS is “normally structured to facilitate activities in five major functional areas:
command, operations, planning, logistics, and finance/administration; in some
circumstances, intelligence and investigations may be added as a sixth functional area”
(p. 48).
As stated in NIMS (2008), Incident Command (see Figure 9) is “responsible for
overall management o f the incident” (p. 49). “In an incident command organization, the
Command Staff typically includes a Public Information Officer, a Safety Officer, and a
Liaison Officer, who report directly to the IC/UC and may have assistants as necessary”
(p. 51). “The incident Command and Management organization is located at the Incident
Command Post (ICP); Incident Command directs the operations from the ICP which is
generally located at or in the immediate vicinity o f the incident site” (p. 53).
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Finance/

Administration
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General Staff

Figure 9

Incident Command System (National Incident Management System, 2008,
p. 53)
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The National Response Framework (2008) points out the requirement for the
Area Command, which is “an organization to oversee the management o f multiple
incidents handled individually by separate ICS organizations or to oversee the
management o f a very large or evolving incident engaging multiple Incident Management
Teams (IMTs)” (National Incident Management System, 2008, p. 61):
If necessary, an Area Command (Figure 10) may be established to assist the
agency administrator/executive in providing oversight for the management
o f multiple incidents being handled by separate Incident Command Posts or
to oversee management of a complex incident dispersed over a larger area
and broker critical resources, (p. 50)

A re a
C om m and

Incident
Command Post
Figure 10

2.2.4

Incident
Command Post

Area Command Structure (National Response Framework, 2008, p. 50)

National Response Framework (NRF)
NRF fulfills a significant role within the Homeland Security architecture. FEMA

Pub 1 (2010) states “in 2008, FEMA led the development of the NRF which replaced
both the National Response Plan developed by DHS in 2004” (p. 12).
The National Response Framework (2008) is “a guide to how the Nation conducts
all-hazards response” (p.l). It “establishes a comprehensive, national, all-hazards
approach to domestic incident response, it provides disaster response principles to guide
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and encourage all response partners to prepare for and provide a unified national response
to major disasters and emergencies” (FEMA Pub 1, 2010, p. 12). It “elaborates the
principles in the NIMS, focusing on prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery. It
provides the structure and mechanisms for coordinating federal support to state and local
incident managers and for exercising federal authorities and responsibilities based on the
NIMS” (Civil Support Operations, 2010, p.2-8).
The National Response Framework (2008) “builds upon the NIMS which
provides a consistent template for managing incidents”(p. 1). It includes “the core
document, the Emergency Support Functions (ESF), Support, and Incident Annexes, and
the Partner Guides” (p.3). “The NRF core document and annexes, including the CIKR
Support Annex, describe processes for coordination among various Federal departments
and agencies; State, local, and tribal governments; and private sector partners, both for
pre-incident preparedness, and post-incident response and short-term recovery” {National
Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2009, p.78).
The NRF “specifies incident management roles and responsibilities, including
emergency support functions designed to expedite the flow o f resources and program
support to the incident area” {National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2009, p. 78).
“FEMA coordinates response support from across the Federal Government and certain
NGOs by calling up, as needed, one or more of the 15 ESFs” {National Response
Framework, 2008, p. 57) (Table 2).
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Table 2

Emergency Support Functions (National Response Framework, 2008)
ESF-1

Transportation

ESF-2

Com m unications

ESF-3

Public Works and Engineering

ESF-4

Firefighting

ESF-5

Emergency M anagem ent
M ass Care, Em ergency A ssistance, Housing,
and Human Services

ESF-6
ESF-7

Logistics M anagem ent and Resource Support

ESF-8

Public Health and M edical Services

ESF-9

Search and R escue

ESF-10

Oil and Hazardous M aterials R esponse

ESF-11

Agriculture and Natural Resources

ESF-12

Energy

ESF-13

Public Safety and Security

ESF-14

Long-Term Com m unity Recovery

ESF-15

External Affairs

The National Response Framework (2008) delineates the missions of
Emergency Support Functions:
ESFs support access to Federal department and agency resources. They
align categories o f resources and provide strategic objectives for their use,
and utilize standardized resource management concepts such as typing,
inventorying, and tracking to facilitate the dispatch, deployment, and
recovery o f resources before, during, and after an incident, (p. 29)

Within the National Response Framework (2008), the Joint Field Office (JFO) “is
a temporary Federal facility that provides a central location for the coordination of
Federal, State, tribal, and local governments, and private-sector and nongovernmental
organizations with primary responsibility for response and recovery” (p. 62). It “provides
the organizing structure to integrate diverse Federal authorities and capabilities and
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coordinate Federal response and recovery operations; the JFO is internally organized and
operated using the concepts and principles o f the NIMS” (p.63). Figure 11 represents the
overview o f the JFO and its key components.
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2.2.5

Joint Field Office (National Response Framework, 2008, p. 63)

Public Safety and Security (ESF-13)
Stability Operations (2011) introduces the elements o f a stable state as human

security, economic and infrastructure development, governance, and the rule of law.
Within the context o f this broad spectrum, Public Safety and Security, the physical
protection o f people and critical assets in urban areas has always been the primary focus
for leading authorities and security agents during both ordinary/peacetime or
crisis/wartime. The requirement summarized by Little (2004) has been assumed as an
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important; “Security needs to be flexible and agile, and capable of addressing new threats
as they emerge” (p. 57).
Emergency Support Functions (ESF) within the NRF are “a critical mechanism to
coordinate functional capabilities and resources provided by Federal departments and
agencies, along with certain private-sector and nongovernmental organizations”
(National Response Framework, 2008, 57). Among these ESFs, the Emergency Support
Function-13 (ESF-13) (Public Safety and Security) provides “a mechanism for
coordination and support consisting of law enforcement, public safety, and security
capabilities and resources during potential or actual incidents which require a coordinated
Federal response” (Emergency Support Function-13, 2008, p. 1).
ESF-13 ensures “the conduit for utilizing and incorporating the extensive network
of public safety and security coordination established for steady-state prevention efforts
through a variety of interagency plans. Prevention and security plans include, but are not
limited to, the following” (Emergency Support Function-13, 2008, p. 2):
•

National Infrastructure Protection Plan

•

Sector-Specific Plans

•

The National Strategy for Maritime Transportation Security

•

Area Maritime Security Plans

•

Vessel and Facility Security Plans

However, the ESF-13 activities “should not be confused with the activities
described in the Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex o f the
NRF or other criminal investigative law enforcement activities” (Emergency Support
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Function-13, 2008, p. 2). “The law enforcement and investigative response to a terrorist
threat or incident within the United States is a highly coordinated, multiagency State,
local, tribal, and Federal responsibility” (Terrorism Incident, 2004, p.l). During any
terrorist threat or incident, “ESF-13 coordinates and contributes support to DOJ/FBI
operations, if requested” (Emergency Support Function-13, 2008, p. 2)

2.3

Hurricane Katrina
The U.S. Senate noted that the response to Hurricane Katrina showed a “failure to

act on the lessons o f past catastrophes, both man-made and natural, that demonstrated the
need for a large, well-equipped, and coordinated law enforcement response to maintain or
restore civil order after catastrophic events” {Law Enforcement Deployment Teams, 2007,
p. 1). Having discussed 'post-disaster security' as one of the focal points in this
dissertation, the forensic history of Hurricane Katrina has been included in the literature
review considering the dramatic background information it provided for the post-disaster
security and law enforcement requirement.
Hurricane Katrina was “one o f the most powerful and devastating storms during
the worst hurricane season in recorded history” (Oscar, 2006, p. 1). It was “the deadliest
natural disaster in the United States since Hurricane San Felipe in 1928” (The Federal
Response, 2006, p. 6). “As of early August 2006, the death toll exceeded 1800”
(Graumann, Houston, Lawrimore, Levinson, Lott, McCown, Stephens and Wuertz, 2005,
p.l).
Hurricane Katrina was also “the most costly natural disaster ever to strike the
United States, and the deadliest since the Lake Okeechobee disaster o f September, 1928”
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(Graumann et al., 2005, p. 1) and it resulted in “approximately $200 billion in property
damage along the Gulf Coast area” (Wigginton, 2007, p. 6) .
In the Select Bipartisan Committee (2006) report, it was reported “during
the first four days, no single organization or agency was in charge o f providing a
coordinated effort for rescue operations” (p. 230), “following the Hurricane
Katrina, general unrest and violence occurred in crowded areas” (p. 244), and
“the fluctuation in centralized command created many collateral problems for law
enforcement, and the breakdown of authority led to an inability to efficiently
request aid from State authorities” (Farber, 2006, p. 8).

2.3.1

Climatological Summary
Hurricane Katrina “was one o f the strongest storms to impact the coast of the

United States during the last 100 years” (Graumann et al., 2005, p.l). Figure 12 depicts
the cone o f uncertainty prior to Katrina’s landfall in southeast Louisiana which has been
issued by National Hurricane Center. “At landfall, sustained winds were 127 mph and the
minimum central pressure was the third lowest on record (920 mb)” (Graumann et al.,
2005, p. 1). “It first made landfall as a Category 1 hurricane just north o f Miami, Florida
on August 25, 2005, then again on August 29 as a Category 4 along the Central Gulf
Coast near New Orleans, Louisiana” (Oscar, 2006, p. 1). “The flooding o f New Orleans
resulted in the displacement o f more than 250,000 people, a higher number than during
the Dust Bowl years o f the 1930’s” (Graumann et al., 2005, p. 1).
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Figure 12

Hurricane Katrina: Cone o f the Uncertainty (Hurricane Katrina, 2006,
P-13)

2.3.2

Forensic Continuum o f the Crisis
This chapter aims to delineate the causes o f disorder and lawlessness in the post

disaster urban environment where the execution of security and law enforcement
missions failed.
The word ‘forensic’ “applies to the use o f scientific methods and techniques to
investigate a crime and help resolve legal issues in a court o f law” (Forensic, Forensic
Science, (n.d.)). Forensic is “relating to or dealing with the application o f scientific
knowledge to legal problems” (Merriam-Webster, Forensic, 2011). “Forensic scientists
are instrumental in identifying and convicting criminals, and their analysis o f forensic
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evidence often confirms the guilt or innocence o f possible suspects in a crime” (Forensic,
Forensic Science, (n.d.)).
Law and Order Operations (2011) defines ‘forensics’ as it is “the deliberate
collection and methodical analysis o f evidence to establish facts that can be used to
establish connections between persons, objects, or data” (p. 3-17). In similar way, NATO
CBRN (2012) discusses that “forensics is the comprehensive scientific analysis o f
physical, biological, behavioral, and documentary evidence in support o f an investigation,
and the goal o f forensics is to determine whether associations exist among people, places,
things, and events” (p. 4).
The following paragraphs, which excerpt information from different sources
provide valuable insights for interpreting the forensic continuum o f the Hurricane Katrina
disaster and evidence o f the public safety and law enforcement failures.

Public Safety and Security Failures
“First the levees were breached, and then law and order” {Select Bipartisan
Committee, 2006, p. 260). “In the aftermath o f Hurricane Katrina, local and state
authorities were unclear o f the procedures necessary to receive assistance from federal
authorities; while FEMA was on site, it alone did not have the authority to bring in active
duty troops” (Oscar, 2006, p. 10). “Much of the military support was also uncoordinated.
The Louisiana National Guard and Department o f Defense active duty forces, under Joint
Task Force Katrina, were under separate commands” {Select Bipartisan Committee,
2006, p. 195).
Following Hurricane Katrina, in support of local police and other security agents,
thousands o f troops from National Guard Units, Active Military Units and other federal
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units were deployed to the disaster area. “As o f 7 September the National Guard forces
operating in the recovery area are over 41,000 and there were more than 17,000 Active
duty Soldiers, Airman and Marines hard at work in the effort” (Oscar, 2006, p. 10). This
great surge o f forces did not make the expected impact on the scene at the initial phases
o f the response/recovery activities:
Due to lack o f coordination and inefficient plans, although while the
military clearly provided vital support, no one had the total picture o f the
situation on the ground, the capabilities that were on the way, the missions
that had been resourced, and the missions that still needed to be completed.
(Pickup, 2006, p. 3)

From the law enforcement perspective, many security failures were experienced
particularly in the first 1-3 days o f the response/recovery phase of the disaster. During
this period, many crimes were committed: stores were looted, many people were
murdered, and gangs terrorized the public in some part of the cities. Eventually, the
shortfalls in security management deteriorated other emergency management
response/recovery missions as it was reported by Select Bipartisan Committee (2006)
report; “ 1,000 FEMA employees set to arrive in New Orleans on Wednesday, August 31,
turned back due to security concerns” (p. 249). Wigginton (2007) described the situation
dramatically:
Once Hurricane Katrina hit the disaster area; the local agents were unable to
act as first responders because o f the flooding. During the waning days
following the storm, there was complete chaos. New Orleans was on the
verge o f anarchy and the police department was literally paralyzed by the
storm. Especially, as the NOPD focused on rescue operations, civil disorder
began to spread throughout the city. Gangs roamed the streets, robbed,
looted and committed acts of arson on businesses and residences. Various
news agencies reported that New Orleans area Wal-Mart stores had been
looted and all the weapons and ammunition had been reported stolen.
NOPD district stations were often victimized by random sniper fire. (p. 5)
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The Select Bipartisan Committee (2006) contended “in some areas, the collapse or
absence o f law enforcement exacerbated the level o f lawlessness and violence” (p.244).
“Citizens described not just a lack o f a show of force but the widespread perception that
the police themselves were engaged in criminal behavior” (Farber, 2006, p.6).
However, “the Louisiana State Police provided relatively quick assistance;
although the New Orleans Police Department had lost its command and control
capabilities, the Louisiana State Police operated under its own broad law enforcement
statutory mandate” (Select Bipartisan Committee, 2006, p. 246). “Approximately four
days following the storm, federal troops began to arriving in New Orleans” (Wigginton,
2007, p.49), and eventually a more stable security environment was established:
Law and order were eventually restored as local law enforcement officers
were removed from search and rescue, reassigned to law enforcement
missions, and supplemented first by state National Guard troops, then by
other state and local police through the Emergency Management Assistance
Compact (EMAC1) process. (Select Bipartisan Committee, 2006, p. 242)

The National Guard “was activated to help maintain law and order in the city as
well as to assist with rescue efforts” (Mener, 2007, p. 45). “These forces participated in
every aspect o f emergency response, from medical care to law enforcement and debris
removal, and were considered invaluable by Louisiana and Mississippi officials”
(Committee, 2006, p. 10).

1 The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) offers state to state assistance during governor-declared
states o f emergency. Ratified by Congress in 1996, 49 states and the District o f Columbia have enacted legislation to
become members o f EMAC. EMAC is administered by the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA)
(Select Bipartisan Committee, 2006, p. 249). Through EMAC or other mutual aid or assistance agreements, a State can
request and receive assistance from other member States. Such State-to-State assistance may include (National
Response Framework, 2008, p. 40):
•
•

Invoking and administering a Statewide Mutual Aid A greem ent as well as coordinating the allocation o f resources
under that agreement.
Invoking and administering EMAC and/or other compacts and agreements, and coordinating the allocation o f
resources that are made available to and ffom other States.
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Mener (2007) claimed “by the end o f the relief efforts, 40,000 National Guard
troops were deployed under state control and an additional 30,000 military personnel
were deployed under federal control” (p. 45), while Select Bipartisan Committee (2006)
underlined the contribution of the active military units:
While not immediately deployed, Department of Defense (DoD) active duty
forces also played a role in restoring and maintaining law and order.
Precautions were taken to prevent DoD active duty forces from direct law
enforcement missions, thereby avoiding Posse Comitatus2 issues, (p. 242)

In summary, while the severity of the disaster deteriorated the overall situation in
terms o f emergency management, the contingency plans and relevant response/recovery
missions did not sufficiently meet the requirements o f coordination and security during
the post-disaster period. There was a lack o f central coordination, and preparedness
regarding the positioning o f the support troops as well as determining the actions that
should be executed by those troops in the disaster hit areas o f the operation. Following
quote highlights this assumption:
Although the process successfully deployed a large number o f National
Guard troops, it did not proceed efficiently, or according to any pre-existing
plan or process. There was, in fact, no established process for the largescale, nation-wide deployment of National Guard troops for civil support. In
addition, the deployments of National Guard troops were not coordinated
with the federal Northern Command. (Committee, 2006, p. 10)

2 The federal Posse Comitatus Act o f 1878 prohibits the use o f the Army and the Air Force (originally part o f the
Army) to execute the laws o f the United States except where authorized by the Constitution or Acts o f Congress
(Committee, 2006, p. 470). The Posse Comitatus Act is inappropriate for modem times and needs to be replaced by a
completely new law. The old law is widely misunderstood and unclear. It leaves plenty o f room for people to do unwise
and perhaps unlawful things while trying to comply with their particular interpretation (Oscar, 2006).
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2.4

Systems Thinking and Complexity
DHS has an organizational structure that presents complex system of systems

(meta-system comprised o f multiple complex systems, further defined on page 40)
characteristics with numerous entities and too many interagency missions/functions that
all require a tremendous amount of oversight, coordination and synchronization effort.
The literature review addressing the ‘Challenges o f Complex Systems' and
Systems Philosophy and Thinking' is included in the next chapters since the analysis and
model development processes of this dissertation were mostly inspired from these
theories.

2.4.1

Challenges o f Complex Systems
Week, Roos and Magee (2011) noted “heightened awareness has been fueled by

the explosion in the information available to people on nearly any topic and technology
continued to progress and systems became even more complex and capable o f making
modem life simultaneously easier and more challenging” (p. 12). Secilmis (2012)
discussed “while already having many mysterious3 and complex universal systems which
are still waiting to be explored, we've found ourselves in dealing with the manmade
systems which have even turned into challenging complex paradigms”, while Week et al.
(2011) claimed “systems that had once been clearly separate began to interact more than
anyone could have imagined, scale and complexity increased inexorably and we ended up
with systems o f systems” (p. 12).

3 Since we realize that even at the beginning o f 219 century, we don't have a clear understanding o f dark matter and
dark energy which are claimed to make over 95 % o f the universe (N ASA-science). Furthermore, cosmologist talk
about multiverses that we don't know yet (Oren and Yilmaz, 2013, p. 158).

Secilmis (2012) further contended “organizational systems as well as the normal
life routines are becoming increasingly complicated due to the involvement of more
sophisticated information and communication technologies” as Bar-Yam (2004)
supported Secilmis's discussion “the amount o f the information that is flowing and the
rate of exchange are both aspects of the growing complexity of our existence” (p. 13).
“Today, boundaries between large-scale technology-based systems are becoming
increasingly blurry. This increasing degree o f complexity and interconnectedness poses
formidable challenges for the new generation o f engineers, scientists, and managers in the
twenty-first century” (Week et al., 2011, p. XII).
In this challenging environment, the individuals' involvement is now more
important for organizational success than it was in the past because the existing high
information flow and rate o f exchange empower the individual easy access to what he or
she needs; however it is likely that “exceedingly large number of entities, dynamic
interactions, continuous unforeseen emergent conditions and high degree o f uncertainty
in a complex system would continue to make the individuals confused to define their
roles and contribute/involve in the system appropriately” (Secilmis, 2012).
Secilmis (2012) claimed “the increase in the numbers of different system
elements would eventually dictate complexity to the system”, while Szabo and Teo
(2013) noted complex systems characteristics “complex systems often exhibit properties
that are not easily predictable by analyzing the behavior o f their individual, interacting
components” (p. 319). “Since all the elements in a complex system are rarely in the same
shape, mode, structure or character; every specific system state would have a different
pattern o f relations” (Secilmis, 2012).
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Calvano and John (2004) state that “a number o f workers in Complexity Science,
seeking to characterize complexity, have developed a list o f features, o f which at least
some would be possessed by a complex system, which are: elements, interactions,
formation/operation diversity and variability, environment, and activities” (p. 30). In a
similar way, Secilmis (2012) has introduced three important characteristics o f the
complex systems: the number o f elements/entities, the number and type o f interactions,
and the dynamic nature o f the system.
The definitions o f Complex Systems and System o f Systems (Table 3) studied by
Keating, Sousa-Posa and Mun (2003) provide a deeper insight on the terminology which
is required for the appreciation o f complexity and complex systems discussions.

Table 3

Definitions of Complex Systems and System o f Systems

CO M PLEX SYSTEMS
A bounded set o f richly interrelated
elements for which the characteristic
structural and behavioral patterns that
produce system performance emerge
over time and through interaction
between the elements and the system
interaction with the environment (p. 3).

2.4.2

SYSTEM O F SYSTEMS
A meta—system comprised o f multiple
embedded and interrelated autonomous
complex subsystems that can be diverse in
technology, context, operation, geography,
and conceptual frame. These complex
subsystems must function as an integrated
meta-system to produce desirable results in
performance to achieve a higher-level
mission subject to constraints (p. 4).

Systems Philosophy and Thinking
Since the systems field is divided into three main components o f ‘general systems

theory, systems science, and systems philosophy’ in a study o f the literature (M ’Pherson,
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1974), the definitions o f philosophy, philosophy o f science, system(s), and systems
philosophy should be revisited before eliciting the relationship between systems
philosophy and systems thinking.
Philosophy is “the academic discipline concerned with making explicit the nature
and significance o f ordinary and scientific beliefs and investigating the intelligibility of
concepts by means o f rational argument concerning their presuppositions, implications,
and interrelationships” (Philosophy, The Free Dictionary, (n.d.)). Philosophy is “the
rational investigation o f the truths and principles o f being, knowledge, or conduct”
(Philosophy, Dictionary, (n.d.)).
Philosophy of science is “concerned with the methods that scientists use in
discovery, and to elaborate and confirm theories” (Machamer, 1998). Philosophy of
science is “the formulation o f worldviews that are consistent with, and in some sense
based on, important scientific theories” (Losee, 2001). “Epistemologically, it asks what
the nature and essential characteristics o f scientific knowledge are, how this knowledge is
obtained, how it is codified and presented, how it is subjected to scrutiny, and how it is
warranted or validated” (Machamer, 1998).
With regard to system(s), Secilmis (2012) states that a basic system phenomenon
should at least consist o f elements/entities, interactions and borders, while Laszlo (1998)
defines the system as it is a “structured set which elements interact among them and that
has characteristics o f the whole no present in the characteristics of its elements or their
relationships” (p. 2). Further, Edson (2008) contends that “a system is a set o f two or
more elements that satisfies the following three conditions” (p. 6):
•

The behavior o f each element has an effect on the behavior o f the whole.
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•

The behavior o f the elements and their effects on the whole are
interdependent.

•

Elements o f a system are so connected that independent subgroups of them
cannot be formed.

Notwithstanding that systems philosophy and systems thinking might be used
interchangeably, Laszlo (1998) tells us “systems philosophy sets forth a reorganization of
ways of perceiving and thinking while systems thinking is systems philosophy as a
process,” while Edson (2008) contends “systems thinking is both a world view and a
process, it can be used for both the development and understanding o f a system and for
the approach used to solve a problem.”
Systems philosophy is “a perspective philosophy, seeking the connections
between different theories, and probing the ultimate implications of the systems
paradigm; it provides links to such traditional philosophical studies as epistemology and
ontology” (M'Pherson, 1974, p.228). Systems philosophy is “about using systems
concepts and systems methods to construct a realistic ‘philosophy’ and putting it to
practical use” (About Systems Philosophy, 2012).
Laszlo (1998) discusses that systems thinking is a cognitive process which uses
both analysis and synthesis to capture a comprehensive understanding o f the whole. It
helps to understand the whole and its parts, the relations between those, and further the
relation o f the whole with its context and environment. In a similar vein, Week et al.
(2011) contend:
System thinking includes holism, an ability to think about the system as a
whole; focus, an ability to address the important system level issues,
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emergence, and recognition that there are latent properties in systems; and
trade-offs, judgment, and balance, which enable one to judge all the
various considerations and make a proper choice, (p. 190)

In systems thinking, as a matter of holism, framing the system problem at the very
beginning is crucial for the subsequent phases o f the analysis. To frame the system
problem, Secilmis (2012) proposes a vantage point and viewing angle far enough from
the area o f system interest in line with the level of their involvement in the system
process, as illustrated in Figure 13. He contends that doing so enables analysts to
appreciate the system structure, layers and functions in both scale and scope.

Viewing angle
a b s t r a c t e d view

Level of A b s tra c tio n

d e ta ile d v ie w

*,

••

SYSTEM OF INTEREST

Figure 13

Systems (Re)Visioning Perspective at Various Levels o f Abstraction and
Viewing Angles (Week et al., 2011, p. 47)
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In conclusion, consistent with the systems philosophy, systems thinking looks for
an understanding o f a system considering the linkages and interactions between the
elements that compose the entire system (Hake, 2009). As Edson (2008) has pointed out,
systems thinking could be utilized in different areas:
In today's world o f interconnectivity, interdependence and globalization, the
traditional and reductionist approaches to problem solving might be
inadequate; while systems thinking, which adopts the holism, provides the
tools to understand and solve the tough problems through the combination o f
synthesis, analysis and inquiry. In this sense, systems thinking can be utilized
in all areas including national security, homeland security, energy,
environment, healthcare, and business, (p. 47)

2.5

Epistemology and Philosophical Perspective of Modeling
Tolk (2013) contends “a formal approach to ontology, epistemology, and

teleology o f Modeling and Simulation (M&S) will provide a framework to address many
fundamental questions systemically and holistically” (p. 12).
The appreciation o f systems philosophy is required for “systems architects” to
conduct complex systems analyses and develop optimal representations and models. The
rationale is that philosophy o f science issues (ontology and epistemology) affect the
utilization and interpretation o f results obtained from applications o f systems
methodologies (Systems Analysis, 2010). For this reason, the exploration o f
Epistemology and Philosophical Perspective o f Modeling has been included in this
chapter to support the key focus areas o f this dissertation theoretically.

2.5.1

Epistemology
Epistemology is “the study of how we come to know, how we define knowledge,

represent it, and communicate it with others” (Hofmann, 2013, p.82). It “focuses on the
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way we define knowledge, especially how we come to know new knowledge” (Wang,
Wang, Li, and Yang, 2013, p. 336). Bozkurt (2009) contends that “the Epistemological
paradigm is related to how the individual tends to seek knowledge about reality; the
questions put forward by epistemology include: What are the sources o f knowledge?
What is nature o f knowledge? Is our knowledge is valid?” (p. 34).
Epistemology “deals with the question of what can be known. It is also closely
associated with the psychology of cognition, with the premise that one cannot give the
best advice about intellectual operations without detailed information about mental
processes” (Bozkurt, 2009, p. 30).
Bozkurt (2009) further discusses empiricism and rationalism as they are the main
two currents o f epistemology paradigm. She defines empiricism as “a theory o f
knowledge which emphasizes the aspects o f scientific knowledge that are closely related
to experience through deliberate experimental arrangements” (p. 35), while “Rationalism
is the philosophical belief that asserts the truth can best be discovered by reason and
factual analysis” (p. 37).
Since a quick overview o f the philosophical paradigms would catalyze the
appreciation o f epistemology and its critical aspects from a holistic perspective, a
synopsis o f the philosophical paradigms has been included in the following paragraph.

Synopsis of the Philosophical Paradigms: Bozkurt (2009) contends that
“Denzin and Lincoln (1994) consider Ontology, Epistemology and Axiology as the main
philosophical paradigms” (p. 29), while Wang et al. (2013) posit “Ontology,
Epistemology, and Teleology build philosophical foundation of a discipline” (p. 336).
Further; “Ruona and Lynham (2004) include Methodology within Axiology” (Bozkurt,
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2009, p. 29), whereas Bozkurt adds Teleology to the philosophical categories to explore
the philosophical profile o f the individual. To that end, “together these branches of
philosophy are indispensable to answer the crucial question: why and when can we rely
on the recommendations generated via M&S” (Hofmann, 2013, p.82). In the context of
model development, a holistic interpretation o f the relationship of these philosophical
paradigms has been depicted in Figure 14, and supporting definitions have been included
in Table 4.

Teleology

Methodology

Abstraction

MODEL
Experimentation
\ Adaptation

U1

Ontology
Interest Domain
Feedback
Validation

Figure 14

Relationships between Philosophical Paradigms in the Context o f Model
Development
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Table 4

Definitions o f Philosophical Paradigms

Ontology
Ontology is “the study o f what exists” (Hofmann, 2013, p.60); it is “our picture o f how
the world looks” (Solem, 2003, p.439); it “includes everything that is accepted”
(Bozkurt, Padilla and Souza-Poza, 2007).

Epistemology
Epistemology is “the study o f how we come to know, how we define knowledge,
represent it, and communicate it with others” (Hofmann, 2013, p.82). It “focuses on the
way we define knowledge, especially how we come to know new knowledge” (Wang et
al., 2013, p. 336).

Axiology
Axiology is ‘the study o f the nature, types, and criteria o f values and o f value judgments
especially in ethics” (Merriam-Webster, Axiology, 2012). Axiology is “the philosophical
study o f goodness, or value, in the widest sense of these terms” (Bozkurt, 2009, p. 40).

Teleology
Teleology is “the study o f purpose and purpose-driven actions that result in methods”
(Wang et al., 2013, p. 349). Teleology is “an area o f philosophy which explains the future
in terms o f the past and the present based upon the study of purpose, ends, goals and
final causes “(Bozkurt, 2009, p. 39).

Methodology
Methodology is “the epistemology within an implemented and more pragmatic level, it
can be assumed to be one level more specific than epistemology. Whereas epistemology
is the theory of acquiring knowledge, methodology is the detailed explanation and
description o f 'how ' and through which means this knowledge is obtained” (Bozkurt,
2009, p. 30). “The desired methodology will provide guidance for methods relating
ontology to epistemology, consistent with axiology. Consequently, the methodology will
be composed o f conclusions derived from the associated principles” (Brewer, 2010, p.
81).
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2.5.2

System Representation and Modeling
Modeling is “a science when we attempt to organize what has been created and

discovered in the field in an attempt to create a working and valuable abstraction o f that
field” (Smith, 2013, p. 253). It is “always centered on a specific problem; whether the
right level o f abstraction was chosen can only be properly assessed with respect to the
problem one wants to solve” (Pyka and Deichsel, 2013, p. 151).
In decision problems as well as in analysis problems, a model is a “representation
o f reality, and simulation provides a very powerful and flexible opportunity for goaldirected experimentation with a model reality (Oren and Yilmaz, 2013, p. 167). Weirich
(2013) contends “a model explains a natural system because of the way the model
represents the natural system; accounting for its explanatory power requires specifying
the representational figures that give it explanatory power” (p. 113). He further discusses
“models are more ambitious in their treatment of reality than are heuristic devices” (p.
112).

Smith (2013) posits “abstraction and aggregation are two powerful tools for
identifying a model's representation of the world; abstraction creates hierarchy, while
aggregation internalizes or eliminates hierarchy” (p. 249). In this sense; “the conceptual
model represents, as a purposeful abstraction and simplification of a perception o f reality,
everything that according to the world view o f the model developers is necessary to
address the underlying research questions, but no more” (Tolk, 2013, p.6).
Regarding the effective utilization o f models, Tolk (2013) contends “the
intelligent use o f modeling and simulation science requires not just an appraisal o f how
well a chosen method works within a given model, but strategies for choosing the
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appropriate modeling techniques to attack a given problem” (p.VII), while Smith (2013)
makes an emphasis on the unbounded nature o f the modeling, “though modem science
and business have created and adopted classification schemes, taxonomies, and operating
rules that can be applied almost universally, the practice o f building models and
simulations remains unbounded by science” (p. 246).
The fineness or correctness o f a model could be appreciated through its resolution
or precision. Tolk (2013) defines the resolution o f a model or simulation as “the degree of
detail and precision used in the representation o f real world aspects in a model or
simulation; resolution means the fineness o f detail that can be represented or
distinguished in an image” (p. 17). In a similar vein, Smith (2013) discusses the
'usefulness' o f the model: “the current practice o f modeling allows almost any approach
while its measure o f correctness is determined solely by the usefulness o f the resulting
product” (p. 246), while Oren and Yilmaz (2013) underline the perception o f reality in
the context o f the representation: “sometimes a representation of reality may be different
than reality under several conditions such as: misperceived reality, misunderstood reality,
distorted reality, deliberately distorted reality, apparent reality, and unknown reality” (p.
164).
Models are “purposeful abstractions and simplification of reality resulting in a
conceptualization that is transformed into an executable simulation system” (Tolk, 2013,
p.l 1). Pyka and Deichsel (2013) contend “simpler models are not only easier to
understand, but they are more tractable as well” (p. 151), and “in practice, it seems more
likely that we do not understand the processes under investigation to a high degree, which
makes approximation and estimation inevitable” (p. 148), whereas Douglass and Mittal
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(2013) point out the importance o f exhaustive information which may lead us to the
utilization o f a complex model: “in order to express a rich knowledge set that includes
environment, contingencies, resources, possible actions and much more; we need a
framework that allows us to represent knowledge in many facets or dimensions” (p. 282).
To that link to the hypotheses o f this dissertation: once the complexity o f a system
increases, a reliable system abstraction/representation through figurative illustrations or
representation by models/methods would be required to appreciate the system
design/concept/context as a whole. In that sense; as has been discussed in Chapter 5, the
utilization o f the figures, which illustrate top-down holistic multi-dimensional system
representations/abstractions could be helpful not only for the decision making and
training requirements o f the system stakeholders (individuals, groups, leaders, etc.), but
also for the development o f reliable models which would perform critical functions to
achieve the assigned goals.
However, we are still having challenges developing optimal complex system
abstractions. In principle, a complex context needs to be utilized to address the
knowledge in many facets when the interest domain represents complex characteristics.
In other words, the complexity o f the methods/models must theoretically match the
complexity o f the systems/system problems. Per contra, the fact that simpler
models/methods are easier to understand is still valid. Models should be scoped in
workable limits, abstraction and aggregation as well as approximation, when dealing with
complex systems with extensive scales. The quality o f the resolution (degree o f detail and
precision used in the representation) o f a model/method inextricably links to the
elaborated details processed in the model/method.
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Therefore, the development o f modeling & simulation and multi-dimensional
holistic illustrative system abstractions/representations is an open ended process, which
mostly relies on divergent thinking capacity and systems appreciation o f the analysts. The
postulate o f Smith (2013) has been included as an epilogue for this discussion:
The unbounded nature o f the current practice of modeling is supportive of
an artistic approach to modeling that encourages creative freedom in
imagining and building a unique new model, (p. 246)

2.6

Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM)
Hester (2010) contends that complex choices are a way of life for individuals, and

it is usually challenging to make a decision on complex choices that involve multiple
attributes4. “In the presence o f a large number o f conflicting criteria and numerous
alternatives, it becomes very difficult for decision makers to articulate trade-off
information and maintain some measure o f consistency in their responses” (Jin, 2005, p.
51).
Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) is a process that helps people make
choices in the presence o f multiple conflicting criteria (Koksalan, Wallenius and Zionts,
2011). MCDM, used interchangeably with Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA), is
a continuum during which supportive ideas or recommendations are developed to provide
a clear guidance for the decision maker(s) who needs to deal with complex choices,
which includes multiple attributes and different sets of criteria.
Considering the stakeholder preferences and value judgments as well as scientific
modeling and risk analysis; MCDM focuses on a comprehensive, structured process for

4 Attribute is a quality or characteristic inherent in or ascribed to someone or something (Attribute, (n.d.)). An attribute
is a concrete descriptive value, a measurable characteristic o f an entity, including interentity relationships. Attributes
are used as both decision variables and decision criteria (Drobne, Lisec, 2009, p. 461).
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selecting the optimal alternative in any given situation (Linkov and Steevens, (n.d.))- The
final goal in MCDM is to come to a compromised judgment or optimal decision to avoid
conflicting evaluations.

2.6.1

Overview of Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM)
MCDM “aims at providing the decision makers with a systematic way to clarify

the decision problem” (Jin, 2005, p. 52). The MCDM framework relies on the decision
criteria and weightings, and it allows assessment o f trade-offs involved in the decision
making process (Linkov and Steevens, (n.d.)). Ye (2006) discusses that multiple criteria
decision analysis involves in defining objectives; identifying criteria, and alternatives;
and then measuring consequences. Malczewski (1999) contends that MCDM addresses a
set o f alternatives that are evaluated on the basis o f conflicting and incommensurate
criteria.
MCDM, as an important subfield of Operations Research/Management Science,
has grown quickly (Koksalan et al., 2011). “As humans tend to base rational decisions on
an assessment o f multiple decision criteria, MCDM methods have become important
tools in management sciences and operations research” (Drobne and Lisec, 2009, p. 460),
and different schools o f thought have been developed for solving MCDM problems.
Since the 1960s, MCDM has been a part o f Operations Research which explicitly
deals with multiple criteria in decision-making processes. The two major classes of
MCDM can be introduced as Multi-Attribute Decision Analysis (MADA) and Multi
objective Decision Analysis (MODA). While MADA is concerned with choosing from
small, finite, or countable number o f strategies, MODA considers choosing from a large,
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infinite, or uncountable number o f alternatives. Both MADA and MODA problems are
categorized into single-decision-maker problems and group decision problems, and these
two categories could be further subdivided into three different groups; Deterministic,
Probabilistic, Fuzzy Decision (Malczewski 1999).
Decision making with consideration o f risk is used when determining the
probabilities o f future or unknowable events; there are potential risks when uncertainty is
involved (Hester, 2010). “Different types o f real life problems in management practice
can be formulated as multi-criteria analysis problems. Such are the problems of
evaluation and choice o f resources, strategies, projects, offers, policies, credits, products,
innovations, designs, costs, profits, portfolios, etc.” (Genova, Vassilev, Andonov,
Vassileva, Konstantinova, 2004).
The measurement processes in MCDM are developed subjectively from various
preferences (Saaty, 2005). MCDM provides a decision matrix framework or structure,
which supports integrating the expected weights as well as evaluating and ranking the
alternatives (Yoe, 2002). “This structured process would be o f great benefit to decision
making for decision problems, where there is currently no structured approach for
making justifiable and transparent decisions with explicit trade-offs between different
factors” (Linkov and Steevens, (n.d.), p. 827).
Within MCDM, there are multiple methods utilized which have unique
characteristics organizing the evaluation/assessment algorithm and data. “Each one o f
these methods has its advantages and shortcomings, connected mainly with the ways of
receiving information by the DM relating to his/her preferences” (Genova et al., 2004).
Regarding the evaluation o f different MCDM methods, Hester (2010) further discusses
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four criteria that could be applied for the assessment of different decision making
strategies: compensatory vs. non-compensatory, effort, alternative-based vs. attributebased strategies, and exhaustive.
In conclusion, decision making processes usually have three content elements
which are alternatives, criteria and methods. From alternatives, we choose the 'best';
criteria is a tool for an exact judgment; and methods are ways to select one alternative
from the whole set. During a complex decision making process, finding the best method
for a problem might be challenging. However, the MCDM methodologies ease the
process, as they provide different measurement algorithms, and the selection o f the
methodology depends on the problem definition and variables at hand, as well as the
decision maker's preferences.

2.6.2

Fuzzy Sets Theory
The conceptual matrix framework o f the PDSI Model, which is delineated in

Chapter 4, has been mostly inspired from the Fuzzy Sets theory, one o f the major
approaches in the school o f MCDM.
Dhar (1979) contends “the concept o f fuzzy sets theory recently has been
extended and applied in various fields'” (p. 586). Regarding the uncertainty, imprecision
and vagueness o f potential decision making problems; Jin (2005) underscores the
powerful characteristics o f fuzzy modeling:
Many systems are not amenable to conventional modeling approaches due
to the lack of precise or accurate information, due to the strongly nonlinear
behavior, the high degree o f uncertainty, or the time varying
characteristics. Fuzzy modeling along with other related techniques has
been recognized as a powerful tool that can facilitate effective reflection of
uncertainties, (p. 65)
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“To find an optimal alternative of a project, usually the states o f the system and
associated utilities are assumed to be statistically known” (Dhar, 1979, p. 585), however
this is not the case for many circumstances, since utilities o f variables usually are
unknown statistically and uncertainty is a typical characteristic of the system state. In that
sense, Dhar (1979) criticizes the statistical decision theory:
In applying statistical decision theory since the decision maker tacitly
equates the system fuzziness with randomness and neglects certain criteria
of merits because o f unavailability o f statistical data, the application of
only statistical decision theory for determination o f the optimal decision is
of doubtful value, (p. 592)

Belmann and Zadeh (1970) posit “by decision-making in a fuzzy environment is
that a decision process in which the goals and/or the constraints, but not necessarily the
system under control, are fuzzy in nature” (p. iii); likewise Dhar (1979) contends “the
final objectives, the system states and constraints are not sharply defined and are fuzzy in
nature” (p. 585).
A fuzzy set is “a class o f objects with continuum o f grades o f membership. The
notions o f inclusion, union, intersection, complement, relation, convexity, etc., are
extended to such sets, and various properties o f these notions in the context o f fuzzy sets
are established” (Zadeh, 1965, p. 338). “Fuzzy goals and fuzzy constraints can be defined
precisely as fuzzy sets in the space o f alternatives. A fuzzy decision, then, may be viewed
as an intersection o f the given goals and constraints” (Belmann and Zadeh, 1970, p. iii).
Through various fuzzy sets applications, both quantitative and linguistic criteria
o f merits are included in the process o f assessment. Regarding qualitative fuzzy
semantics, “the fuzzy assessments expressed in linguistic terms are often the most
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intuitive and effective way for the decision makers to deal with the subjectiveness and
vagueness inherent in the fuzzy MCDM problem” (Yeh and Deng, 1997, p. 1567).
Some significant characteristics of step-wise algorithms which have been derived
from Fuzzy Sets Theory as include;
•

Fuzzy Sets enable decision maker(s) to perform analysis considering all
possible system states.

•

Both grades o f membership for each possible system state and utility weights
for each alternative can be incorporated into analysis.

•

Both statistical data and linguistic variables can be processed within the
criteria of merit. (Decision maker can include the criteria o f merit that are
usually neglected in statistical decision theory.)

•

The choice o f an optimal alternative, as an output of the decision making
process, indicates the relative merits of all alternatives.

2.6.3

Recognition Heuristic and Elimination by Aspects
In case the exhaustive methods are impractical due to time constraints, resources,

etc., a heuristic approach could be utilized to accelerate the speed o f the decision making
process, which seeks a compromised solution. Hester (2010) contends that “decisions are
biased by individual’s availability heuristic (whatever information is most available to the
analyst at the time o f the analysis carries the most weight)” (p. 45).
The recognition heuristic is “a simple model that can be applied for many
purposes” (Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 2011, p. 114). It is “a low effort, alternative-based,
non-exhaustive approach; it is very efficient but not necessarily optimal” (Hester, 2010,
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p. 46). The recognition heuristic “makes inferences about criteria that are not directly
accessible to the decision maker; it exploits the basic psychological capacity for
recognition in order to make inferences about unknown quantities in the world”
(Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 2011, p. 101).
Regarding the significant characteristics of heuristics, some summary points
developed by Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011) as follow (p. 474):
•

“Heuristics can be more accurate than more complex strategies even
though they process less information.”

•

“A heuristic is not good or bad, rational or irrational; its accuracy depends
on the structure of the environment.”

•

“With sufficient experience, people learn to select proper heuristics from
their adaptive toolbox.”

•

“Decision making in organizations typically involves heuristics because
the conditions for rational models rarely hold in an uncertain world.”

Elimination by aspects, as a technique, is also “a heuristic followed by decision
makers during a process o f sequential choice and which constitutes a good balance
between the cost o f a decision and its quality (Laurent, 2006, p. 1). It is a “medium effort,
attribute-based, non-exhaustive approach” (Hester, 2010, p. 45). “At each stage of
decision, the individuals eliminate all options not having an expected given attribute,
until only one option remains” (Laurent, 2006, p. 1).
Elimination by aspects “can be utilized to eliminate some sub-optimal alternatives
early in the decision process; if we order our attributes in descending order of
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importance, this approach is very useful in attaining a good choice quickly” (Hester,
2010, p. 45).

CHAPTER 3
ANALYSIS OF THE INCORPORATION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT,
AND PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY

3.1

Introduction
Within the broad domain o f Homeland Security, the Emergency Management

concept plays a critical role for the conceptual design of the Homeland Security missions
and functions. Following the foundation of the DHS, the development o f Homeland
Security concept was inspired from Emergency Management, which has addressed the
response activities' in the past.
In the last decade, since the terrorist acts o f 9/11, parallel with the increase in the
vulnerability of urban areas, myriad efforts, including public, state or private initiatives
(policy/strategy development, legislation, academic research and activities, administrative
regulations, exercises, etc.) have been made to enhance the national preparedness. These
efforts incorporated the essence of the Emergency Management concept differently in
their relevant studies under the oversight of the Homeland Security enterprise leaded by
DHS.
Initial contextual analysis (conducted through the review o f relevant literature,
which comprises numerous governmental and public references) reveals an
epistemological problem with the existing contextual structure of Homeland Security
regarding the incorporation o f the Emergency Management concept.
Furthermore, an examination o f the ESFs which have been framed within the
NRF (a critical mandate o f Homeland Security domain) - through a holistic systems
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thinking with post-disaster security centric focus - reveals that the conceptual design of
the ESFs - particularly the ESF-5 and ESF-13 - also suffer from similar epistemological
problems. These issues require the modification o f contextual system design as well as
the development o f additional vulnerability assessment models to enhance the Public
Safety and Security planning process.
In this regard, Chapter 3 analyzes the contextual architecture o f Homeland
Security regarding the incorporation o f the Emergency Management concept, and Public
Safety and Security within NRF according to the methodology delineated in Chapter 3.2.
The analysis primarily focuses on the definitions and major components/phases of the
concepts. (Comprehensive analysis of the whole context is beyond the scope of this
dissertation.)

3.2

Analysis Methodology
Systems analysis “does involve finding the 'best' way to address the problem, or

in mathematical terms 'optimization' among alternatives” (Keating, 2008), while systems
thinking “includes holism, an ability to think about the system as a whole” (Week et al.,
2011, p. 190). Systems thinking “tries to understand the whole (system) and its parts
(subsystems), the relations between the parts and the whole, and the relation of the whole
with its context or environment” (Laszlo, 1998, p. 9). The utilization o f holistic approach
through systems o f systems thinking is critical since it helps to avoid a Type IV error,
which is to try to solve the problem with inappropriate, incompetent or insufficient tools,
methodologies, and resources (Secilmis, 2012).
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In the light of the systems thinking and holistic approach theories, the contextual
analysis o f Homeland Security regarding the incorporation o f the Emergency
Management concept, and the Public Safety and Security function within the NRF has
been conducted based on the Contextual Analysis Methodology (CAM)5 depicted in
Figure 15. The CAM is accomplished in six phases. Although it suggests a sequential
flow throughout the analysis process, nonlinear interactions and information exchange
could take place when necessary.

R elevant Environm ent Specification

Contextual
Identification

System of Interest
Identification

Specification of Problem s

C om parison/Synthesis
and A ssessm ent

Conclusions & R ecom m endations

Figure 15

Contextual Analysis Methodology

5 Contextual Analysis Methodology (CAM) has been developed mostly inspiring from the Keating's (2000)
methodology for conducting analysis of system structure (p. 189).
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3.3

System of Interest Identification (Phase 1)
Keating (2000) notes that “detailed analysis requires the system of interest is

clearly identified; failure to identify the system for study can result in unnecessary
ambiguities in further stages of analysis” (p. 186). To point out the focus o f this analysis,
two corollaries (Table 5) have been developed based on the discussions in Chapter 1.2
(Problem Domain), since Chapter 1.2 has already clarified the system of interest that is to
be addressed during the dissertation.

Table 5

Focus of the Analysis

Incorporation o f the Emergency Management concept within
the Homeland Security contextual system design should be re
aligned contextually to enhance the resiliency and

Corollary 1

preparedness o f the overall system, since the efficiency o f both
organizational and functional system structures strongly relies
on the coherence in the contextual structure,
Post-disaster security centric planning approach should be

Corollary 2

promoted within the National Response Framework to
improve the reliability o f security plans.

In line with these corollaries, the purpose o f the analysis is to identify the major
implications of contextual inconsistencies stemming from the inaccurate incorporation of
the Emergency Management concept throughout many official documents, and to
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evidence the significance o f the Public Safety and Security function and post-disaster
security centric planning approach within NRF.

3.4

Relevant Environment Specification (Phase 2)
This phase comprises the identification of wider system characteristics in a

holistic approach which are external to the system o f interest. “The relevant environment
for a system is the set o f entities and patterns external to the system that either have an
influence on the system or are influenced by the system” (Keating, 2000, p. 186). To
avoid Type III error6, which refers to “muddled thinking, or solving the wrong problems
precisely” (Secilmis, 2012), this phase should be considered seriously. In this vein, the
theoretically relevant environment that influences the focal discussions o f the analysis
has been specified in the following paragraphs.
Emergency Management, as a profession, “did not exist 35 years ago” (FEMA
Pub 1, 2010, p. 15); it “started slowly being recognized after the Disaster Relief Act of
1974” (McEntire, (n.d.), p. 12). Today, Emergency Management plays a critical role for
the accomplishment of other Homeland Security missions. However as Blanchard (2007)
has discussed, it contextually resides in an erratic structure:
Emergency Management in the U.S. is very much conditioned and
constrained by the various contexts within which it must function. It operates
within the changing intergovernmental system. The “power relationship”
amongst these levels of government has shifted over time when it comes to
hazards, disasters, emergency management, and now homeland security, (p.
23)
6 Mitroff (1998) discusses five basic types o f Type HI Error. Each type represents a different sense but they are not
independent;
• Picking the wrong stakeholders
• Narrowing one's options
• Picking the wrong language o f variables
• Narrowing the boundaries/scope o f a problem
Ignoring parts/systems connections

64

Emergency Management belongs to a contextual domain where numerous
concepts have linked to each other. While Blanchard (2007) contends that Emergency
Management is not synonymous with Homeland Security, the National Incident
Management System (2008) discusses that Incident Management refers to how incidents
are managed across all Homeland Security activities, including prevention, protection,
and response, mitigation, and recovery (although the aforementioned activities
theoretically address the components Emergency Management). On the other hand, the
Post-Katrina Act (2006) ascribes a broad governmental functional role to Emergency
Management, which almost covers all mission areas o f Homeland Security.
While the Bridging the Gap (2010) report defines Emergency Management as a
subset o f the Incident Management, the National Incident Management System (2008)
articulates that NIMS has been built on the foundation provided by existing emergency
management and incident response systems. Furthermore, the National Emergency
Management Agency (NEMA) follows totally a different approach defining Emergency
Management and Disaster Management as synonymous concepts: “the discipline of
dealing with and avoiding risks, particularly those that have deleterious or catastrophic
consequences for communities, regions, or entire countries” ( What is Emergency
Management, (n.d.)).
Regarding post-disaster security centric planning, the relevant environment that
virtually surrounds post-disaster security also stays within the boundaries o f Homeland
Security. The Public Safety and Security function, which addresses the security
requirements to be fulfilled during an emergency, has been designed within NRF as it is
one o f the conceptual pillars o f Homeland Security.
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Security “enhances freedom o f action by reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile
acts, influence, or surprise” (Joint Operations, 2011, A-3). “The ultimate goal of security
operations is to protect the force from surprise and reduce the unknowns in any situation.
Security operations encompass five tasks; screen, guard, cover, area security, and local
security” (Offense and Defense, 2012, p. 5-3).
“The security sector consists o f both uniformed forces— police and military— and
civilian agencies and organizations operating at various levels within the operational
environment. Elements o f the security sector are interdependent; the activities o f one
element significantly affect other elements” (Figure 16) (Stability Operations, 2008, p. 613).

STATE SECURITY
PROVIDERS

Nonstate S i
S ector P rI

Figure 16

G overnm ent S ecu rity
Ma n a g e m e n t a n d

O versight bodies

Elements o f the Security Sector (Stability Operations, 2008)

From the holistic perspective o f Homeland Security, there are two major target
audiences in the existing security paradigm: people and assets. As its name implies, the
ESF 13 (Public Safety and Security) has been designed within the NRF to ensure security
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and protection for both audiences. The Public Safety and Security support function
provides “the conduit for utilizing and incorporating the extensive network o f public
safety and security coordination established for steady-state prevention efforts through a
variety of interagency plans” (Emergency Support Function 13, 2008, p. 2).

3.5

Specification of Problems (Phase 3)
The problems which address the discrepancies in the contextual layer of the

'System o f Interest' are identified during this phase in accordance with implications
derived from the 'Relevant Environment Specification' phase. However, substantiation of
the problems as valid findings still requires evaluations and assessments that are to be
performed in the 5th Phase (Synthesis and Assessment). This phase is considered as
critical since its outcomes would navigate the rest of the analysis process. Therefore,
“enough time should be allocated for the identification of system problem in the
beginning o f analysis” (Secilmis, 2012).
With the System o f Interest and Relevant Environment of the problem domain
identified and the focus o f the analysis summarized with corollaries stated in Chapter 3.3,
the synopsis o f the analysis problems to underline the background motives o f the analysis
is as follow:
•

Incorporation o f Emergency Management concept within the extensive
contextual structure of Homeland Security shows epistemological
problems with numerous discrepancies.

•

Conceptual design of the ESFs within the NRF has similar problems,
and existing urban area Public Safety and Security planning processes
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have not been supported by the methodologies which address post
disaster security requirements.

In this phase, as a part o f the technique adopted by this methodology (CAM), the
analysis regarding the incorporation of Emergency Management has been expanded with
citations from different references providing specific background information explicitly.
The citations have been clustered into two groups in Appendix A:

3.6

•

General and Coordination Issues

•

Poor Policy Formulation (Epistemological Problems) and Lack o f Training

Contextual Identification (Phase 4)
Keating (2000) contends “every structure must operate within a context, and in

effect; context provides both constraint and facilitation to the operational structure” (p.
188). In that sense, the contextual and organizational structures of a system have an
inextricable link to each other and this link directly affects the viability functions of the
system. A coherent context allows a well-designed, reliable organizational system
structure that eventually yields properly running system functions.
During the analysis, a rational mixture of holistic and reductive approaches
should be employed to explore the context o f the whole system as well as to identify the
problems precisely (Secilmis, 2012). To that end, Phase 4 is dedicated to identification of
the substantial data reviewing through the references that constitute the contextual
structure o f the problem domain (utilizing the data triangulation process: gather-analyze-
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refine. See Chapter 4.8 for further information). The captured data would support the
assessments which are to be made during the 5th phase (Synthesis and Assessment).

3.6.1

Emergency Management within the Homeland Security Contextual Structure
The evolution o f Emergency Management in the context o f Homeland Security

has moved along with the development o f the Homeland Security concept. Having
already discussed previously, the incorporation of the Emergency Management concept
within the different layers of the Homeland Security system design lacks contextual
coherence with numerous discrepancies. During the evolutional process, the notion and
principles o f Emergency Management have been adapted differently in numerous
documents without epistemological consistency. This course has catalyzed the production
of different terms and definitions, which are mostly used interchangeably.
Particularly, when capstone documents like NIMS, NRF, QHSR, DHS Strategic
Plan, etc. are reviewed comparatively, the take-away is too fuzzy either to appreciate the
exact role o f Emergency Management in the DHS Integrated Strategic Framework or to
make a clear distinction between the contents of the definitions of Emergency
Management and other concepts - Homeland Security, Incident Management, Disaster
Management, Crisis Management, National Preparedness. In a similar vein, the
discussion o f McEntire (2004) underlines this confusion:
Another way to foster the theory is to seek an alternative name for the field
o f emergency management. There are many possibilities being discussed
including disaster management, risk management, sustainable hazards
management or disaster vulnerability management. While it is doubtful

7 DHS Integrated Strategic Framework has been illustrated in DHS Strategic Plan (2012. p. A-3) without including any
explanatory information which would help the interpretation o f this figure. It is contended that this framework
represent an ill-designed system architecture since the logic behind its design plan is blurry and does not match with
facts o f the historical development process o f Homeland Security which have delineated in the relevant documents.
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that the term emergency management will disappear because of its
increased recognition in recent years, scholars should at least make explicit
the drawbacks o f continuing to rely on this name for the discipline, (p. 9)

In the following paragraphs, the concepts o f Homeland Security, Incident
Management, Disaster Management, Crises Management, National Preparedness and
Emergency Management are explored (to elaborate similarities and distinctions to be
considered in the following phase - Synthesis and Assessment). This is completed
through literature review with regard to definitions and major components/phases, since
the Homeland Security theoretical constellations, which constitute the contextual
structure, have been clustered around these overarching concepts.

Homeland Security8
Homeland Security is “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks
within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the
damage and recover from attacks that do occur” (National Strategy for Homeland
Security, 2007, p.3). Homeland security “describes the intersection o f evolving threats
and hazards with traditional governmental and civic responsibilities for civil defense,
emergency response, law enforcement, customs, border control, and immigration”
(Quadrennial Report, 2010, p. viii).

Incident Management9
Incident Management is “the broad spectrum o f activities and organizations
providing effective and efficient operations, coordination, and support applied at all
8 For further information about Homeland Security concept see Chapter 2.2.1.
9 For further information about NIMS see Chapter 2.2.3.
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levels of government” (National Incident Management System, 2008, p. 140). Incident
management "includes measures and activities performed at the national level and
includes crisis and consequence management activities” (Homeland Security, 2005. IV7).
Origination o f NIMS dates back to 2003. On February 28, 2003, Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) - Management o f Domestic Incidents,
directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop and administer a national
incident management system (Fundamentals o f Emergency Management, 2011).
The NIMS framework “sets forth the comprehensive national approach” (National
Incident Management System, 2008, p. 5). “Originally published on March 1, 2004, the
NIMS document was revised in 2008 to reflect contributions from stakeholders and
lessons learned during recent incidents” (National Incident Management System, 2008, p.
4).
Civil Support Operations (2010) defines the NIMS as it “establishes the national
approach for incident management across local, state, and federal levels (All types of
emergencies and disasters generally are known as incidents)” (p. 2-1), while National
Incident Management System (2008) makes a distinction between Emergency
Management and Incident Response:
Emergency management and incident response refer to the broad spectrum of
activities and organizations providing effective and efficient operations,
coordination, and support. Incident management, by distinction, includes
directing specific incident operations; acquiring, coordinating, and delivering
resources to incident sites; and sharing information about the incident with
the public, (p.45)
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Disaster Management
Disaster is “a crisis situation causing wide spread damage which far exceeds our
ability to recover” (Thirunavukarasu, (n.d.)). Disasters “often strike with limited or no
warning, and by definition they result in large-scale death, destruction, and mass hysteria;
they often have long-lasting and large-scale economic, political, and psychological
effects” (Mener, 2007, p. 3). McEntire and Marshall (2003) contend:
Disasters are qualitatively distinct from accidents and emergencies. First
responders are required for small incidents, while their efforts are
supplemented and superceded by those of emergency managers in larger
disasters. Therefore, first responders are not emergency managers,
although they are certainly important participants in emergency
management. Emergency managers, on the other hand, are really disaster
managers, (p. 122)

Regarding the management o f disasters, Thirunavukarasu (n.d.) defines 5 phases
in a disaster management cycle - Disaster phase, Response phase, Recovery/
Rehabilitation phase, Risk Reduction/ Mitigation phase and Preparedness phase. Disaster
Management (Emergency Management) is “the discipline o f dealing with and avoiding
risks, particularly those that have deleterious or catastrophic consequences for
communities, regions, or entire countries” (What is Emergency Management, (n.d)).

Crisis Management
Johansson (2010) discusses Crisis Management in the context o f Emergency
Management: “Crisis Management is normally divided into four main phases; mitigation
(also referred to as prevention), preparedness, response and recovery” (p. 13); while Joint
Publication 3-26 focuses on Crisis Management underlining the significance of Law
Enforcement: “Crisis Management is predominantly a law enforcement response and in
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such cases involves measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use o f resources needed to
anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism under federal law"
(Homeland Security, 2005, IV-8).
The relationship between Crisis Management and Consequence
Management10 has been depicted in Figure 17. The pinnacle of the pyramid
represents the starting point o f the response activity. While the control of the initial
phases is dealt with through Crisis Management, the control of the final phases is
overtaken by the Consequence Management, and Law Enforcement is the most
critical mission at the very beginning o f the response activity.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CRISIS MANAGEMENT
AND CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT

FOLLOW-ON ASSETS TO SUPPORT THE RESPONSE
TO CONSEQUENCES ON LIVES AND PROPERTY

Figure 17

Relationship between Crisis Management and Consequence Management
(Homeland Security, 2005, IV-8)

10 Consequence Management includes the actions required to manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters
and catastrophes. DHS/FEMA has the primary responsibility for coordination o f federal Consequence Management
assistance to state and local governments (Homeland Security, 2005, IV-8, 9).
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National Preparedness
Preparedness “is the range of deliberate critical tasks and activities necessary to
build, sustain, and improve the operational capability to prevent, protect against, respond
to, and recover from domestic incidents” (National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2006,
p. 104). “Within the National Incident Management System, preparedness focuses on the
following elements: planning; procedures and protocols; training and exercises; personnel
qualification and certification; and equipment certification” (National Incident
Management System, 2008, p. 145).
Contextually, 'Preparedness' is usually defined as one of the four historical
mission areas o f Emergency Management; however, as Blanchard (2007) has discussed,
sometimes it has been linked to 'Emergency Preparedness':
The Disaster Relief Act of 1974 described the conditions under which the
President could request assistance for emergencies and disasters. In the
1978, National Governors Association (NGA) issued Emergency
Preparedness Project Final Report, which defined four phases for
Emergency Preparedness - Mitigation, Preparedness, Response and
Recovery, (p. 18)

In 2003, HSPD-8 defined the term "preparedness" as it “refers to the existence of
plans, procedures, policies, training, and equipment necessary at the Federal, State, and
local level to maximize the ability to prevent, respond to, and recover from major events”
(National Preparedness, 2003). The Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-8) dated 2011,
provided a 'National Preparedness' definition which matches with the context of
Emergency Management as well as the Homeland Security domain as an overarching
context:
National Preparedness refers to the actions taken to plan, organize, equip,
train, and exercise to build and sustain the capabilities necessary to prevent,
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protect against, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recover from those
threats that pose the greatest risk to the security o f the Nation. (National
Preparedness, 2011, p. 5)

Emergency Management
An emergency is “a situation featuring one or several abnormal events in the
behavior o f a system, if the system in question cannot be brought back to normal
operation by normal routine procedures only” (Gheorghe, Vamanu, 1996, p. 7).
Emergency is “any incident, whether natural or manmade, that requires responsive action
to protect life or property” (Fundamentals of Emergency Management, 2011, p. 2-13).
“Emergencies take many forms; they can involve any combination o f consequences
stemming from technological and man-made hazards, natural disasters, internal
disturbances, energy and material shortages, and attack” (Comprehensive Emergency
Management, 1979, p. 12).
Baird (2010) contends “the widespread use of'm itigation, preparation, response,
and recovery' to help describe 'Comprehensive Emergency Management'11 is the result
o f work by the National Governors’ Association (NGA) in the late 1970s” (p. 2). The
original NGA description states: “following the establishment of FEMA, the activities
and objectives o f federal, state, and local emergency management activities in the United
States have been based on a ‘comprehensive emergency management model’ divided into
four phases: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery” (Hidek, 2010, p. 210), and
“the federal government acknowledged that emergency management included mitigation,

11 The 'comprehensive' aspect o f Comprehensive Emergency Management (CEM ) includes all four phases o f disaster
or emergency activity: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery, and it applies to all risks: attack, man-made,
and natural, in a federal-state-local partnership (Comprehensive Emergency Management, 1979, p. 11).
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preparedness, response and recovery activities and Emergency management was slowly
being recognized as a profession” (McEntire, (n.d.), p. 12).
In 2006, the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA)
provided the following Emergency Management definition which has been discussed
during this analysis as an important catalyst o f the epistemological problems:
Emergency Management is the governmental function that coordinates and
integrates all activities necessary to build, sustain, and improve the
capability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, or
mitigate against threatened or actual natural disasters, acts o f terrorism, or
other man-made disasters, (p. 1394)

In Fundamentals o f Emergency Management (2011), a FEMA document,
Emergency Management has been defined as “the managerial function charged with
creating the framework within which communities reduce vulnerability to hazards and
cope with disasters. Emergency management key components include;
Prevention/Protection, Preparedness, Mitigation, Response and Recovery” (p. 4.2), while
NEMA has provided the following Emergency Management definition which is
considered synonymous with the Disaster Management:
Emergency management (disaster management) is the discipline o f dealing
with and avoiding risks, particularly those that have deleterious or
catastrophic consequences for communities, regions, or entire countries.
Focus on mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. Effective
emergency management relies on integration o f emergency plans at all levels
o f government and non-government. Activities at each level (individual,
group, community) affect other levels. (What is Emergency Management,
(n.d))

Emergency Management has also been defined within the NRF as an ESF:
Emergency Management (ESF-5), which is one o f the Emergency Support
Functions within the National Response Framework, is responsible for
supporting overall activities o f the Federal Government for domestic incident
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management. It is organized in accordance with the National Incident
Management System (NIMS). (Emergency Support Function 13, 2008, p. 1)

Furthermore, in Fundamentals o f Emergency Management (2011), a
categorization for Emergency Management activities has been included: “there are two
ways to categorize emergency management activities; Emergency management core
functions and Emergency management program functions. Emergency management core
functions are performed during emergencies while Emergency management program
functions continue on a day-to-day basis” (Fundamentals o f Emergency Management,
2011, p. 10-6) (Table 6).

Table 6

Emergency Management Core and Day-to-Day Program Functions
(Fundamentals o f Emergency Management, 2011)

Core Functions

Day-to-Day Program Functions

•

Direction and control

•

Laws and Authorities

•

Information Collection

•

Risk Analysis

and Dissemination

•

Hazard Mitigation

•

C ommunications

•

Resource Management

•

Warning

•

Planning

•

Emergency public

•

Direction, Control, and Coordination

information

•

Communication and Population Warning

Evacuation (or in-place

•

Operations and Procedures

sheltering)

•

Logistics and Facilities

•

Mass care

•

Training

•

Health and medical

•

Exercises, Evaluations, and Corrective Actions

•

Resource management

•

Public Education and Information

•

Finance and Administration

•
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Lastly, Emergency Management has also been considered as an integrated effort,
and a subset of incident management as delineated in the following excerpts:
Emergency Management is the risk-based coordinated and collaborative
integration of all relevant stakeholders into the four phases o f emergency
management (mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery) related to
natural, technological, and intentional hazards. Its framework is both topdown as well as bottom-up - meaning that the theory and practice of
emergency management has been significantly shaped by contributions from
all levels o f government. (Blanchard, 2007. P. 10)

Emergency Management, as subset o f incident management, is the
coordination and integration of all activities necessary to build, sustain, and
improve the capability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover
from, or mitigate against threatened or actual natural disasters, acts of
terrorism, or other manmade disasters. (Bridging the Gap, 2010, p. 106)

3.6.2

Public Safety and Security
'Public Safety and Security', which includes law enforcement, public order, and

physical protection o f critical infrastructures and key assets in urban areas, has always
been the primary focus for leading authorities and security agents during both
ordinary/peacetime or crisis/wartime system states.
In a crisis in a highly populated urban environment (after high scale natural or
man-made disasters), the security agents, on behalf o f the law enforcement authority, are
responsible for preventing panic and chaos, establishing security, maintaining law and
order, and facilitating successful execution of other response/recovery missions. The
police and military usually assume the primary response role to meet the aforementioned
urban security requirements. Other state, public or private local agents are involved in
response missions, when necessary.
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Wigginton (2007) contends “traditionally, the mission of police is to protect life,
prevent crime and maintain order” (p. 14); likewise, the military is supposed to have
similar missions/responsibilities to support the police force by request. Buddelmeyer
(2007) underlines the significant support of the military during Hurricane Katrina: “the
federal military and National Guard response to Hurricane Katrina was both necessary
and exceptional; Katrina demonstrated that no other organization maintains the
manpower, resources, and capabilities necessary to execute large-scale disaster relief like
the military” (p. 25).
In Stability Operations (Joint Publication) (2011), the elements o f a stable state
are introduced as “human security; economic and infrastructure development; governance
and the rule of law” (p. 1-2). Within the framework o f Stability Operations, the end state
conditions include the following (Stability operations, 2008, p. 1-16):
•

A safe and secure environment

•

Established rule of law

•

Social well-being

•

Stable governance

•

A sustainable economy

In a similar way, regarding the rule o f law, the 'Law and Order Operations'
(2011) introduces three categories in terms o f Law and Order measures:
Law and Order measures can be generally aligned within three categories;
law enforcement, physical security, and crime prevention. They are most
effective when conducted in a synchronized and integrated manner,
producing a layered approach to security and Law Enforcement. The intent
o f Law Enforcement, physical security, and crime prevention measures are to
prevent, detect, and respond to crime and criminal activity, (p. 3-7)
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Within the boundaries o f the stability paradigm, it could be postulated that Law
Enforcement, Security and Public Order missions should be considered seriously during
assessments performed to identify Public Safety and Security requirements, since all
these missions have an inextricable link to each other as the security agents usually
perform them in an integrated/interconnected fashion.
Secilmis2 (2012) discusses the significant role that Law Enforcement has in the
continuum of post disaster recovery efforts in the wider context of Homeland Security.
He contends that the lack o f necessary Law Enforcement implementation could aggravate
the crisis environment to chaos or anarchy; therefore, in the state o f a post disaster
environment, decision makers should confirm that they have necessary assets and reliable
law enforcement plans to establish physical security and public order in the disaster area
to assure that other disaster response/recovery efforts can be conducted smoothly.
In a similar way, Bowman (2000) underlines the significance o f the Law
Enforcement: "Law enforcement promotes the rule o f law. The significance o f this cannot
be overestimated. Promoting the rule o f law plays a key role in assuring them that they
will eventually achieve stability" (p. 30).
Having resonated with the anterior discussions, it is assumed that any other
response or recovery missions cannot be accomplished in a post-disaster environment
where the Public Safety and Security mission fails. Considering that it may provide a
wider insight for the discussions in the 5th phase of this analysis (Synthesis and
Assessment), the criticality o f the Public Safety and Security has been highlighted using
the following metaphors depicted in Figure 18:
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•

Metaphor 1
Symbol: Circulatory System o f Human Body.
Intriguing Question: How critical is the circulatory system for the viability
o f other human body systems?

•

Metaphor 2
Symbol: Urban Area Road Network.
Intriguing Question: What is the significance o f a road network for the
continuation o f daily critical routines in an urban area?

•

Metaphor 3
Symbol: Skyscraper.
Intriguing Question: Is it technically possible to construct the upper stories
o f a skyscraper without building the first floor or foundation?

Maintenance
Repair
Medical Treatment
Evacuation
First Aid
First Response (saving lives)
Public Safety and Security

Figure 18

Public Safety and Security Metaphors (Circulatory System, Road
Network, and Skyscraper Construction)
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The following corollary could be postulated to signify these metaphors:
“Considering the execution o f other follow-up response/recovery missions within the
NRF, the Public Safety and Security mission, which directly links to Emergency
Management and Homeland Security, is as critical as the circulatory system in the human
body, as a road network in an urban area, and as building the foundation in a skyscraper
construction.”

Public Safety and Security (Emergency Support Function-13)
In the U.S., Public Safety and Security as a response mission has been designed
within the context of NRF, which stays in the domain of Homeland Security.
As discussed in Chapter 2.2.4; the NRF is “a guide to how the Nation conducts
all-hazards response” (National Response Framework, 2008, p. 1). It establishes “a
comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident response” (FEMA
Pub 1, 2010, p. 12). It “builds upon the NIMS which provides a consistent template for
managing incidents” (p. 1), and it is “comprised o f the core document, the ESFs, Support,
and Incident Annexes, and the Partner Guides” {National Infrastructure Protection Plan,
2009, p. 3). National Response Framework (2008) outlines the function of ESFs:
The ESFs serve as the primary operational-level mechanism to provide
assistance in functional areas such as transportation, communications, public
works and engineering, firefighting, mass care, housing, human services,
public health and medical services, search and rescue, agriculture and natural
resources, and energy, (p. 57)
Amongst these ESFs, ESF-13 (Public Safety and Security) provides “the conduit
for utilizing and incorporating the extensive network of public safety and security
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coordination established for steady-state prevention efforts through a variety of
interagency plans” (Emergency Support Function 13, 2008, p. 2), and it further provides:
A mechanism for coordinating and providing Federal-to-Federal support;
Federal support to State, tribal, and local authorities; and/or support to other
ESFs, consisting o f law enforcement, public safety, and security capabilities
and resources during potential or actual incidents requiring a coordinated
Federal response, (p.l)

3.7

Synthesis and Assessment (Phase 5)
This phase is dedicated to examination and interpretation o f the data obtained

through the previous phases as well as other sources from literature review. The
outcomes o f this phase may include the causes of contextual deficiencies and
discrepancies, and further inputs for the determination of the potential solutions.

3.7.1

Incorporation o f Emergency Management Concept
The Homeland Security enterprise represents an ultra-complex system of systems

that assumes a tough responsibility to ensure the security o f U.S. citizens within the
borders o f the homeland. The findings of the previous chapters have been synthesized
and aggregated in this phase in a chronological order to assess the problem holistically in
the different layers o f the Homeland Security spectrum.
Starting with the Synthesis and Assessment phase, a brief summary o f the
analysis problem is highlighted in Table 7. As discussed in previous chapters, there are
significant setbacks in the contextual evolution of the Homeland Security enterprise,
regarding the incorporation of Emergency Management concept. These are mostly due to
the lack of common understanding o f Emergency Management definition and its
components.
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Table 7

A Brief Summary o f the Analysis Problem

ANALYSIS PROBLEM
T h e i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f t h e E m e r g e n c y M a n a g e m e n t c o n c e p t in t h e
d iffe r e n t la v e r s o f th e c o m p r e h e n s iv e H o m e la n d S e c u r ity s y s t e m

d e s ig n in d ic a te s e p is t e m o lo g ic a l in c o n s is t e n c y .

“What is Emergency Management itself?” has been one of the challenging
questions in this research. Since the principal focus of this analysis has been on the
content o f official capstone documents, the analysis inferences and conclusions would
mostly be based on the data included in those documents. Having this caveat, there is
very limited information in the official documents regarding the definition o f the
Emergency Management concept. This affirms the conclusion of Blanchard (2007):
“there is not an established Emergency Management Doctrine” (p. 3).
Although there are diverse definitions and explanations in the public references,
some auxiliary official documents which use the term Emergency Management
interchangeably with Disaster Management (as in NEM A's definition), Crisis
Management, Risk Management and Incident Management; the capstone official
documents, such as Federal Emergency Management Agency Publication 1 (2010),
Fundamentals o f Emergency Management (Independent Study 230.b. FEMA) (2011) and
National Response Framework (2008) comprise the same definition which refers to Post
Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA) (2006) (see Page 75 for the
PKEMRA definition).
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Regarding the Emergency Management concept, the other type o f information
articulated in the official documents is the historical phases, components or missions of
Emergency Management. While the content of the Emergency Management definition is
mostly consistent in the principal official documents, which refer only to PKEMRA's
definition (although PKEMRA's Emergency Management definition is theoretically
conflicting with the definitional content of Homeland Security as it is elaborated in the
next paragraphs), the phases or components o f Emergency Management have been
discussed diversely in numerous documents, with different sort of elements. Table 8
provides examples o f the confusion about phases/components.
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Table 8

Evolutional Adaption o f the Emergency Management Phases/Components

Comprehensive Emergency Management (CEM)
includes all four phases o f disaster or emergency
activity (CEM, 1979)

•
•
•
•

Mitigation
Preparedness
Response
Recovery

The purpose o f the NRP is to establish a comprehensive,
national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident
management across a spectrum of activities including
(NRP, 2004)

•
•
•
•

Prevention
Preparedness
Response
Recovery

Incident management refers to how incidents are
managed across all Homeland Security activities,
including (National Incident Management System,
2008, p.5)

•
•
•
•
•

Prevention
Protection
Response
Mitigation
Recovery

Key tasks related to the three phases o f effective
response are (National Response Framework, 2008, 27)

•
•
•

Prepare
Respond
Recover

According to PKEMRA, FEMA leads and supports the
Nation in a risk-based, comprehensive emergency
management system o f (FEMA Pub 1, 2010, p. 55)

•
•
•
•
•

Preparedness
Protection
Response
Recovery
Mitigation

For the past 7 years, homeland security has rested on
four key activities oriented principally against the threat
o f terrorism (Quadrennial Report, 2010, p. 14)

•
•
•
•

Prevention
Protection
Response
Recovery

Key components of Emergency Management
(Fundamentals o f Emergency Management, 2011, p. 42)

•
•
•
•
•

Prevention/Protection
Preparedness
Mitigation
Response
Recovery

The national preparedness system shall include a
series o f integrated national planning frameworks,
covering (National Preparedness, 2011, p. 3)

•
•
•
•
•

Prevention
Protection
Mitigation
Response
Recovery
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In order to identify the grass roots causes o f the epistemological problem, the
evolution o f the Emergency Management and Homeland Security concepts should be
scrutinized in chronological order.
The starting point o f the inquiry theoretically leads to the 'Response' mission,
which dates back to 1800s. National Response Framework (2008) elaborates the
discussion:
Response doctrine is rooted in America’s Federal system and the
Constitution’s division o f responsibilities between Federal and State
governments. Because this doctrine reflects the history of emergency
management and the distilled wisdom of responders and leaders at all levels,
it gives elemental form to the Framework, (p. 8)

Fundamentals o f Emergency Management (2011) stated “the role o f the Federal
Government in disaster response has evolved throughout the past 200 years” (p.2-1). “As
disasters have occurred in the United States, policies relating to emergency management
have also been developed” (McEntire, (n.d.), p.l 1). Mener (2007) underlines the role of
federal government in disaster response:
Throughout the 19th century and the early 20th century, disaster response was
handled by the federal government on a case-by-case basis without any
clearly defined system. The vast majority o f incidents were handled by state
and local authorities independent of federal involvement. When federal
disaster management was necessary, the military was the primary coordinator
and source o f manpower, (p. 7)

Lindsay (2010) contends “the approach to disaster relief changed dramatically
from 1950 to 1979, when it transitioned from a largely uncoordinated and decentralized
system o f relief to the current model, which is dominated by the federal government” (p.
21). “After the promulgation o f the Disaster Relief Acts of 1950, the process of
administering disaster relief was further shaped by the Disaster Relief Acts o f 1966,
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1974” (Lindsay, 2010, p.23); and in 1979, “President Jimmy Carter created the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) by executive order and Robert T. Stafford
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Public Law 100-707), was passed in
1988. It was an amended version of the Disaster Relief Act o f 1974” (McEntire, (n.d.), p.
1 2 ).

McEntire (n.d.) noted “in conjunction with Stafford Act, FEMA also established
the Federal Response Plan in 1992 as a way to better coordinate the government’s
reaction to disasters; it included the involvement o f 28 federal agencies as well as the
American Red Cross” (p. 12).
After the 2000s, the two significant milestone events, September 11th and
Hurricane Katrina, seriously influenced the evolution o f both Emergency Management
and Homeland Security. Figure 19 depicts these milestone events and key elements o f the
evolutional process o f Homeland Security to provide a holistic view.
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Key Elements of Homeland Security Evolution Process12

Pre-2001 Period
For the pre-2001 period, it is assumed that there was a common agreement for the
definition and phases o f Emergency Management, which referred to the guide o f National
Governors’ Association. In the A Governor’s Guide' which dated 1979, Comprehensive
Emergency Management (CEM) was defined addressing the state’s responsibility and
capability for managing all types o f emergencies and disasters by coordinating the actions

12 Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPD) could also be included in this context. NRF (2012) box with the
dotted line represents the working draft document.
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of numerous agencies. The “comprehensive” aspect of CEM included all four phases13 of
disaster or emergency activity - mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery.

Period between 2001 and 2005
After the September 11 terrorist acts, DHS was established in 2002, and the
National Strategy for Homeland Security (2002) identified three strategic objectives of
Homeland Security, in order o f priority and six critical mission areas:
The Strategic Objectives of Homeland Security:
•

To prevent terrorist attacks within the United States;

•

To reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism;

•

To minimize the damage and recover from attacks those do occur.

Homeland Security Critical Mission Areas:
•

Intelligence and warning,

•

Border and transportation security,

•

Domestic counterterrorism,

•

Protecting critical infrastructure and key assets,

•

Defending against catastrophic terrorism,

•

Emergency preparedness and response.

From a holistic perspective, while no direct reference has been attributed to the
Emergency Management concept in the National Strategy fo r Homeland Security (2002),
13 "Following the establishment o f FEMA, the activities and objectives o f federal, state, and local emergency
management activities in the United States have been based on a ‘comprehensive emergency management m odel’
divided into four p h a s e s- MPRR” (Hidek, 2010, p. 210). “The widespread use o f “mitigation, preparation, response,
and recovery” to help describe 'Comprehensive Emergency M anagement' is the result o f work by the National
Governors’ Association (NGA) in the late 1970s” (Baird, 2010. p. 2).
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the three strategic objectives and six Homeland Security critical mission areas are based
on the principals o f four phases of Comprehensive Emergency Management (CEM)
defined by the National Governors’ Association. However, the focus o f the strategy has
been on terrorism as it is traced in its Homeland Security definition: “Homeland Security
is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce
America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks
that do occur” (National Strategy for Homeland Security, 2002, p. 2).
During this period, Homeland Security and Emergency Management have been
defined as an 'incident management discipline' by the National Response Plan (2004):
The NRP incorporates best practices and procedures from various incident
management disciplines - homeland security, emergency management,
law enforcement, firefighting, hazardous materials response, public
works, public health, emergency medical services, and responder and
recovery worker health and safety - and integrates them into a unified
coordinating structure, (p. 2)

Post-2005 Period
After Hurricane Katrina, which was one o f the nation’s most destructive natural
disasters, the evolution of the Homeland Security and Emergency Management concepts
sailed towards a fuzzier context, creating some more epistemological problems. In 2006,
the PKEMRA14 provided a contentious Emergency Management definition. The
PKEMRA's definition aimed to mark the boundaries of Emergency Management in
principle. However, since its content articulated an overarching concept addressing a
broad mission spectrum, the new terminology theoretically could conflict with the

14 Nelson, Bodurian and McEvoy (2010) has contended "‘this legislation restored some of the agency’s autonomy by
reclassifying FEMA as a “distinct entity” within DHS. like the U.S. Coast Guard and Secret Service, and by prohibiting
the transfer o f FEMA resources to other DHS components” (p. 1).

domain o f the Homeland Security, which was supposed to have the higher structural
context.
Following PKEMRA, one year later, the National Strategy fo r Homeland Security
(2007) kept up the same focus on terrorism as the Strategy o f 2002 but also suggested a
common framework by which the American nation should focus on the four goals to
guide, organize, and unify the Homeland Security efforts (p. 1):
•

Prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks;

•

Protect the American people, our critical infrastructure, and key resources;

•

Respond to and recover from incidents that do occur; and

•

Continue to strengthen the foundation to ensure our long-term success.

The Strategy o f 2007 made no direct reference to the Emergency Management
concept, as did the Strategy of 2002. However, the four goals in the Strategy of 2007
were built in the light of four traditional phases of Emergency Management.
The National Infrastructure Protection Plans (NIPP) of 2006 and 2009 included
almost no detail about the Emergency Management concept, with one exception; NIPP
(2006) referred to the National Response Plan of 2004 which had defined Homeland
Security and Emergency Management as an 'incident management discipline.'
This was not the case for the NIMS and NRF, which were issued in 2008. These
documents brought more epistemological inconsistency to the existing problem domain,
although both adopted the same Emergency Management definition o f PKEMRA (2006).
Furthermore, NIMS (2008) provided another confusing interpretation, adapting the four
traditional Emergency Management phases as the 'Homeland Security activities':
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NIMS uses a systematic approach to integrate the best existing processes
and methods into a unified national framework for incident management.
Incident management refers to how incidents are managed across all
homeland security activities, including prevention, protection, and
response, mitigation, and recovery. (National Incident Management
System, 2008, p. 5)

The new taxonomy o f Homeland Security activities in the NIMS (2008) literally
excluded the 'preparedness' phase o f traditional Emergency Management, but adding
prevention' and 'protection.' Moreover, the brand new 'three phases o f effective
response' taxonomy o f the NRF (2008), which was the contemporary o f the NIMS
(2008), blurred the context a little more: “Key tasks related to the three phases of
effective response are prepare, respond, and recover” (National Response Framework,
2008, 27).
In addition, the NIMS (2008) highlighted the need for focusing on improving
Emergency Management, incident response capabilities, and coordination processes
across the country due to the September 11 terrorist attacks and the 2004 and 2005
hurricane seasons; but the NRF (2008) incorporated Emergency Management as if it was
only a part o f ESFs within the NRF, although the definition o f Emergency Management
in the same document (NRF) linked to PKEMRA definition which was requesting more
than that.
In the following years, the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR)
(2010) provided an extensive definition of Homeland Security which expanded its
boundaries in comparison with the one defined in the National Strategy for Homeland
Security o f 2002 and 2007, putting a provident distance between its primary
responsibilities and Emergency Management: “ ...In other areas, such as critical
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infrastructure protection or emergency management, the Department’s role is largely one
o f leadership and stewardship on behalf of those who have the capabilities to get the job
done” (p.iii).
QHSR (2010) also stated “for the past 7 years, homeland security has rested on
four key activities— prevention, protection, response, and recovery— oriented principally
against the threat o f terrorism” (p. 14), and delineated the new homeland security
missions:
1. Preventing terrorism and enhancing security;
2. Securing and managing our borders;
3. Enforcing and administering our immigration laws;
4. Safeguarding and securing cyberspace; and
5. Ensuring resilience to disasters.

Although the four key activities and the design of the missions in QHSR are
similar to the foundational roots o f Emergency Management, it directs the Emergency
Management focus only to the 5th mission (Ensuring resilience to disasters) underlining
the resiliency requirement to disasters:
The strategic aims and objectives for this mission are grounded in the four
traditional elements o f emergency management: hazard mitigation,
enhanced preparedness, effective emergency response, and rapid recovery.
Together, these elements create the resilience to disasters so necessary to
the functioning and prosperity o f this Nation, (p.31)

While QHSR directed the Emergency Management focus only to the 5th mission
and particularly referred to four traditional elements o f Emergency Management: hazard
mitigation, enhanced preparedness, effective emergency response, and rapid recovery, the
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capstone document o f FEMA, Publication 1 (2010), contextually linked to the broader
PKEMRA Emergency Management definition and five core missions o f preparedness,
protection, response, recovery, and mitigation: “According to PKEMRA, FEMA leads
and supports the Nation in a risk-based, comprehensive emergency management system
of preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and mitigation” (FEMA Pub 1, 2010, p.
55).
Fundamentals o f Emergency Management (2011), which is the FEM A's
Independent Study 230.b., suggests five key Emergency Management components15 that
include 'prevention', similar to what FEMA Publication 1 (2010) described before.
Meanwhile, the FEMA Strategic Plan (2011) heads towards the shores o f QHSR, which
has a different perspective than Fundamentals o f Emergency Management (2011), and
FEMA Publication I (2010).
In March 2011, the Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-8) 'National
Preparedness' was issued with a revolutionary agenda and scope:
The directive has aimed at strengthening the security and resilience o f the
United States through systematic preparation for the threats that pose the
greatest risk to the security of the Nation, including acts of terrorism, cyber
attacks, pandemics, and catastrophic natural disasters. (National
Preparedness, 2011, p. 1)

Although PPD-8 (2011) included early inferences and similar epistemologically
inconsistent perspective regarding the incorporation o f the Emergency Management
concept within the architecture o f the Homeland Security enterprise, it delivered
significant Presidential Guidance, which has links to primary focus o f this dissertation
analysis:
15 Emergency management key components include: Prevention/Protection Preparedness Mitigation Response
Recovery (Fundamentals o f Emergency Management, 2011, p. 4-2).

95

This directive shall be implemented consistent with relevant authorities,
including the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act o f 2006
and its assignment o f responsibilities with respect to the Administrator of
the Federal Emergency Management Agency, (p. 5)
The term "national preparedness" refers to the actions taken to plan,
organize, equip, train, and exercise to build and sustain the capabilities
necessary to prevent, protect against, mitigate the effects of, respond to,
and recover from those threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of
the Nation, (p. 5)
The national preparedness system shall include a series of integrated
national planning frameworks, covering prevention, protection, mitigation,
response, and recovery, and the frameworks shall be coordinated under a
unified system with a common terminology and approach, built around
basic plans that support the all-hazards approach to preparedness and
functional or incident annexes to describe any unique requirements for
particular threats or scenarios, as needed, (p. 3)

In February 2012, DHS issued its strategic plan which covered the fiscal years
2012-2016. The DHS Strategic Plan (2012) had been built on the design o f the QHSR
(2010), although the PPD-8 (National Preparedness) was promulgated in March 2011
with a different mindset. The DHS Strategic Plan also included a DHS Integrated
Strategic Framework' (p. A-3) without any explanatory information. Although the
framework provided a figurative holistic system representation, it was too fuzzy to clarify
the role o f Emergency Management and other functions/missions within Homeland
Security in accordance with what the previous documents delineated before.
Finally, towards the end of this research, the working draft o f 2012 NRF was still
being staffed for approval. In one of the significant changes in this draft, the name o f the
ESF-5, which was 'Emergency Management' in 2008 NRF, was changed to 'Information
and Planning' without any rationale to clarify how this framework incorporates the
Emergency Management concept. Also, additional tables of 'core critical capabilities'
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and critical tasks' have been added to draft, which could add more confusion. The
following quote provides an insight about the design perspective o f this framework:
The NRF is one element of the National Preparedness System mandated by
PPD-8. The NRF describes how the Nation prepares to deliver the core
capabilities established in the National Preparedness Goal for the Response
mission area. The other mission areas defined by PPD-8 have corresponding
frameworks that explain how the core capabilities established for those
mission areas are delivered. (NRF - Working Draft, 2012, p. 46)

In conclusion, regarding the incorporation o f the Emergency Management
concept within the Homeland Security contextual structure, the following deductions
could be posited:
•

Considering the whole context, it could be inferred that the September 11
(2001) terrorist attacks and Hurricane Katrina (2005) disaster are the
milestone events which framed the evolutionary process o f Homeland
Security, as well as Emergency Management.

•

Before 2001, there is an overall consensus on the system o f interest context,
which links to the guide o f National Governors’ Association (1979).

•

Between 2001 and 2005, although there is no specific reference to the
Emergency Management concept in the official capstone documents, the
conceptual design o f the Homeland Security (particularly the objectives and
critical mission areas), which were established after 2002, were founded on
the principles o f Emergency Management.

•

After 2005, the PKEMRA's Emergency Management definition (2006)
added to the epistemological hurdle within the overall contextual
architecture. Although the PKEMRA's definition has aimed only to mark the
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boundaries o f Emergency Management in principle, its theoretical influence
zone covered the domain of the Homeland Security, which is supposed to
have the higher structural context.
•

While the major theoretical conflict between Homeland Security and
Emergency Management at the highest level distracted the whole system
design, the divergent interpretation of the Emergency Management concept
adopted within numerous Homeland Security key documents (like NIPP,
NRF, NIMS, QHSR, FEMA Strategic Plan, PDD-8, etc.) has created an
entangled ball o f string.

•

Although the National Preparedness (PPD-8) (2011) aimed to create an
architecture based on a coordinated and unified system with a common
terminology and approach, its content (when examined holistically in terms
of definitions and components/phases o f key concepts) is epistemologically
inconsistent and fuzzy; and the recent working draft o f National Response
Framework (2012) is poised to be a major contributor to the existing
epistemological complicity.

3.7.2

Public Safety and Security
The challenging aspects o f the urban environment and emergent characteristics o f

diverse threats/hazards have been elaborated in Chapter 2.1 as they are the major
components o f the modem security paradigm. Today, we are more likely to live in an
environment that is:
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•

Associated with densely populated urban areas, and more complexities
representing different social, political and economic tensions,

•

Dominated by emergent threats, which impose a broad spectrum o f
challenges that have ambiguous traits.

In a crisis system state, just after a catastrophic disaster like an earthquake or
hurricane, what is called post disaster environment, the overall situation immediately gets
more complicated with the involvement of numerous diverse interactions between the
system elements. Deductive logic tells us that the characteristics o f the security
requirement will be more challenging because it would not be easy to deal with the post
disaster urban environment where the following characteristics dominate:
•

Lack o f power and other supplies

•

Lack o f communication

•

Disorder

•

Emergency

•

Potential Threats

•

Complexity

•

Uncertainty

•

Poor coordination

In the post-disaster urban environment, the Public Safety and Security function,
including Law Enforcement, assumes a vital role for the facilitation o f other follow-up
disaster response/recovery activities in the wider scope o f the Emergency Management
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(Secilmis2, 2012). All disaster response/recovery activities, such as first response (saving
lives), first aid and medical treatment, law enforcement, public order and security,
evacuation, maintenance, repair, etc. should be executed coherently in a relatively secure
and stable system state using a synchronized planning methodology. However, there is
always high probability for having the states o f crises ranging from the least to most, like
'chaos' or 'anarchy.'
In this demanding conjuncture, Homeland Security describes “the intersection of
evolving threats and hazards with traditional governmental and civic responsibilities for
civil defense, emergency response, law enforcement, customs, border control, and
immigration” (Quadrennial Report, 2010, p.viii). In the overarching domain o f Homeland
Security, the Public Safety and Security (ESF-13) which has been built within the context
o f NRF provides “a mechanism for coordinating and providing support; consisting o f law
enforcement, public safety, and security capabilities and resources during potential or
actual incidents requiring a coordinated Federal response” (Emergency Support Function
#13,2008, p. 1).
Public Safety and Security (ESF-13) provides “the conduit for utilizing and
incorporating the extensive network of public safety and security coordination established
for steady-state prevention efforts through a variety o f interagency plans. Prevention and
security plans include, but are not limited to, the following” (Emergency Support
Function #13, 2008, p. 2):
•

National Infrastructure Protection Plan

•

Sector-Specific Plans

•

The National Strategy for Maritime Transportation Security
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•

Area Maritime Security Plans

•

Vessel and Facility Security Plans

Finally, as underlined in the metaphors, the Public Safety and Security mission is
highly critical. Lack o f security on the scene could aggravate the crisis environment,
letting it degrade to chaos or anarchy; in other words, other response or recovery
missions cannot be accomplished in a post-disaster environment where the Public Safety
and Security mission fails. In this sense, the lessons learned from Flurricane Katrina,
which have been elaborated in Chapter 2.3, provide valuable insights to explore the
discussion on the extent o f Public Safety and Security, and underpin how any lack of
security and law enforcement missions could severely impact the post-disaster
response/recovery activities.

3.8

Conclusions16 (Phase 6)
There is a long history of outstanding achievements and great experiences in the

U.S. regarding Homeland Security. As the Quadrennial Report (2010) states: “Homeland
security draws on the rich history, proud traditions, and lessons learned from these
historical functions to fulfill new responsibilities that require the engagement o f the entire
homeland security enterprise and multiple Federal departments and agencies” (p. 14).
The established rules and experiences gained during the disaster response' endeavors
have been evolved throughout the past 200 years. Due to the evolution o f threats and
hazards, the disaster relief efforts were finally institutionalized in the Federal level with
the establishment o f FEMA in 1979. It was during this period that “the federal
16 The recommendations pertinent to this analysis have been excluded from this chapter to be included in Chapter 5.
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government acknowledged that Emergency Management included mitigation,
preparedness, response and recovery activities and Emergency Management was slowly
being recognized as a profession” (McEntire, (n.d.), p. 12).
Although it faced many challenges during its first years from 1979-2000s,
“FEMA developed the Integrated Emergency Management System, an all-hazards
approach based on preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation, which provided
direction, control, and warning systems common to the full range o f emergencies from
small, isolated events to the ultimate emergency - war” (FEMA Pub 1, 2010, p. 15), and
a number o f major reforms were initiated to streamline disaster relief and recovery
operations.
From the 2000s up until now, the U.S. experienced two major milestone events
that played a critical role on the evolution o f U.S. Emergency Management concept. The
first event was the September 11 terrorist attack which led the foundation o f a brand new
organization, DHS that would be responsible for security against terrorist acts. In 2003,
FEMA was subsumed by DHS, while DHS kept its strategic focus on the threats
emerging from the terrorist acts. The second event was Hurricane Katrina in 2005. After
this devastating disaster, the 2006 PKEMRA was issued, including an Emergency
Management definition and follow-up adjustments, which provided a broad spectrum for
the maneuver o f Emergency Management related concepts and activities. During this
time, the Homeland Security mission was leaded by DHS in an overarching role that was
supposed to integrate and coordinate all efforts and activities.
In this sense, nobody can underestimate the vigorous initiatives, and devoted
efforts o f the U.S. to sustain a high level o f resiliency and preparedness against all type o f
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threats. However, from a holistic perspective, the Homeland Security contextual system
design has serious discrepancies in terms of the incorporation of the Emergency
Management definition and basic components/phases, as delineated in Chapter 3.7.1.
Further, these discrepancies have the potential to hinder the expected overall coordination
and coherence o f the whole system architecture, which has numerous entities, missions
and functions.
As Blanchard (2007) contends: “There is not an established Emergency
Management Doctrine” (p. 3), which has been synthesized and well-defined particularly
for the period after 2001 up until now. Moreover, during the evolution o f Homeland
Security, the adaption/interpretation o f the definition and historical phases/components of
the Emergency Management by different concepts in a different way has turned the
overall contextual architecture into an enigma17 which indicates epistemologically illdesigned features.
In addition to the epistemological problems delineated in the analysis, the
Homeland Security contextual system structure Iso suffers ffom the lack o f holistic and
reliable graphic/figurative system representations in a top-down approach, which is
critical for the situational awareness

I ft

o f system stakeholders. Although there is a single

example o f holistic representation - DHS Integrated Strategic Framework - in the DHS
Strategic Plan (2012, p. A-3), it is not clear enough to appreciate the incorporation of

17 Regarding the causes o f some part o f contextual problems, Hidek’s (2010) excerpt highlights the potential impacts o f
disconnected, uncoordinated studies “...layers o f statutes have been built upon existing guidelines without modifying
previous statutes or reassessing the assumptions upon which they rest” (p. 253).
Situational awareness is a cognitive state that reflects the current, real-time understanding o f an environment and its
relation to pertinent goals (Gap Assessment Report, 2010, p. 3-12).
18 Situational awareness is a cognitive state that reflects the current, real-time understanding o f an environment and its
relation to pertinent goals (Gap Assessment Report, 2010, p. 3-12).
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Emergency Management concept within the system framework in line with the discipline
that consistently resonates with the historical evolution o f Homeland Security as it has
been articulated in the former references. Furthermore, there is no explanatory
information associated with this annex, and it is contended that the missions, functions,
priorities, etc. illustrated in this figure (in the context of Homeland Security) have been
intermingled in a fuzzy logic.
Considering the whole problem domain, it has also been concluded that there are
two major driving factors which have caused the existing context to be fuzzier and
epistemologically more inconsistent:
•

Evolving state of security environment which is being driven by challenging
urban area characteristics and emergent nature o f threats/hazards.

•

The bulky scope o f the Homeland Security enterprise.

The integration o f impacts comprises a complex cluster of interactions between a
vast number of interconnected, interdependent and independent elements, which should
be the entities, functions, missions, goals, contexts, structures, etc. The potential for
'overwhelming complexity' emerges as the most significant challenge for the context
development and management processes, which should be dealt with seriously.
Regarding the post-disaster security centric focus, security and law enforcement
plays a critical role for the facilitation o f other follow-up disaster response/recovery
activities in the post-disaster urban environment. In the U.S. Homeland Security system
architecture, the Public Safety and Security mission has been designed as an Emergency
Support Function' within the NRF. However, the design mindset o f this function in the
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NRF is incompetent, and the instructions and guidelines provided in the existing Public
Safety and Security (ESF-13) annex do not include necessary details, particularly in
terms o f interaction with the other ESFs, which would support the accomplishment o f
security missions in severe conditions like catastrophic post-disaster periods.
Although the criticality and vulnerability assessment of critical assets in an urban
area (including critical infrastructures, facilities, state/public/private properties, etc.) has a
significant impact on the post-disaster security planning process, there is no model in
practice that provides an urban area critical asset prioritization methodology that
specifically addresses the post-disaster urban security unique characteristics.
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CHAPTER 4
POST-DISASTER SECURITY INDEX (PDSI) MODEL

4.1

Introduction
The Public Safety and Security function within the NRF plays a significant role

for the execution other response/recovery missions under the overarching architecture of
the Homeland Security enterprise. The NRF associated with NIMS and NIPP sets the
policies/procedures and concepts o f operations for the Public Safety and Security
function, including the security o f critical infrastructure and key resources. However,
post-disaster security requirements are lacking and open to the incorporation o f new
mindsets and innovative approaches.
A significant part o f the existing knowledge about urban area security (mostly the
security related perspectives of the military doctrines) stays within the concept o f Urban
Area Operations. However, there is limited information (tactical level direction and
guidance, criteria sets, techniques, methodology, etc.) in the military literature about how
security agents should improve security plans to cope with the challenges, such as crisis
in the post-disaster environment. In brief, decision making and prioritization
requirements for force tailoring, unit positioning, identification of appropriate security
operations techniques, etc. for a tactical unit that would be responsible for maintaining
the security o f an urban area in a post-disaster environment has not been elaborated
categorically in the literature.
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4.2

Requirement for Better Planning and Coordination
From the Homeland Security perspective, there are two major target audiences in

the existing security paradigm: people and assets. Within the NRF, the ESF-13 (Public
Safety and Security) was designed to ensure the security and protection o f both
audiences. In a post-disaster urban environment, the Police are the first echelon/tier
responsible authority (to be supported by military and civilian security agents as
necessary) for the coordination and execution of the Public Safety and Security mission.
The NIPP (2009) is a critical initiative, which aims to provide the “unifying structure for
the integration” (p. 1) o f efforts to protect the critical infrastructures and key resources.
It is assumed that the requirement for security, law enforcement and public order
in terms o f the Public Safety and Security exponentially increases in the post-disaster
urban environment, and excessive numbers of troop deployment are likely, as was the
case during Hurricane Katrina in 2005. To accomplish the Public Safety and Security
mission in a post-disaster urban environment, a successful security planning process
should be completed in advance. During this planning process, the security assessments
(vulnerability assessments and prioritization) for critical assets in a jurisdiction become
important, since they would be required during any decision making process on the
selection o f optimal courses o f actions for the security operations requirements, such as
force tailoring, unit positioning, identification o f appropriate security operations
techniques, etc.
The assessment data provided through this process is also critical for both internal
and external coordination requirements, as coordination activities play a crucial role in
synchronous operations. In that vein, the Public Safety and Security operations will
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require similar coordination activities in the post-disaster environment. To underline the
significance o f this coordination requirement between Homeland Security stakeholders,
the dramatic difference between the military capability requirements in typical and
catastrophic incidents is depicted in Figure 20. The figure implies that support troops
deployed from adjacent regions or other locations in great numbers should be oriented by
the local troops and pertinent authorities, and this means that an effective and
comprehensive coordination effort will be required to achieve success during the security
operations.
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Additionally, the National Guard response to Hurricane Katrina in terms o f troop
numbers in Figure 21 provides a spectacular illustration o f how massive a response
support troop deployment can be in a disaster area.
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National Guard Response to Hurricane Katrina19 (Wombwell, 2009, p. 70)

After Hurricane Katrina, due to the severe impact o f the storm and the lack o f
effective preparedness (mostly lack of pre-coordination o f common supporting
methodologies and advance exchange o f necessary information), the execution o f the
Public Safety and Security missions failed early and further deteriorated the execution of
other response and recovery missions in a domino effect. The following quotes highlight
these facts:

19 When Hurricane Katrina hit, almost 6,000 National Guardsmen were on state active duty in Louisiana. Three days
later, the number of Guardsmen in Louisiana doubled to more than 12,000 (Wombwell, 2009, p. 70).
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Although the process successfully deployed a large number o f National
Guard troops, it did not proceed efficiently, or according to any pre
existing plan or process. There was, in fact, no established process for the
large-scale, nation-wide deployment o f National Guard troops for civil
support. (Committee, 2006, p. 10)
While the military clearly provided vital support, no one had the total
picture o f the situation on the ground, the capabilities that were on the
way, the missions that had been resourced, and the missions that still
needed to be completed. (Pickup, 2006, p.3)
One thousand FEMA employees set to arrive in New Orleans on
Wednesday, August 31, but turned back due to security concerns. (Select
Bipartisan Committee, 2006, p. 249)

The security landscape o f the post-disaster urban environment is exemplified by
Hurricane Katrina in this dissertation, since it provided a plentiful number o f lessons
learned. However, as the discussion expands with different cases, the post-disaster
security requirements still have much room for improvement. In addition, existing Public
Safety and Security planning methodologies should be supported by different
tools/models to provide more precise solutions for the security and coordination
requirements.
New vulnerability assessment and prioritization models, which would process
multiple criteria and different systems state variables for the critical assets, and produce
generalizable indices for decision making requirements, should be developed to support
the post-disaster security planning processes that theoretically should address the worstcase scenarios o f the fuzzy post-disaster environment. This type o f model would fully
support the tactical level security agents in decision making and planning processes
regarding force tailoring, unit positioning, identification o f appropriate security
operations techniques, etc. in the context o f post-disaster security operations.

I ll
4.3

Existing Security Planning Practices
Before exploring the existing security planning considerations, the tactical aspects

o f the current security operations concept should be captured. To that end, Security
Operations have been outlined at Appendix B. The protection of the population and
critical assets is the top priority in post-disaster urban area security operations. There are
different techniques available to security agents, as discussed at Appendix B. Four of
these techniques - Patrol, Guard, 'Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance' (ISR)
and Response/Reaction Force - have primary roles in security operations. The concept of
security operations is practically based on the execution o f these techniques by troops
assigned to area o f responsibility. To elucidate the existing practice o f security operations
planning and execution, the following questions could be articulated:
•

What are the methodologies being used to develop post-disaster
security plans for urban areas?

•

What kind o f criteria is being utilized in these methodologies?

•

Specifically, how are the force tailoring20 and unit positioning21
decisions being made to allocate the optimal numbers o f troops for the
execution o f security operations techniques (Patrol, Guard,
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance' (ISR) and
Response/Reaction Force, etc.)?

20 Force tailoring refers to the process o f determining and deploying the right mix o f capabilities to support the force or
mission. During Urban Operations, the sustainment commander can tailor the support element required to accomplish a
specific mission or task, thereby mitigating the risk associated with deploying a larger, more robust capability package
forward into the urban area (Urban operations, 2006, p. 10-7).
21 Unit positioning/Deployment refers to the positioning o f forces into a formation for battle (DoD Dictionary o f
Military and Associated Terms, 2010, p. 105). Factors affecting base and unit positioning include the implications o f
the current threat assessment, the suitability and survivability o f available facilities, and the subordinate unit mission
requirements. Component commanders and their staffs should use these factors and their own risk assessments to
determine whether units should be dispersed or grouped together for mutual support (Joint Security Operations in
Theater, 2010, p. 111-18).
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Based on the information provided through literature review and interviews with
the subject matter experts, the common approach to develop a security plan for an urban
area hinges on the identification of critical assets within the area of responsibility, and
follow-up criticality and vulnerability/threat assessments. Through various criticality and
vulnerability/threat assessment methodologies, the decision makers can provide some
security requirement parameters for each critical asset, and eventually a decision making
process supported by different prioritization approaches could be executed for the
organization and deployment o f the available troops in term o f force tailoring' and 'unit
positioning'. Finally, with the identification o f security operations techniques to be
executed by the deployed troops in area o f operation, the overall planning process is
roughly completed.
As it has been stated in Police Intelligence Operations (2010), “there are
numerous tools available to assess the criticality and vulnerability o f a particular asset,
and each o f these tools has unique inherent strengths and weaknesses” (p. 5-17).
However, there is no methodology or technique in place yet to provide a comprehensive
approach that incorporates the complex characteristics of the post-disaster urban
environment and diverse threat spectrum into its process design.
The argument can be traced through the NIPP as well as other tools available for
the Police and Military. The Emergency Services Sector-Specific Plan (SSP)22 that is a
part of the NIPP provides a sophisticated assessment and prioritization tool to address
critical infrastructure protection. “The cornerstone o f the NIPP is its risk analysis and

22 The Emergency Services Sector-Specific Plan (ES SSP) is an annex to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan
(NIPP) and addresses efforts to improve protection o f the ESS in an all-hazards environment (p. i). The ES SSP, in
conjunction with the NIPP, provides the unifying Federal structure for the integration o f Emergency Services Sector
(ESS) critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) protection efforts into a single national program (Emergency
Services Sector-Specific Plan, 2010, p. v).
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management framework (Figure 22) that establishes the processes for combining
consequence, vulnerability, and threat information to produce assessments o f national or
sector risk” (National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2009, p. 2).

Continuous improvement to enhance protection of C1KR

Figure 22

NIPP Risk Management Framework (National Infrastructure Protection
Plan, 2009)

In this framework, the base element for the vulnerability component is the
Enhanced Critical Infrastructure Protection (ECIP)23 security survey, which resides in the
Infrastructure Survey Tool (1ST)24 and utilizes the approved DHS Infrastructure
Protection vulnerability methodology (Emergency Services Sector-Specific Plan, 2010).
However, although the NIPP Risk Analysis and Management Framework and the other
tools used in the ECIP program may provide outstanding capabilities for resource
allocation decision processes, the employment o f these tools to support the tactical level
security planning processes is unlikely, since they do not adequately address the post-

23 The Enhanced Critical Infrastructure Protection (ECIP) program is designed to assess risks to fixed facilities to
compare - with risks to like facilities (Emergency Services Sector-Specific Plan, 2010, p. ii).
24 The Infrastructure Survey Tool (1ST) provides asset or facility based information from a wide range o f CIK.R
facilities, such as commercial buildings, electrical substations, and dams (p. 5). It has more than 1500 variables
covering 6 major components and 42 subcomponents (Fisher, Buehring, Bassett, Dickinson, Haffenden, Klett, and
Lawlor, 2009, p. 9).
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disaster aspects o f the security paradigm from a perspective o f security concept of
operations as discussed in Appendix B.
In police security operations, the primary focus is on the practice of patrolling',
which has a broad spectrum consisting o f different types. The methodology for the
development o f patrol plans is usually shaped with inputs provided through numerous
computer-based software applications that allow a wide range of applicable data to be
overlaid, including demographic data, industrial hazard areas, sensitive assets, key traffic
routes and congestion points, existing patrol and police station operational boundaries.
They also allow security agents to overlay crime and incident data on a digital map o f the
Area o f Operations (AO) as it is elaborated in Law and Order Operations (2011).
While existing planning approaches for patrol planning supported by
aforementioned computer-based software applications enable security agents to enhance
the security measures to some extent, they would not be sufficient to support the
development o f comprehensive security plans that integrate the execution o f other
necessary security operation techniques besides patrolling. Also, since existing methods
mostly rely on historical crime data

without incorporating the ambient tensions and

variables specific to each critical asset, the outcomes of plans developed through these
methods would likely not be resilient enough to tackle the complexities o f post-disaster
urban environment.

25 This data comes from historical records o f criminal and other police and security-related activity, demographic data
for the jurisdiction in question, seasonal and other cyclical events or activities, and areas o f specific command emphasis
(Law and Order Operations, 2011, p. 2-22).
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In the context o f the military security concept of operations; while patrol
planning26 has similar established practices like the police security operations, the
security paradigm is usually managed through the principles o f Military Decision Making
Process (MDMP)27 as it is a common approach applied for all military actions which
requires the commander's decision at the appropriate level. However, there is also limited
discussion in the military literature

-JO

regarding the identification of force tailoring and

unit positioning requirements o f the troops to be deployed in the post-disaster urban area.
For these particular requirements, military references usually advice general approaches
and techniques without providing specified direction and guidance, criteria sets, etc. as
outlined in Appendix C. To deliver precise outputs, these approaches and techniques
require elaboration thorough the decision making processes which relies on the decision
makers' vision and personal capability.
In addition to primary approaches/methodologies employed within the context of
■JQ

the military decision making process (like METT-TC, OAKOC, IPB)

[see Appendix C

26 Patrol areas and patrol distribution are methods used by Law Enforcement agencies to divide a jurisdictional area
into manageable and organized subordinate areas for Law Enforcement personnel to conduct operations. Patrol
distribution must consider, at a minimum, the following factors (Law and Order Operations, 2011, p. 2-22);
• Crime and complaint histories for the AO.
• Geography and characteristics o f the AO, including;
- Population and critical resource densities across the AO.
- Obstacles and number o f ingress or egress routes.
• Minimum response requirements.
• Manpower and mission requirements, including personnel available and mission loads.
27 The military decision making process (MDMP) is an iterative planning methodology to understand the situation and
mission, develop a course o f action, and produce an operation plan or o rd er. The military decision making process
integrates the activities o f the commander, staff, subordinate headquarters, and unified action partners to understand the
situation and mission; develop and compare courses o f action; decide on a course o f action that best accomplishes the
mission; and produce an operation plan or order for execution (The Operations Process, 2012, p. 2-11). Theoretically,
decision making process (and the mission analysis within the decision making process algorithm) begins with the
receipt of the mission and it is usually followed by the risk/threat/hazard assessment.
28 The scope of the military literature research is limited to U.S. military literature.
29 M ETT-TC: Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Weather, Troops and Support Available, Time Available, Civil
Considerations.
OAKOC: Observation and Fields o f Fire. Avenues o f Approach, Key Terrain, Obstacles, and Cover and
Concealment.
IPB: Intelligence Preparation o f the Battlefield.
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for further information excerpted from Urban Operations (2006)], the MSHARPP30 and
CARVER31 assessment techniques provide relatively advanced toolsets for the security
planners as they are elaborated in Antiterrorism (2011). However, since both focus on
terrorist threats, and their concept frameworks have not been designed to address the
complex characteristics o f the post-disaster urban areas, the use of those tools would not
meet the post-disaster security planning requirements.

4.4

Conceptual Background of the PDSI Model
The concept design o f the PDSI Model is derived from a combination of the

epistemological perspective o f modeling, Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM),
systems thinking and relevant aspects of the military literature including MDMP.
The essence o f the PDSI Model relies on the realistic assumptions o f post-disaster
security, and mostly addresses the planning requirements for the deployment o f the
security agents (including both the local/state police and military forces and external
support agents from adjacent regions or other locations as necessary) who are responsible
for securing any urban area, and maintaining law and order after a catastrophic natural or
man-made disaster.
Prescriptive research aims to provide a remedial solution as implied in its name.
Wollman (n.d.) further delineates what the prescriptive research is:
Prescriptive research comes up with an assertion, a solution, and a proposal
for how to address a known problem space. The implication o f most research
questions in prescriptive research is what we should do now: how a policy
should be changed or improved; how an organization can achieve specific
outcomes or meet requirements; a set of recommendations or solutions or
ideas that involve change and action.
30 M SHA RPP: Mission, Symbolism, History, Accessibility, Recognizability, Population, and Proximity.
31 CARVER: Criticality, Accessibility, Recuperability, Vulnerability, Effect and Recognisability.
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The PDSI Model has been developed through a prescriptive research
methodology. Its foundational motives are based on the following three conclusions,
which were derived from the literature review and analysis results delineated in previous
chapters. The conclusions are:

Conclusion 1: Increasing complexity o f urban environment and emergent
characteristics o f diverse threats (all types o f natural and man-made threats)
impose serious challenges to the post-disaster urban security.

Conclusion 2: Since the Public Safety and Security function plays a critical role
for the execution o f other follow-up disaster response/recovery missions in the
context o f the NRF, the security agents should ensure that they have reliable
Public Safety and Security plans in place.

Conclusion 3: To maximize the efficiency, the Public Safety and Security plans
should be developed utilizing appropriate tools and methodologies that can
address post-disaster urban environment characteristics theoretically reflecting
worst-case scenario features, such as lack o f power and other supplies, lack of
communication, disorder, emergency, potential threats, complexity, uncertainty,
poor coordination, etc.

4.5

Significance of the PDSI Model
Regarding the existing practice o f urban security operations planning, the

criticality and vulnerability assessment o f critical assets has a significant impact on the
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planning o f security operations techniques which are to be executed on the ground as
necessary. Presently, a number o f different tools are available for the security agents as
discussed in the previous chapters. These tools are used to provide data for asset
prioritization for different purposes as some o f them support the decision making
processes on resource allocation. However; from the tactical level security planning
perspective, there is no model o f an urban area critical asset prioritization methodology
that employs both a multiple criteria decision making approach (like fuzzy sets for
multiple system states), and criteria sets that specifically address unique post-disaster
urban security characteristics.
To that end, the implementation o f the PDSI Model would be valuable for urban
area security planners, enhancing the quality o f their post-disaster security plans, which
also have critical implications for the continuation o f other disaster response/recovery
missions. With the conceptual background delineated in Chapter 4.4, the significance o f
the PDSI Model is outlined in the following three topics:
1. Since the security implications and vulnerabilities vary according to different
system states, the model design has been built in a matrix form. So different
grades o f membership and indexes, which represent outcomes o f different
system states can be aggregated in a fuzzy sets approach.
2. Since the post-disaster environment has unique characteristics, the Criteria of
Merit to be processed through the model have been developed based on
realistic assumptions that address these unique features. In addition to
comprehensive review and synthesis o f the relevant literature, the decision
tree analysis in Chapter 4.8 supports the validation of the criteria set.
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3. The PDSI Model empowers a methodology that ensures generalizable indices
with the incorporation of generalizability grades o f membership for each
Criteria o f Merit, and each Possible System State. Therefore, the potential
outcomes would be helpful at different levels in the planning processes in the
wider context o f the Homeland Security enterprise, as delineated in Chapter 5.

4.6

PDSI Model Algorithm

4.6.1

Introduction
The expected outcome o f the PDSI Model is basically to provide an efficient

vulnerability assessment tool for security planners who deal with post-disaster urban area
security in the tactical level. In addition, the m odel's implementation would also likely to
have operational and strategic level implications. The concept design and step-wise
algorithm o f the PDSI Model have been delineated in this dissertation. However, a
software program supported by Geographic Information Systems (GIS) is still required
for the practical use o f the model in future. The PDSI Model includes five sequential
components (Figure 23):
1. Identify Boundaries
2. Identify Critical Assets
3. Measure Basic Criticality Value (BCV)
4. Measure Post-Disaster Security Fuzzy Index (PDSFI)
5. Measure Post-Disaster Security Index (PDSI)

120

POST-DISASTER SECURITY INDEX (PDSI) MODEL
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Components of the Post-Disaster Security Index Model

Before starting to explore each phase, note the basic assumptions outlined below
for further appreciation o f the implementation process:
•

The model concept addresses the post-disaster urban area environment which
has unique characteristics that are depicted, but not limited to those in Figure
24.

Lack o f p o w e r a n d
o th e r supplies
U ncertainty

Limited
C om m unication

D isorder
Com plexity
Em ergency

P o te n tial
T h reats

Poor
C oordination

Figure 24

Unique Characteristics o f Post-Disaster Urban Environment
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•

There are four major security operations techniques: Patrol, Guard,
' Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance' (ISR), Response/Reaction
Force.

•

The security agents who are responsible for securing any area o f
responsibility (sectors/sub-sectors) in a jurisdiction utilize the outputs of this
model to improve post-disaster security plans in terms o f force tailoring and
unit positioning as well as identifying the required security operations
techniques to be executed on the scene.

•

The model could be utilized for any urban area o f responsibility (sub-sector,
sector, district, city, state, etc.) as appropriate, and the outputs could be
integrated/aggregated and interpreted in a bottom-up and top-down approach
through various methods.

4.6.2

Identify Boundaries (Phase 1)
In the first phase o f the PDSI Model, the areas of responsibility are identified in

line with any existing administrative boundaries: e.g.; police districts , patrol division
sectors, etc. Different techniques could be utilized for this requirement, however a unified
approach should be adopted for the whole interest area (as illustrated at Figure 25) to
ensure the consistency and generalizable integration/aggregation inferences be derived
for specific purposes.

32 After Hurricane Katrina, Emergency Support Function (ESF)-13 (the Public Safety and Security) requests were
processed through the Law Enforcement Coordination Center (LECC) at Louisiana State Police (LSP) headquarters in
Baton Rouge (Select Bipartisan Committee, 2006, p. 257). The LECC divided the federal law enforcement entities by
New Orleans police districts. Each federal law enforcement agency was responsible for coordinating with the precinct
captain o f the district (Select Bipartisan Committee, 2006, p. 259).
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4.6.3

Identification o f Critical Assets (Phase 2)
Having clarified the boundaries, the critical assets (which include critical

infrastructures, facilities, state/public/private properties, etc.) in each sector are identified
with rough estimates, and enumerated (see an example at Figure 26). If it were
technically possible, all the assets in the sector could be assumed as critical and
enumerated accordingly. However, since it would be unfeasible to work with all assets in
an urban area throughout the assessment process, the former instruction should be
followed.

CRITICAL ASSETS INSECTOR ALFA
I- Nortotk Scope A ren? US Bankruptcy f o u t!
1 Nor folk N p ig h b o 'h o o d I e isur *•
4 Bank of C om m onw ealth
5 W ells farg o Bank
6 fjn v o rth U n ited M e th o d ist Chtwrh
7 C om m onw ealth P roperty A ssoriates
8- Norfolk City P o lite
4 fre e m a s o n St Baptist C hurrh
10- M oses M yers House
I I- Tidew ater C om m vndy college
12- St P au l's Place Co
I V- N orfolk P o iite M useum
14- M acArthur Pharmacy
15- St P a u l's TexiKo
16- N ordstrom M acArthur Ce n te r
17- D illard's M acArthur C enter
18 S ecret Service US
14 Norfolk Fire D ep artm en t
20- Norfolk lu v en lleC o u rt Clerk
21- D ow ntow n P lara Shopping C enter
22- St P a u l's Episcopal Church
23 C onsulate G en eral of S w eden
24- Virginia P ort A uthority
7S- Banks o f H am pton Roads
26- SunTrust
71 H am pton R oads Naval M useum
28- Norfolk Crvk Plaza
29 Old Point N ational Bank
10- City o f Norfolk D epartm ent
I I C o n su late G en eral o f ttafy
32- N orfolk Parking D ep artm en t
33- Tow nbank Branch O ffk e
34- N orfolk Circuit Court Clerk
n RBCBank
34^ W achovia Bank
37 Norfolk Yard Sales D ep artm en t
38- Norfolk Real e s ta te D ep artm en t
39- W a te rsid e Festival M arketplace
4 0 Banks o f H am pton Roads

Figure 26

Identification and Enumeration o f Critical Assets
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Although the initial criticality identification could be made through either
intuitive methods like Recognition Heuristic and Elimination by Aspects as discussed in
Chapter 2.6.3 or any other methods to be performed by the subject matter experts, official
guidance provided by local, state or federal authorities associated with the set o f certain
criteria and classifications defined within the appropriate margins would support optimal
decisions and produce generalizable outputs.
As a guide for planning purposes, a list of the potential types o f critical assets in
an urban area is included in Table 9, which has been adapted from the list o f the Critical
Infrastructure and Key Resource Sectors (CIKR) (Table 1).

Table 9

Potential Types o f Critical Assets
P o w e r P la n t s
G o v e r n m e n t a l B u ild in g s
M a j o r In d u str ia l F a c i l i t i e s

_____________________ B a n k s /A T M s ______________________
G a s S t a t io n s
M a jo r R e t a il
S h o p p in g M a lls
_____________________ H o s p it a ls _______________________
________________________ S c h o o l s ________________________
P l a c e s o f W o r s h ip
A ir p o r t s
M a jo r T r a n sp o r ta tio n T e r m in a ls
H ig h ly P o p u la t e d B u ild in g s
R e c r e a tio n C e n te r s
R o a d I n t e r s e c t io n s (T r a f fic C o n t r o l)
P o s s ib le S h e lte r s -P o s t D is a s te r
P o i n t s o f D is t r ib u t io n ( P O D ) - P o s t d is a s t e r
P r is o n s
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4.6.4

Measurement o f Basic Criticality Index (BCI) (Phase 3)
Various asset criticality assessment methods can be used to produce a criticality

index to be processed in the PDSI Model. However, the possible outcomes o f these
methods would address contextually different aspects as each of their conceptual designs
has been built to achieve a different goal. Nevertheless, the criticality index provided
through the Basic Criticality Index (BCI) Assessment Matrix (Table 4-4), which has been
developed in line with the context o f the PDSI Model, would adequately reflect the post
disaster urban environment characteristics considering the viability functions o f the key
sectors/services.
The function o f the BCI is to normalize the Post-Disaster Security Fuzzy Index
(PDSFI), which is to be produced in the next phase. The BCI, for each critical asset, is
obtained through the equation included in the relevant key sector/service row at Table 10.
It provides a score between 0 and 1 that reflects the relative functional weight of
criticality o f the assigned asset in terms o f its level o f involvement in the relevant
sector/service group33. However, the BCI does not reflect the post-disaster security
requirements o f the assigned assets. Rather, it addresses the criticality o f assets in the
system state o f the post-disaster urban environment where the key sectors/services play a
significant role for the continuation o f daily life activities. The ultimate role o f the BCI is
to normalize the PDSFI to culminate in PDSI at the last phase. See Appendix D for the
detailed instructions for the measurement o f the BCI.

33 Urban Area Key Sectors/Services list has been generated in line with essence o f 18 Critical Infrastructure and Key
Resource Sectors (CIKR) that have been developed within the context o f National Infrastructure Protection Plan
(NIPP).
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T a b le 1 0

No

B a s ic C r itic a lity In d e x (B C I ) E q u a tio n s

BCI(i)

Urban Area Key Sectors/Services

1

Governance, Homeland Security,
Law/Public Order, Emergency Service

BCI1=S1 x (SRW1 UEW 1)

2

Housing Accommodation

BCI2=S2 x (EW2 U OW2)

3

Power Energy Service (Power plants,
nuclear reactors, dams, fuel supply
stations, etc.)

BCI3=S3 x (SRW3 U EW3)

4

Healthcare and Public Health

BCI4-S4 x (SRW4 U EW4)

5

telecommunication (including
Information Technology)

BCI5=S5 x (SRW5 U EW5)

6

Transportation Postal and Shipping
Service (including airports, major
transportation terminals)

BCI6=S6 x (SRW6 U EW6)

7

Food'Water and Other Goods Service
(Shopping malls, major retail, etc.)

8

Banking and Finance (including
banks ATMs, etc.)

9

Critical Manufacturing (including major
industrial facilities)

10

Training and Education Activities
(including schools)

BCI10=S10 x (EW10 U STW10)

11

Worship Activities (Places of worship,
etc.)

BCI11=S11 x (EW11 USCW11)

BCI7=S7 x (EW7 U SW7)
BCI8=S8 x (SRW8 U EW8)
BCI9=S9 x (EW9 U IW9)

Variables: Si: Scaling Constant: SRW: Service Relativity Weight; EW: Employment Weight:
OW: Occupancy Weight; SW: Size Weight; IW: Investment Weight; STW: Student Capacity
Weight; SCW: Seating Capacity Weight
The combination rule for the equations: A U B = (A+B) - (AxB)
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4.6.5

Measurement o f Post-Disaster Security Fuzzy Index (PDSFI) (Phase 4)

The Post-Disaster Security Fuzzy Index (PDSFI) component provides a matrix
assessment structure that constitutes the backbone o f the PDSI Model. The theoretical
concept of this matrix structure simply relies on the incorporation o f three sub
components, which are illustrated in Figure 27.

AMBIENT CRITERIA
OF MERIT

POSSIBLE

FUZZY MATRIX

SYSTEM
STATES

Figure 27

Three Main Components of PDSFI Matrix

The ultimate goal in this phase is to produce a PDSFI for each critical asset
through the process formulated within the Fuzzy Matrix component (elaborated in Table
12) considering the parameters to be derived from the incorporation o f the Ambient
Criteria o f Merit and Possible System States listed in Table 11.

Table 11

Ambient Criteria o f Merit and Possible System States

A M BIE N T CRITERIA O F M E R IT

PO SSIB LE SY ST E M STATES
•

•

Physical Security (C l)

•

N um ber o f Inhabitants/ V isitors (C2)

•

Size/ A rea (C3)

O ffences against Property (like looting,
larceny/theft, burglary, arson, m otor
vehicle theft, etc.) (S I)

•

sexual assault, robbery, etc.) (S2)
•

•

Traffic A ccess/M obility (C4)

O ffences against P erson s (like murder,

Terrorist A ttacks/ W arfare Threats
(aggregated assaults, sabotages, etc.)
(S3)
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Technically, we can generate numerous criteria for vulnerability assessments that
would conclude with security requirement prioritizations. However, since different
system states dictate different security requirements, the criteria set for any system state
should be developed in line with the essence of the system state characteristics. To that
end, the Ambient Criteria o f Merit (Table 10) identified in this study would sufficiently
address the post-disaster security requirement characteristics. The validation o f the
criteria set has been supported by the decision tree analysis included in Appendix H.
From the causality perspective, the vulnerability o f each asset may vary according
to the characteristics o f the system state. As an example, in a system state where there is
lack of food, the assets which provide any kind of food services would be more
susceptible to the potential offences while the others do not attract the offenders who
have been motivated by the lack o f food. To incorporate the assets' different vulnerability
weights (according to the different system state characteristics) in the PDSI Model
measurement process, three Possible System States (Table 11) have been defined in line
with the major crime categories adopted within the common justice literature. ( Terrorist
Attack/Warfare Threats' is the only exception o f this rule, which has been added a as a
third system state since it has been considered critical.)
Furthermore, to ensure the outputs o f this model provide generalizable indices
that address a broad implementation spectrum, the Generalizability Grades of
Membership' index definitions have been developed per each Criterion and System State,
considering they would represent the generalizable local/ambient parameters regarding
each Criterion and System State, but not the critical asset.
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Table 12 depicts the integrated PDSFI Matrix. Three steps associated with the
matrix variables are outlined below:
1.

Measurement o f Input Variables

2.

Measurement o f Fuzzy Matrix Variables

3.

Aggregation

Table 12

Post-Disaster Security Fuzzy Index (PDSFI) Matrix

V(C1)
(scl)

Cl: Physical Security

(sc2)
(se3)

C2: Number of Inhabitants/
Visitors
C3: Size/Area

(sc4)

C4: Traffic Access/Mobility

Possible System States

Vulnerability Indexes

via)

V|C3)

V(C4)
SI: Offences against Property
S2: Offences against Persons

G(C1)

G(C2)

G(C3)

G<C4)

PDSFI(Sl)

(G l.V l)

(G2, V2)

(G3, V3)

(G4.V4)

G(S1)

P05FI(S2)

(G5.V5)

(G6, VG)

(G7.V7)

(G8, V8)

G(S2)

PDSFI(S3)

(G9.V9)

(G10, V10) (G11.V11) (G12, V12)

S3: Terrorist Attacks/ Warfare Threats

G(S3)

MKSl)

M(S2)

V u ln erab ility
Index M o d ifie rs

Fuzzy Matrix

Generalizability Grades of Membership

Generalizability
Grades of Membership

Scaling Constant (sc)

Ambient Criteria of Merit

M(S3)

1. Measurement of Input Variables:
The list of PDSFI Matrix input variables and their sub-components are listed
below. Further information for the measurement o f each variable and sub
components is included in Appendix E.

a.

Scaling Constants:
•

scl: Scaling Constant for the Criterion o f Physical Security
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•

sc2: Scaling Constant for the Criterion o f Number of
Inhabitants/Visitors

•

sc3: Scaling Constant for the Criterion o f Size/Area

• sc4: Scaling Constant for the Criterion o f Traffic Access/Mobility

b.

Vulnerability Indexes of the Critical Asset per each Criterion:
•

V(C1): Vulnerability Index o f the Critical Asset for Physical
Security
Perimeter Security Index
Building Envelope Wall Type Index
Building Envelope Fenestration Index

•

V(C2): Vulnerability Index o f the Critical Asset for Number o f
Inhabitants/Visitors

• V(C3): Vulnerability Index of the Critical Asset for Size/Area
• V(C4): Vulnerability Index of the Critical Asset for Traffic
Access/Mobility
Periphery Road Width Index
Adjacent Primary Roads Proximity Index
Bridge Dependency Index
Transportation Terminals Proximity Index

c.

Vulnerability Index Modifiers of the Critical Asset per each Possible
System State:
•

M(S1): Vulnerability Index Modifier o f the Critical Asset for
Offences against Property

•

M(S2): Vulnerability Index Modifier o f the Critical Asset for
Offences against Persons

•

M(S3): Vulnerability Index Modifier o f the Critical Asset for
Terrorist Attacks/Warfare Threats
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d. Generalizability Grades of Membership per each Criterion:
•

G(C1): Generalizability Grades o f Membership for Physical Security
Seismicity Vulnerability Index
Hurricane Vulnerability Index
Flood Vulnerability Index

•

G(C2): Generalizability Grades o f Membership for Number o f
Inhabitants/Visitors

•

G(C3): Generalizability Grades o f Membership for Size/Area

•

G(C4): Generalizability Grades o f Membership for Traffic
Access/Mobility
Road Length Index
Transportation Lines Index
Bridges Index

e. Generalizability Grades of Membership per each Possible System
State:
•

G(S1): Generalizability Grades o f Membership for Offences against
Property

•

G(S2): Generalizability Grades o f Membership for Offences against
Persons

•

G(S3): Generalizability Grades o f Membership for Terrorist
Attacks/Warfare Threats

2. Measurement of Fuzzy Matrix Variables:
The equations for the measurement of fuzzy matrix variables (Table 13) have
been included in Table 14. The combination rule for Generalizability Grades of
Membership Variables is:
A U B = (A+B) - (A*B)

(1)
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Table 13

F uzzy M a trix

Table 14

Fuzzy Matrix Variables

PDSFI(Sl)

(61, VI)

(62, V2)

(63, V3)

(G4, V4)

PDSFI(S2)

(65, V5)

(66, V6)

(67, V7)

(68, V8)

PDSFIJS3)

(69, V9)

(G10, V10) (G il, Vll) (G12, V12)

Equations for the Measurement of Fuzzy Matrix Variables

Generalizability Grades of
Membership Variables

Vulnerability' Index
Variables

G1 = G(C1) U G(S1)

VI = scl * V(C1) * M(S1)

G2 = G(C2) U G(S1)

V2 = sc2 * V(C2) * M(S1)

G3 = G(C3) U G(S1)

V3 = sc3 * V(C3) * M(S1)

G4 = G(C4) U G(S1)

V4 = sc4 * V(C4) * M(S1)

G5 = G(C1) U G(S2)

V5 = scl * V(C1) * M(S2)

G6 = G(C2) U G(S2)

V6 = sc2 * V(C2) * M(S2)

G7 = G(C3) U G(S2)

V7 = sc3 * V(C3) * M(S2)

G8 = G(C4) U G(S2)

V8 = sc4 * V(C4) • M(S2)

G9 = G<C1)UG(S3)

V9 = scl * V(C1) * M(S3)

G10 = G (C 2)U G (S3)

V I0 = sc2 * V(C2) * M(S3)

G il = G(C3)U G(S3)

V I 1 = sc3 * V(C3) * M(S3)

G12 = G(C4)U G(S3)

V12 = sc4 * V(C4) * M(S3)
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3. Aggregation:
Following the measurement o f fuzzy matrix variables, final aggregation is
performed through Equation 2 below. When necessary, matrix variables could also be
aggregated per each system state through Equations 3, 4, 5 to be processed for different
assessment purposes (e.g.; for a specific area o f responsibility, vulnerability weights of
the critical assets could be scrutinized only considering the Offences against Property'
system state).

12

x Vi

PDSFI =

/1 2

(2 )

L i =1

PD SFI(Sl) =

(3)

x Vi

/4

x Vi

/4

(4)

Gi x Vi

/4

(5)

Li= 1

PDSFI(S2) =
L i= 5

x
12

PDSFI(S3)

L i=9
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4.6.6

Measurement o f Post-Disaster Security Index (PDSI) (Phase 5)

The Post-Disaster Security Index (PDSI), which is the final output o f the PDSI
Model, is measured processing the Basic Criticality Value (BCV) and Post-Disaster
Security Fuzzy Index (PDSFI) (which have already been measured in the previous
phases) through Equation 6. The PDSI provides a score between 0 and 10.000 that
represent the post-disaster security requirement of each critical asset assigned in the area
of responsibility34.
PDSI = (BCV * PDSFI)* 1000

4.7

Sample Measurement

4.7.1

Scenario

(6)

The Operations Bureau in the City o f Delta Police Department has been tasked to
develop a Post-Disaster Security Plan for the city. To proceed the planning process, they
need to identify the criticality and vulnerability weights o f the critical assets within the
city to decide on the best option between force tailoring (organization) and unit
positioning (deployment) alternatives for the execution of security operations techniques
(which could be Patrol, Guard, 'Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance'(ISR),
Response/Reaction Force).
The Operations Bureau planning team decided to use the PDSI Model to make the
vulnerability assessments and derive necessary data for the prioritization and decision
making. They followed the five sequential phases delineated in Appendix F.

34 The equation is multiplied by a coefficient o f 1000 to obtain an integer which provides a score highest in precision,
minimally rounded to the left.
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4.7.2

Measurement Results

The PDSI for each critical asset is listed in Table 15, which has been obtained
through the PDSI Model algorithm at Chapter 4.6.

Table 15

PDSI o f the Critical Assets

C ritical Asset
Blue Shopping Center (BSC)
Delta City Hospital (DCH)
City o f Delta Department (CDD)

PDSFI
2.334
1.121
0.699

BCV
0.548
0.792
0.950

PDSI
1279
887
664

Performance Sensitivity results of the indexes (Va (raw), Va, PDSFI, PDSI) are
listed in Table 16.
Table 16

Performance Sensitivity

Critical Asset

Index Types

DCH
5.66
0.929
1.825
0.49
1.121
0.48
887
0.694

BSC
6.09
1
3.723
1
2.334
1
1279
1

Va(raw)*
Normalized Va(raw)
Va**
Normalized Va
PDSFI
Normalized PDSFI
PDSI
Normalized PDSI

CDD
4.59
0.754
1.206
0.324
0.699
0.299
664
0.519

* Va (raw): Average o f the raw Vulne rability Indexes
4

V a(raw ) =

V( Ci)

/4

i=1
** Va: Average o f the Fuzzy Vulneral>ility Indexes
12
Va =

^ > \i
i=l

/1 2

*** Normalized weights are obtained through the division o f
each weight by the maximum.
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4.8

Reliability and Validity of the Constructs
The conceptual design of the PDSI Model is based on the combined knowledge of

the epistemological perspective of modeling, MCDM, systems thinking and relevant
aspects o f the military literature, including the MDMP. The model has been developed
through a prescriptive research methodology.
Korb, Geard and Dorin (2013) discuss how expert opinions have a significant role
in the validation o f the models, while the Bayes' Theorem suggests the incorporation of
both the statistical tests and expert opinions during the research. In line with the
discussion o f Korb et al., the validation of the PDSI Model as a whole and the set of
criteria incorporated in the model relies heavily on the subjective assessments of subject
matter experts, since the statistical testing o f this model requires high scale
comprehensive experimentation through extended studies and extensive participation of
diverse security stakeholders. Nonetheless, for the validation of the PDSI Model
including its development process; Face Validity, Content Validity and Internal Validity
methods have been applied during the dissertation.
For the subjective analysis o f a model and its characteristics, Oren and Yilmaz
(2013) state that “a model is not considered to be absolutely correct or incorrect, but
rather subjective analysis o f qualitative characteristics is considered essential for its
acceptability and credibility” (p. 162) in the pragmatist and holistic schools, while Korb,
Geard and Dorin (2013) claim “a great deal o f practical effort in developing models goes
into making sense o f expert opinions about a modeling domain” (p. 255).
Regarding the Face Validity; Health and Jackson (2013) contends “while there are
similar approaches when compared to traditional scientific techniques o f validation such
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as statistical testing, Face Validation (i.e., asking experts to determine whether the model
behavior seems reasonable) almost completely relies on subjective human judgment” (p.
100). In a similar way, Korb, Geard and Dorin (2013) underline the significance o f face
validity “while face validity is a weak kind o f test o f a model, it is nevertheless central to
most modeling endeavors” (p. 262). In this sense, the Face Validity o f the PDSI Model
has been obtained through interviews with subject matter experts35 who have more than
10 years o f experience in their respective domains. The validation questionnaire utilized
during the interviews is included in Appendix G.
Pertaining to Content Validity, Korb, Geard and Dorin (2013) state: “Content
Validity considers whether the most important factors and relationships between
variables noted in the literature are present in the model; expert opinion will be the
primary guide here, but focused reviews of the literature will also be useful” (p. 262).
Triangulation, which could be utilized as a Content Validity approach, is “broadly
defined as synthesis and integration o f data from multiple sources through collection,
examination, comparison, and interpretation” (Overview of Triangulation Methodology,
(n.d.), p. 7). It is “typically a strategy for improving the validity and reliability o f research
or evaluation o f findings” (Golafshani, 2003, p. 603). The triangulation methodology,
which has been adapted from the cycle illustrated in Figure 28, was applied during the
development o f the PDSI Model (particularly during the development o f the variables of
the Ambient Criteria o f Merit and measurement matrixes) to synthesize and distill the
information provided through the relevant literature.

35 The author o f this dissertation also qualifies the requirements as the subject matter expert on this domain.
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Gather data from
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Visual Representation o f the Triangulation Process (Overview o f
Triangulation Methodology, (n.d.), p. 15)

Finally, regarding Internal Validity, Korb, Geard and Dorin (2013) highlight how
this method focuses on the assessment o f the model variables:
Internal Validity examines whether variation in the model's variables is
reasonable. This could specifically consider co-variation between sets of
variables, to determine whether changes in some variable either cause or are
co-dependent with changes in others, in ways which are judged sensible by
experts; this is generally called sensitivity analysis, (p. 262)

Considering the variables o f the PDSI Model in this context, the overall situation
usually gets more complicated with numerous diverse interactions between great numbers
of elements existing within the system boundaries in a crisis system state like a post
disaster environment. In such a case, it is critical that the models supporting the Public
Safety and Security planning process address the post-disaster urban environment
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characteristics, since they theoretically reflect the features o f the worst-case scenario, like
lack o f power and other supplies, lack o f communication, disorder, emergency, potential
threats, complexity, uncertainty, poor coordination, etc. The Ambient Criteria of Merit
incorporated in the PDSFI matrix were developed with the aim of capturing the
aforementioned post-disaster security requirements. The Ambient Criteria of Merit play a
significant role in the measurement/assessment process of the PDSI Model; each criterion
in this set has multiple sub-variables that address the different aspects o f the security
paradigm in the context of post-disaster environment. In addition, the Internal Validity of
the Ambient Criteria of Merit have been validated through the Decision Tree Analysis,
which has been developed based on a specific scenario (see Appendix H: Basic Reality
Face-Off Decision Tree).

4.9

Conclusion
The vulnerability assessment (associated with the criticality assessment aspects)

o f the critical assets significantly impacts post-disaster security planning for urban areas
considering the different types o f threats. Since the prioritization o f security requirements
for the critical assets, which is a critical driver for decision making, relies heavily on the
assets' vulnerability assessments. However, there is no model or methodology
(employing fuzzy multi-criteria decision making, and incorporating different system
states and multiple sets o f criteria derived from the essence o f the security concept o f
operations) in place to provide the aforementioned vulnerability assessment capability.
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As elaborated in the Sample Measurement in Chapter 4.7, the relative weights of
the normalized vulnerability indexes36 attributed for each critical asset vary, as do the
number of variables processed during the measurement of each index as depicted in
Figure 29. Through quantitative experimentation or statistical testing, it is challenging to
choose the best quality, more precise index from among these. The validation and
reliability testing for each index and its measurement process requires subjective analyses
and the assessments o f subject matter experts.
However, considering the serious differences between the normalized weights,
the trade-offs at the end o f the assessment process will have an inextricable link to the
precision or resolution o f the utilized index. Furthermore, since the assessment or
prioritization process deals with a macro level system of interest with cumulative
elements, it is most likely that the assessment results would exponentially change based
on the type o f utilized index, which theoretically provide different levels o f precision or
resolution.
Considering the justifications outlined for the PDSI M odel's reliability and
validity, it is assumed that it would provide valuable parameters for urban area security
planners to enhance the reliability o f their post-disaster security plans in the context o f
NRF. The potential outcomes o f the PDSI Model have been elaborated in Chapter 5.2.

36 Each index represents different approaches and includes different variables in the measurement process.
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Normalized Va(raw)

Normalized Va

Normalized PDSFI

Normalized PDSI

No Critical Asset
1
2
3

Figure 29

BSC
DCH
CDD

Normalized Normalized Normalized Normalized
PDSFI
Va(raw)
Va
PDSI
1
1
1
1
0.929
0.49
0.48
0.694
0.754
0.324
0.299
0.519

Relative Performance Sensitivity o f Normalized Indexes37

37 The normalized indexes have been imported from the Sample Measurement in Chapter 4.7.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
To achieve resilience, we must more fully incorporate a comprehensive understanding o f
risk to establish priorities and inform decision making. Resilience will also require a shift
from a reliance on top-down emergency management to a process that engages all
stakeholders. (Quadrennial Report, 2010, p. 31)

In this dissertation, the incorporation of the Emergency Management concept
within the U.S. Homeland Security contextual structure (theoretical content) has been
scrutinized holistically, including the conceptual design of the NRF that is one o f the
critical mandates o f the Homeland Security domain. Furthermore, in the context o f the
NRF, particularly the significance o f the ESF-5 (Emergency Management) and ESF-13
(Public Safety and Security) has been underlined, and the PDSI Model has been
developed with the aim o f supporting the existing post-disaster security planning process,
which is a critical part o f the Public Safety and Security (Figure 30).

Contextual Analysis

PDSI Model Developmen

r
National Response Framework (NRF)

National Strategies
Homeland Security
Acts
/ Strategic Plans and
('
Reviews

Emergency Support Functions

NIMS
NRF
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Emergency M anagem ent

Homeland Security
Figure 30
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5.1

Conclusions

5.1.1

Homeland Security Contextual Structure
Homeland Security led by DHS in the U.S. represents an ultra-complex

organizational enterprise with great numbers of stakeholders, numerous missions, and
functions that entail extraordinary oversight and synchronization. This enterprise is
critical and has unique characteristics, since it aims to provide people with the security
that is a first priority core human need.
After the 2000s, Homeland Security was founded on the conceptual framework of
Emergency Management which is theoretically the successor of'disaster response'
efforts that date back to 19th century. From the 19th century until the establishment o f
FEMA in 1979, the disaster response was handled by decentralized initiatives. In 1979,
FEMA assumed an overarching role on the response missions and institutionalized and
centralized these initiatives up to 2002. However, during this time, rather than developing
a comprehensive Emergency Management concept/doctrine, which would elaborate the
expected contextual structure including the concept boundaries of the system, only the
definition and phases/components of Emergency Management were circulated.
After the September 11 terrorist attacks, DHS was established and charged with
critical responsibilities. During that time, the National Strategy fo r Homeland Security
and the Homeland Security Act o f 2002 defined the Homeland Security key missions and
priorities based on the theoretical context o f Emergency Management without any direct
reference to Emergency Management. In 2003, FEMA was subsumed by DHS, and the
contextual conflicts started to be surfaced. After Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the Post
Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 aggravated the epistemological
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problems, since it attributed an overarching mission spectrum to Emergency Management
that overlapped with the theoretical domain o f DHS.
In the following years, the contextual deviation and confusion regarding the
incorporation o f the Emergency Management concept in the Homeland Security context
continued through the National Strategy fo r Homeland Security (2007), QHSR (2010)
and other key mandates as discussed in Chapter 3. Considering particularly the recent
strategic documents o f Presidential Policy Directive-8 (2011), DHS Strategic Plan
(2012) and draft NRF (2012), the following problems still exist, and unless necessary
actions are taken, they would negate the development of Homeland Security, which
basically aims to enhance the preparedness and resiliency o f American Nation:
•

“There is not an established Emergency Management Doctrine” (Blanchard,

2007, p. 3), and the conceptual relationship between Emergency Management and
Homeland Security has not been clearly defined.
•

Regarding meaning and content, there are different connotations attributed

for Emergency Management in the various key Homeland Security mandates.
•

The conceptual design o f the ESFs within the NRF suffers from the lack o f

comprehensive Emergency Management doctrine and common terminology.
•

In the pertinent official literature, there is also a lack of holistic, multi

dimensional, top-down figurative system representation. Although it is crucial to
let complex system stakeholders oversee the system process and development, it
is too fuzzy to appreciate the existing system framework holistically as well as to
understand the system boundaries, and the relationships between key elements
(entities, stakeholders, missions, functions, etc.).
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•

Upon the evolution of the threat spectrum and other challenges, new

conceptual designs have been generated during the development o f Homeland
Security with the justification o f evolutional requirements. However, the new
regulations have inherited the aforementioned epistemological problems in a
domino effect.

The epistemological inconsistency and lack o f holistic system representation
within the Homeland Security contextual structure is likely to produce more confusion,
that could end up with a fuzzy and lumpish system with poor policy context, blurred
system representations/abstractions, poorly educated personnel devoid o f necessary
situational awareness, ill-designed organizational structures, and improperly running
operational functions. On the other hand, contextual coherence allows a well-designed
system structure to facilitate system viability functions properly. Therefore, the challenge
stemming from the contextual inconsistency should be scrutinized seriously and further
amendments should be implemented to the existing Homeland Security contextual
structure to transform and adapt the Emergency Management concept appropriately. In
this sense, the assertion o f Gheorghe and Vamanu (1996) provides a meaningful guidance
for those who would take part in further contextual analyses: “Validating, applying, and
maintaining - including refining - existing Emergency Planning Preparedness and
Management (EPPM) knowledge and systems is as important as generating new
knowledge” (p. 15).
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5.1.2

Post-Disaster Security
The primary focus o f authorities has always been the Public Safety and Security,

including law enforcement, public order, and physical protection of critical
infrastructures and key assets during both ordinary/peacetime and crisis/wartime system
states. Particularly after a high scale natural or man-made disaster in an urban area, the
security agents are supposed to prevent public order from turning into panic and chaos by
establishing security, maintaining law and order, and letting other response/recovery
missions be executed successfully.
All disaster response/recovery activities (saving lives, first aid and medical
treatment, law enforcement by sustaining public order and security, evacuation,
maintenance, repair, etc.) are necessarily supposed to be executed coherently in a
relatively more secure and stable system state using a synchronized planning
methodology. Security and law enforcement play a critical role in the facilitation o f other
follow-up disaster response/recovery activities.
In the U.S. Homeland Security system architecture, the Public Safety and Security
mission has been designed as an Emergency Support Function within the NRF. However,
the design mindset o f this function in the NRF is incompetent, and the instructions and
guidelines provided in the existing Public Safety and Security (ESF-13) annex do not
comprise necessary details, particularly in terms o f interaction with the other ESFs, which
would support the accomplishment of security missions in severe conditions like
catastrophic post-disaster periods.
Although the criticality and vulnerability assessment o f critical assets (which
include critical infrastructures, facilities, state/public/private properties, etc.) in an urban
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area has a significant impact on the post-disaster security planning process, there is no
model in practice which provides an urban area critical asset prioritization methodology
with both a fuzzy multiple criteria decision making approach incorporating different
system states, and multiple sets o f criteria that specifically address the post-disaster urban
security unique characteristics.

5.2

Recommendations
Since the epistemological inconsistency and lack o f necessary holistic system

representation within the Homeland Security contextual structure is likely to produce
more confusion, poorly educated staff, ill-designed organizational structures, and most
importantly, improperly running operational functions, the contextual structure should be
scrutinized seriously as a whole and further amendments applied to ensure the
Emergency Management concept be transformed and adapted appropriately within the
context o f Homeland Security.
Rather than evolutional, the system should be overseen through a transformational
perspective by controlled, coordinated and unified efforts and common terminologies as
it has been directed by the Presidential Policy Directive-8 (National Preparedness,
2011), and systems thinking, which is supported by the holistic vision should be utilized
by the system stakeholders who have the stewardship responsibility.
Preliminarily, a complete organizational system analysis could be performed for
further specification and clarification of the problem domain, and identification o f the
possible solutions from an 'independent vantage point' perspective, since the system's
contextual structure dominated by the discussed problems is highly complex and
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extensive in scale, and linked to system's organizational and functional structures. A
proposed roadmap for a Complete Complex Organizational System Analysis’ is included
in APPENDIX I.
After the proposed analysis is complete, the contextual system architecture should
be redesigned by including common terminologies and proper taxonomies. A SimplifyUnify-Integrate' rule could be adopted to consolidate the loose and fuzzy contextual
clusters in the system. In that sense, without trying to paraphrase the differences between
them, two critical mandates - NIMS and NRF - should be integrated to produce a single
simple capstone document.
On the other hand, the potential dilemma “while complex systems require
complex solutions38, simple approaches39 are preferred to deal with complexity” should
be handled with the optimal decisions. While there is no golden rule for the optimal
design o f the system context (Figure 31), a successful system re-design could be
accomplished with the utilization o f a unique methodology which is exclusive to the
system, and the employment o f qualified subject matter experts who have the holistic
thinking capability as well as the necessary system content knowledge that is
epistemologically consistent with the historical development process o f the system.

38 “In order to express a rich knowledge set that includes environment, contingencies, resources, possible actions and
much more, we need a framework that allows us to represent knowledge in many facets or dimensions.” (Douglass and
Mittal, 2013, p. 282)
39 Simplicity is central to reducing complexity in planning and it fosters a shared understanding o f the situation, the
problem, and the solution (Stability Operations, 2008, p. 4-1).
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Sim plicity

Complexity

Figure 31

Optimal Design o f the System Context

With regard to the conceptual design of the Emergency Support Functions, the
Joint Field Office (JFO), Incident Command (IC) and ESFs are the key elements in
response and recovery operations within the integrated framework o f NRF and NIMS.
Theoretically, ESFs bridge the JFO to the IC to facilitate the four major functional areas:
operations, planning, logistics, and finance/administration, as depicted in Figure 32. In
this framework, to eliminate the negative implications of the epistemological problems
discussed, the role of the Emergency Management (ESF-5) should be re-designed
conceptually and graphically in the existing context to ensure it oversees the whole
framework as an overarching coordination function rather than a support function as the
others, which are facilitated between the functional areas to link the support cycles [as it
is delineated in the next paragraphs; also the role o f ESF-13 (Public Safety and Security)
should also be modified to let it function with a central, backdrop role in the NRF].
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Facilitation o f Functional Areas

While the contextual and structural architecture o f the system is re-designed
properly and diverse functional mechanisms are let operate efficiently, the necessary
figurative multi-dimensional holistic system representations which would provide a clear
insight for the individuals and other stakeholders should also be included in the relevant
capstone documents. The concept o f the multi-dimensional holistic system representation
is depicted in Figure 33. The sample complex system represented in the figure includes
different layers, components and sub-components accompanied by a great number o f
functions/entities that have networked in a fuzzy structure which has different clusters
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and relation patterns. The representations to be produced in a similar way would provide
a useful guide for the system stakeholders to make top-down and bottom-up inquiries
through the system architecture as well as drill down exploration in any cluster (even in
any critical nexus in any cluster) within any layer.

Holistic View

O

First
Tier
v
Main Components

O

O

P r-v

O
I ^Second Tier
Sub-components

Tmrd Tier)
Sub-components

Figure 33

Multi -Dimensional Holistic System Representation
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Gheorghe and Vamanu (1996) discuss that “Emergency Planning, Preparedness
and Management (EPPM) knowledge should be made available at the level o f widest
conceivable use” (p. 15). In that sense, coherently well-designed contextual structures
with multi-dimensional holistic figures would catalyze the circulation o f necessary
knowledge enhancing the situational awareness of the system stakeholders. The
education and training initiatives should also leverage this approach to ensure the
complex mega-systems are manned with qualified individuals and teams who have a deep
insight on the system design and framework.

Public Safety and Security
The Public Safety and Security function plays a critical role within the NRF, since
any serious failure in this function could cause the collapse o f the whole framework,
especially during a post-disaster period. Thus, the decision makers should ensure they
have necessary assets and reliable Public Safety and Security plans to establish security
and public order in the disaster area so other disaster response/recovery missions are
conducted coherently. A high level o f resiliency could be derived from the military
perspective o f effective planning: If the security plan is developed based on the possible
implications of the worst-case scenario, then it would work at its best during the
implementation phase whatever the conditions could be.
In line with the essence of this assumption, the Public Safety and Security plans
should be developed with a post-disaster security centric focus that addresses the
implications o f the worst-case scenario characteristics, and utilizes some principal drivers
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like 'holistic approach, systems thinking, proactive planning, applicable criteria and
reliable data, simplicity, etc.' (Figure 34).
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Post-Disaster Security Environment Characteristics and Principal Drivers
for Potential Planning Solutions

Since the Public Safety and Security is highly critical for the facilitation of other
follow-up disaster response and recovery missions, the Public Safety and Security plans
(ESF-13) should be improved through the utilization o f models which can process
multiple criteria and different system state variables to address the fuzzy characteristics
o f the post-disaster urban security. In addition, the role of the ESF-13 should be modified
in the NRF to let it function with a central, backdrop role. Having these done, it would
possible to provide more granularity in the content o f the Public Safety and Security
plans, ensuring they provide relevant stakeholders and other support functions with the
supportive decision making and prioritization parameters [e.g.; secure lines of
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transportation, potential locations/coordinates of aid delivery points, shelters, deployable
operations centers, security zones (safe havens that would be secured with the highest
degree security measures during the crisis), etc. could be identified utilizing the outcomes
o f the PDSI Model],
The PDSI Model introduced in Chapter 4, which has been developed with a post
disaster centric focus, should be utilized to develop resilient security plans to support
other disaster response/recovery activities in emergency. Since the model offers to
produce generalizable indices for the vulnerability assessment and prioritization o f the
critical assets in any urban environment, it would provide valuable insights for all level
security planners to tackle with the complexities during any crisis.
Furthermore, with this model implemented, the emergency response framework
would be reinforced, since its conceptual design has been developed to address the
characteristics o f worst case scenarios derived from the post-disaster urban environment.
To enhance the resiliency and preparedness o f the response framework, a 'Baseline
Security Plan,' which is to be developed through the utilization of possible PDSI Model
outcomes could be accompanied with the other plans outlined in NRF Emergency
Support Function -13 (2008)40. Previously discussed supportive decision making and
prioritization parameters could easily be transferred to other ESFs as necessary.

40 Public Safety and Security (ESF-13) provides the conduit for utilizing and incorporating the extensive network o f
public safety and security coordination established for steady-state prevention efforts through a variety o f interagency
plans. Prevention and security plans include, but are not limited to, the following (Emergency Support Function 13,
2008, p. 2);
•
National Infrastructure Protection Plan
Sector-Specific Plans
•
The National Strategy for Maritime Transportation Security
Area Maritime Security Plans
•
Vessel and Facility Security Plans
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The potential outcomes o f the PDSI Model follow:
•

Utilization o f realistic and precise (to the largest extent possible) assessment
parameters41 (an example is depicted in Figure 35) in the security planning
process in terms of:
-

Force tailoring (organization).

-

Unit positioning (deployment), identification o f boundaries for each
troop/unit.

-

Identification of the security operations techniques: Patrolling, Guard,
ISR, Response/Reaction Force, etc. (e.g. identification o f critical patrol
clusters, identification of target prioritization requirements for ISR
assets).

PDSI LEGEND

Figure 35

Depiction o f PDSIs in Color Code

41 To be accompanied by Geographic Information Systems (GIS).
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•

Better coordination and interoperability opportunities for the local and

external support troops in all levels via detailed map overlays produced with the
support o f PDSI data sets.
•

Easy identification o f the local and external support requirements from

different resources (City Police, State Police, National Guard, Active Military,
other State Agents or Federal Organizations). The PDSI Model provides
generalizable indices that help identify the approximate security requirements.
•

Provision o f valuable inputs to be used in exercises that should be realistic in

scenario and consequences as requested by the National Security Strategy (2010).
•

Support to strategic decision making. The implementation o f the model in the

city, state or country level would also provide critical insight for the strategic
planning and decision making processes in terms of optimizing the mix of
military Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) elements42 as
well as Police and other security agents, and the strategic peacetime emplacement
(geographic footprint) requirements o f these elements. This level o f planning has
an inextricable link to the Homeland Security missions and most o f these
elements are assigned for disaster response/recovery support operations as
required.

42 The optimization o f the mix o f military Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) elements has been
requested by Strategic Guidance (2012) to make them best suited to what has been stated in the strategy.
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APPENDIX A - BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR THE SPECIFICATION
OF ANALYSIS PROBLEMS
1.

General and Coordination Issues:
The past three decades have presented the emergency management
community with significant challenges and conditions that have necessitated
reevaluation o f strategic and operational approaches to delivering emergency
management services. (FEMA Strategic Plan, 2011, p. 1)
This country has had a great deal o f experience with disasters, and it has
been - in many instances - both innovative and successful in emergency
management. In spite of its many advances in this burgeoning profession, the
U.S. suffers from many problems that are both unique and similar to those
that affect other countries. In addition, the U.S. has witnessed numerous
setbacks and disappointing mistakes from which others may learn. (McEntire,
(n.d.), p. 1)
While the United States has been a model for emergency management
programs around the world, it is not without numerous weaknesses. The
emergency management profession has much room for improvement in the
U.S. as it does elsewhere. (McEntire, (n. d.), p. 18)
Topics such as the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the
National Response Plan (NRP) are clearly and effectively described and
explained, but virtually no research seems available to offer emergency
managers concerning the usefulness or performance in practice o f NIMS and
NRP. (Barbee, 2007, p. 4)
Homeland security is a step back from the proactive approaches being
recommended today, and it de-emphasizes all hazards other than terrorism.
This rivalry among divergent and incomplete paradigms has created
confusion for a discipline that so desperately needs both inclusion and
direction. (McEntire, 2004, p. 8)
On the domestic front, federal security planners faced what seemed like an
infinite amount o f pressing tasks, with no real ability to determine whether or
not their work would turn out to be something like a military victory. Federal
planners also faced a serious dilemma concerning the comprehensive nature
o f the homeland security mission, the sheer number o f agencies involved at
all levels o f government, and extensive private sector involvement.
Furthermore, the complicated daily workings of the Homeland Security
Council and the President’s Office o f Homeland Security were accompanied
by a maze-like jumble of congressional oversight and appropriations
committees. (Hidek, 2010, p. 102)
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Another problem that must be addressed is coordination among all o f the
actors involved in emergency management in the United States. Ways must
be found to improve communication among all pertinent actors during
disasters and work harmoniously to promote recovery in the aftermath of
such events. (McEntire, (n. d.), p. 17)
As currently structured, the degree o f fragmentation and antagonism between
DHS and its institutional subcomponents have created a veritable
‘uncoordinated network. (Hidek, 2010, p. 212)
The pre-9/11 planning designed to meet the new governmental mission of
‘homeland defense’ focused on developing an ‘integrated intelligence’ and
planning capability to support tactical antiterrorism objectives. The result
was the emergence o f a complex web o f institutional relationships,
generating clashes to come over function, purpose, and influence. (Hidek,
2010, p. 99)
The American disaster response system functions admirably during the vast
majority o f disasters. The system quickly arranges for emergency shelter,
food distribution, medical care, and monetary distributions to disaster
victims. However, the disaster response system is imperfect since the
coordination o f these fragmented resources is extremely cumbersome.
(Mener, 2007, p. 56)
Since 9/11, the principles of transparency, cooperation, and collaboration at
the core o f disaster management appear to be replaced a new command-andcontrol-based domestic security system. Furthermore, security initiatives to
protect cities have gone forward following the creation and subsequent
reorganization o f DHS, complicating shared governance. (Hidek, 2010, p.
51)
As we continue to search for more optimal pathways, we can expect
domestic preparedness to be complicated by a national system where
disasters are governed by multiple regulations - namely the Stafford Act, the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Post Katrina Emergency Management
Reform Act o f 2006, and the National Response Framework. These many
plans reflect the long history o f U.S. disaster policy, through which
competing interests and groups have been cobbled together to build new
agencies, and layers o f statutes have been built upon existing guidelines
without modifying previous statutes or reassessing the assumptions upon
which they rest. (Hidek, 2010, p. 253)
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2.

Poor Policy Formulation (Epistemological Problems) and Lack of

T raining
The United States must acknowledge that disaster losses are rising and that a
more proactive approach will be required (p. 17). Policy makers need to
develop a more coherent disaster policy that is integrated at all levels of
government (p. 18). Instead o f writing emergency operations plans, we need
to find ways to reduce vulnerability and enhance capabilities. (McEntire,
(n.d.), p. 17)
If you surveyed my American colleagues, you would find little to no
understanding o f the disaster response system. Virtually nobody has read the
426 page all-hazards plan titled the National Response Plan, and with the
exception o f some major cities, few emergency response agencies have
reinforced or protected emergency infrastructure. (Mener, 2007, p. 2)
Poor policy formulation and lack o f training limit the ability o f public
officials to prevent disasters or react to them in an effective manner.
(McEntire, (n.d.), p. 4)
There is not an established Emergency Management Doctrine. (Blanchard,
2007, p. 3)
Although there is obviously a need to develop a theory of emergency
management, there is no guarantee that this task will be easy. In fact, there
are several major epistemological problems that are hindering the
development o f knowledge in this area. (McEntire, 2004, p. 5)
To be successful, emergency managers need sufficient knowledge, training,
and experience to be able to navigate within the bigger waters. (Blanchard,
2007, p. 3)
An epistemological hurdle hinges on the definition o f emergency
management, which is analogous to the conceptual problem o f disaster. The
term emergency management has at least two significant defects. The very
name o f the field we study is a misnomer. Emergency managers are not
really concerned about emergencies; they are instead interested in larger
events that have community-wide impact. (McEntire and Marshall 2003, p.
222)
There are serious epistemological problems facing those who study
emergency management. These challenges range from disagreement about
theoretical concepts and faulty assumptions about the human role in disasters
to disputes about the inclusion o f various disciplines and the relative merit of
competing paradigms. (McEntire and Marshall 2003, p. 226)
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Emergency Management is an oxymoron. It may unintentionally suggest
that we can control or always effectively deal with extreme events. While it
is true that we are able to prevent some disasters or reduce their adverse
impacts, we are less likely to manage our responses to these events in a
totally effective manner. (McEntire and Marshall 2003, p. 223)
The term “emergency management” has at least three significant problems.
First, as scholars we are really interested in disasters, not emergencies.
Second, the focus on “emergency” makes the field reactive and limits its
applicability to first responders. Third, emergency management may imply
that we have total control in our ability to deal with the adverse occurrences
we call disasters. Hence, emergency management is both a misnomer and an
oxymoron. But a suitable replacement has not been found, and one may
never be accepted due to the increasing professional recognition o f the name
emergency management. (McEntire, 2004, p. 5)
The current language of emergency management (and homeland security)
seems to confirm the theorems suggested by Kaplan (Baird, 2010, p. 42):
Theorem 1: 50% of the problems in the world result from people
using the same words with different meanings.
Theorem 2: The other 50% comes from people using different words
with the same meaning.
The four phases o f emergency management present an additional
epistemological problem and the complexities of these phases have already
been explored by researchers in terms o f overlap and fluidity. (McEntire and
Marshall 2003, p. 224)
Although the “four phases” are part of the common language and theoretical
underpinning o f emergency management in the U.S., a number of
adaptations can be found. Some sources now refer to five phases rather than
four. Others have changed the descriptive terms for one or more o f the
phases. Important sources appear to disagree on the language, and a number
o f government publications examined as part o f this research are more
confusing than informative. (Baird, 2010, p. 7)
Adding to the confusion, the core National Response Framework document
also refers to “the three phases o f effective response: prepare, respond, and
recover” . That is not a typo, three phases of response. (Baird, 2010, p. 10)
Confusing matters a bit, after the creation of the Department o f Homeland
Security, RAND Corporation employees under contract to DHS to develop
the National Response Plan and the National Incident Management System
invented their own terminology - what I call the Five Phases o f Homeland
Security: Prevention, Mitigation, Readiness, Response and Recovery. This
new terminology was invented, according to those I have communicated with
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who came into contact with RAND personnel during the review phase of the
earlier conceptions o f the NRP, to play to the law enforcement and
intelligence communities and their mission o f preventing terrorism. As
noted earlier, emergency management and homeland security are not
synonymous. The newly invented Five Phases of Homeland Security
operate within Homeland Security and do not supplant or replace the Four
Phases o f Emergency Management - which is, again, all-hazards, all-phases,
all-actors. (Blanchard, 2007, p. 19)
Despite having responded to thousands of natural disasters and numerous
terrorist attacks, at present the United States government at the federal, state,
and local levels is exceedingly unprepared to handle the immediate
aftereffects o f disasters. The federal government has created numerous large
bureaucracies and congressional panels as well as generated hundreds of
official reports each o f which purports to detail appropriate disaster response
guidelines. Nonetheless, the improvements since the first disaster response
plan was implemented during World War I are not palpable. (Mener, 2007,
p. 3)
Blanchard (2007) acknowledges the communication o f Mike Selves, the
Emergency Manager for Johnson County Kansas, and President of the International
Association o f Emergency Managers, a summary follows as:
.. .Our current problems with FEMA and the role of emergency management
in the federal structure stems, in my humble opinion, almost entirely from
the lack o f any generally understanding or acceptance of these basics... We
are requiring NIMS training o f virtually everyone in the country, what good
is NIMS training if you don't understand the context within which NIMS
must operate. The current screw up o f preparedness and response concepts
at the Federal level is due to this problem o f defining everything using an
"emergency services" first responder framework. Our efforts on Capitol Hill
have only bom any fruit at all because we are finally getting some key
members and staffers to understand this bigger picture. The system is not
failing because first responders need more attention; it is failing because the
coordinators and decision-makers need more attention... (p. 2)
...one o f the biggest challenges emergency managers face, as a profession,
is dispelling the misconception that our function is simply the sum total o f
the efforts and resources of the emergency services. The public can identify
with firefighters, police and EMTs. However, the idea that there is a
profession o f public administration, called Emergency Management, whose
job is to facilitate the creation o f basic disaster policy framework and to
coordinate the implementation of the policy during a disaster, is not well
understood. Our job ties together not only the responders but also the
decision makers, public and private agencies not normally associated with
emergency response and a whole array of other elements o f the local
community before, during and after any disaster event... (p. 6)
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APPENDIX B - SECURITY OPERATIONS

During the long history o f Homeland Security, including 'disaster response,'
which dates back to 1800s, military doctrine has had a significant role in the development
o f relevant concepts linked to disaster response activities, particularly Public Safety and
Security. As Neiman (2001) and Hidek (2010) discussed in a similar way, Mener (2007)
highlights the security aspects of the military doctrine on the disaster management:
The overwhelming influence o f the military doctrine on the disaster
management and security related planning efforts is undeniable since the
historical references o f the military knowledge dates back for a long time.
When federal disaster management was necessary, the military was the
primary coordinator and source of manpower, (p. 7)

In the military literature, although 'security' usually implies defensive
characteristics,43 it is one o f the twelve principles o f Joint Operations. Joint Publication
3-0 (Joint Operations, 2011) states “the purpose of security is to prevent the enemy from
acquiring unexpected advantage; security enhances freedom o f action by reducing
friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise” (p. A-3), while Offense and
Defense (2012) states “the ultimate goal of security operations is to protect the force from
surprise and reduce the unknowns in any situation. Security operations encompass five
tasks: screen, guard, cover, area security, and local security” (p. 5-3). In the context o f the
Joint Security Operations concept, the key joint security related functions and nodes are
depicted in Figure 36.

43 There are five general characteristics o f the successful defense: preparation, security, disruption, massing effects, and
flexibility (Urban operations, 2006, p. 8-1).
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KEY JO INT SECU R ITY AREA
RELATED FU N C TIO N S /N O D E S

Figure 36

FUNCTIONS

|

NODES

I

Force Projection
Movement Control
Sustainment
Command and Control

|
§
§
1

Airbases/Airfields/Forward
Arming and Refueling Points
Seaports
Sea Bases

|
|
|
|

Key Joint Security Functions and Nodes (Joint Security Operations in
Theater, 2010, p. 1-6)

Stability Operations (2008) defines the basic elements of the security sector and
their characteristics: “The security sector consists of both uniformed forces - police and
military - and civilian agencies and organizations operating at various levels within the
operational environment. Elements o f the security sector are interdependent; the activities
of one element significantly affect other elements” (p. 6-13). In a wider context, the
excerpts in Table 17 provide a panoramic perspective for the concept o f Security
Operations, which has been delineated in various military references.
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Table 17

JP 3-07, Stability
Operations, (2011)

JP 3-10, Joint
Security
Operations in
Theater, (2010)

FM 3-07.31, Peace
Operations MultiService Tactics,
Techniques, and
Procedures for
Conducting Peace
Operations
(w/change 1),
(2003)

FM 3-21.8, The
Infantry Rifle
Platoon and Squad,
(2007)

Security Operations

Population Security. To provide protection to the population,
JFCs employ a range of techniques (p. III-15);
(1) Static protection o f key sites (e.g., market places or
refugee camps)
(2) Persistent security in areas secured and held (e.g.,
intensive patrolling and check points)
(3) Targeted action against adversaries (e.g., search or strike
operations)
(4) Population control measures (e.g., curfews and vehicle
restrictions).
Active Security. The active Lines o f Communications (LOC)
security techniques include measures initiated to achieve positive
control of the LOCs and reduce the threat. Active security
includes (p. V-4);
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Patrols
Snipers
Fighting positions along LOCs
Check points
Route sweeps

Fixed Site Security techniques. Commanders may combine and
vary these techniques according to the local situation (p. III-3);
(1) Periodic observation by patrols, to include over flights
(2) Obstacles
(3) Electronic monitoring
(4) Guards - periodic or permanent
(5) Patrols should make periodic, random checks o f guard
posts
Techniques used to perform Security Operations are (p. H-2);
(1) Observation post
(2) Combat outpost
(3) Battle position
(4) Patrols
(5) Combat formations
(6) Movement techniques
(7) Infiltration
(8) Movement to contact
(9) Dismounted, mounted, and air insertion
(10) Roadblocks
(11) Checkpoints
(12) Convoy and route security
(13) Searches

183

Table 17

ADRP 3-90,
Offense and
Defense, (2012)

FM 3-21.8, The
Infantry Rifle
Platoon and Squad,
(2007)

ATTP 3-39.10,
Law and Order
Operations, (2011)

FM 3-19.4,
Military Police
Leaders'
Handbook, (2002)

Continued

Security operations encompass five tasks (p. 5-3);
(1) Screen
(2) Guard
(3) Cover
(4) Area security
(5) Local security
Security in the defense includes all active and passive measures
taken to avoid detection by the enemy, deceive the enemy, and
deny enemy reconnaissance elements accurate information on
friendly positions. The two primary tools available to the platoon
leader are Observation Posts and Patrols (p. 8-21).
Law Enforcement specific activities include (p. 3-8);
(1) Police station operations
(2) LE patrolling
(3) Traffic enforcement operations
(4) Criminal investigations
(5) Employment o f forensic and biometric capabilities
(6) Detention cell operations
Area Security. Military Police activities that support Area
Security include reconnaissance operations, Area Damage Control
(ADC), base and Air Base Defense (ABD), response force
operations, and critical site asset and high-risk personnel security
(P- 6-1).

Security. Early warning o f pending actions ensures the base
FM 3-24.2,
commander time to react to any insurgent threat. Outposts, patrols,
Tactics in
ground surveillance and counter mortar radar, military working
Counterinsurgency,
dogs teams, and air reconnaissance and surveillance provide early
(2009)
warning (p. 6-11).
Military Police support law-enforcement operations by (p.3-2);
(1) Providing liaison teams with local, state, and federal
agencies; Host Nation police; and joint and multinational
agencies.
(2) Employing Special Reactions Teams and hostagenegotiation teams.
(3) Providing traffic enforcement, Main Supply Route
FM 3-19.1,
regulation enforcement, and other route-control measures.
Military Police
(4) Employing Military Working Dogs.
Operations,
(5) Conducting Military Police investigations (criminal and
(2001)
noncriminal).
(6) Conducting patrolling, area security, and surveillance
measures.
(7) Implementing applicable threat-condition measures.
(8) Conducting and implementing other law-enforcement
measures as required by the commander.
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As a snapshot that epitomizes the whole picture, the techniques or missions
employed in security operations could be classified into four groups: active security,
early warning, static physical security and other techniques (listed in Table 18). Within
these techniques, patrol or patrolling' is the most significant, and mostly employed
technique for uniformed forces to maintain the security o f urban areas. The quotes
included in Table 19 provide insight that supports the rationale behind this assumption.
Usually patrols are executed by the Patrol Divisions o f Police Departments in the sectors
assigned within borders o f the jurisdiction.

Table 18

Security Operations Techniques/Missions
Patrol

Active Security Techniques

Guard
Response/Reaction Force

Early Warning Techniques

Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR)

Static Physical Security

Fences, Barriers, Intrusion

Techniques

Detections Systems, Lighting, etc.
Curfew, Restrictions, Criminal

Other Techniques

Investigations, Employment of
Forensic and Biometric
Capabilities, etc.

185

Table 19

Emergency Support
Function #13
(2008)

Norfolk Police
Department Annual
Report (2010)

Select Bipartisan
Committee (2006)

Patrolling in the Urban Areas

Providing basic law enforcement assistance to Federal,
State, tribal, and local agencies during incidents that
require a coordinated Federal response. Such assistance
may include conducting routine patrol functions and
making arrests as circumstances may require (p. 4).
Police services are provided to communities using a variety
o f traditional and non-traditional means, including marked
patrol units, bicycle patrol, walking beats, and concentrated
enforcement sweeps (p. 34).
These agencies brought a wide array of capabilities and
tactical teams to help restore and maintain law and order.
Most o f the federal personnel were deputized as state law
enforcement officials, so they could fully partner with local
police by participating in patrols, investigating crimes, and
arresting suspects (p. 242).
The Louisiana National Guard was deployed before
landfall, and provided security at the Superdome that
helped maintain order there. Once looting broke out in
New Orleans, they also patrolled the streets (p. 242).

In the context o f military concept of operations, other techniques like Guard' and
'Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance' (ISR) are also critical for the
sustainment o f security. They are usually performed with patrol missions to support each
other. The deployment o f response' or reaction' forces is a common practice to
maintain the security of military bases or base clusters when necessary. Brief explanatory
information is included below:

Patrol. The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad (2007) defines 'patrol,' which is the
major technique in practice for the execution of security operations:
A patrol is sent out by a larger unit to conduct a specific combat,
reconnaissance, or security mission. The terms “patrolling” or “conducting a
patrol” are used to refer to the semi-independent operation conducted to
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accomplish the patrol’s mission. Patrols require a specific task and purpose.
(p. 9-1)

Guard. A guard force is “an effective and useful component o f a facility’s
physical security program” (Physical Security Handbook, 2005, p. 61). A guard is “a
security task to protect the main body by fighting to gain time while also observing and
reporting information and preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against
the main body” (Offense and Defense, 2012, p. 5-3). Guard is a term used when referring
to:
•

A special unit responsible to the officer o f the day for the protection and
security o f an installation or area.

•

An individual responsible to keep watch over, protect, shield, defend,
warn, or any duties prescribed by general orders and/or special orders
(Guard Duty, 1971, p. 2-2).

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). ISR is “an activity that
synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation o f sensors, assets, and processing,
exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support o f current and future
operations” (Operations, 2011, p. 4-8).
ISR “identifies information gaps and the most appropriate assets for collecting
information to fill them; ISR synchronization considers all assets - both internal and
external to the organization” (Operations, 2011, p. 4-8). Within this context, satellites,
radars, detection sensors, stationary or mobile cameras, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV),
planes, helicopters, etc. are the most common ISR assets utilized in military and police
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security operations. Buddelmeyer (2007) underlines the significance o f ISR assets which
have supported the Hurricane Katrina post-disaster activities:
Hurricane Katrina also demonstrated the exceptional value o f military
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets for use in
disaster relief operations. For the first time, Air Force, Air National
Guard, and DHS ISR assets were called to domestic contingency
service to provide imagery and full-motion video to military decision
makers and on-scene response providers, (p. 26)

Response/Reaction Force. Military Police Operations (2001) states that “a
response force is summoned when the base or base cluster is faced with threat forces that
are beyond their self-defense capability” (p. 3-7), while Tactics (2001) states “the
response force moves quickly to counter the enemy before he can extensively damage the
base; the base commander lifts or shifts base defense fires to support the maneuver o f the
response force” (p. E-28). Tactics in Counterinsurgency (2009) also defines the Quick
Reaction Force (QRF) as “a designated organization for any immediate response
requirement that occurs in a designated area o f operation; a QRF increases the overall
flexibility o f a base defense and is available for contingencies” (p. 6-12). In a similar
vein, Physical Security (2010) groups the forces that respond to major threats on military
installations in the following categories (p. 9-3):
•

Emergency responders

•

Special reaction teams

•

Other response forces
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APPENDIX C - URBAN AREA DEFENSE

Public Safety and Security in the context o f the post-disaster urban environment
can be best linked to Urban Area Defense in the military concept o f operations. However,
as already been said before, there is limited information in the military literature
regarding the identification o f force tailoring and unit positioning requirements of the
troops to be deployed, or security operations techniques which could be executed in the
post-disaster urban area.
In the context o f Military security concept o f operations; the security paradigm is
usually managed through the principles o f MDMP as a common approach applied for all
military actions that requires the commander's decision. For the particular requirements
linked to post-disaster urban security, the military references usually advice general
approaches and techniques without providing specified direction, guidance, criteria sets,
etc.
In this sense, the following paragraphs, which represent the best tangible military
considerations, have been excerpted from Urban Operations (2006). They could be
exploited during the assessment o f post-disaster urban security requirements noted in this
research:
The urban operational framework - understand, shape, engage, consolidate,
and transition - provides structure to developing considerations for defensive
operations. The considerations can vary depending on the level o f war at
which the operation is conducted, the type o f defense, and the situation. Most
issues discussed may, in the right circumstances, apply to both commanders
conducting major Urban Operations and commanders at lower tactical levels
of command, (p. 8-9)
The urban operational framework assists commanders in visualizing urban
operations. This framework is simply an aid to the commander. It is not
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sequential, nor is it a planner’s tool for phasing an operation. Commanders
should combine the urban operational framework with (p. 6-1):
• The principles of war.
• The tenets o f Army operations.
• The components of operational design.
•
Considerations for stability operations and civil support operations.
•
Sustainment characteristics.
• Running estimates.
•
Commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR).
• Each commander’s experience.
The commander defending in the urban area must assess many factors. His
mission statement and guidance from higher commanders help him focus his
assessment. If the mission is to deny a threat access to port facilities in an
urban area, the commander’s assessment will be focused much differently
than if the mission is to deny the threat control over the entire urban area. The
mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time
available, civil considerations (METT-TC)44 structure guides the
commander’s assessment. O f these, the impacts o f the threat and
environment— to include the terrain, weather, and civil considerations— are
significant to the commander’s understanding of urban defensive operations,
(p. 8-9)
In the urban defense, a key element is the commander’s understanding o f the
threat. One o f his primary concerns is to determine the attacker’s general
scheme, methodology, or concept. Overall, the attacker may take one o f two
approaches. The most obvious would be a direct approach aimed at seizing
the objectives in the area by a frontal attack. A more sophisticated approach
would be indirect and begin by isolating Army forces defending the urban
area. Innumerable combinations of these two extremes exist, but the threat’s
intentions toward the urban area will favor one approach over another. The
defending Army commander (whose AO includes but is not limited to the
urban area) conducts defensive planning, particularly his allocation o f forces,
based on this initial assessment of threat intentions. This assessment
determines whether the commander’s primary concern is preventing isolation
by defeating threat efforts outside the area or defeating a threat attacking the
urban area directly. For the higher commander, this assessment determines
how he allocates forces in and outside the urban area. For the commander in
the urban area, this assessment clarifies threats to sustainment operations and
helps shape how he arrays his forces, (p. 8-9)

44 METT-TC is a memory aid that identifies the mission variables: Mission, Enemy, Terrain and weather, Troops and
support available, Time available, and Civil considerations. It is used in information management (the major categories
o f relevant information) and in tactics (the major variables considered during mission analysis). Mission analysis
describes characteristics o f the area o f operations in terms o f METT-TC, focusing on how they might affect the mission
(Operations, 2011, 6-8).
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A second key assessment is the defensive qualities o f the urban environment.
This understanding, as in any defensive scenario, is based on mission
requirements and on a systemic analysis of the terrain in terms o f observation
and fields o f fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and
concealment (OAKOC), It is also based on potential chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear and fire hazards that may be present in the urban area.
This understanding accounts for the unique characteristics o f urban terrain,
population, and infrastructure, (p. 8-9)
Generally, units occupy less terrain in urban areas than more open areas. For
example, an infantry company, which might occupy 1,500 to 2,000 meters in
open terrain, is usually restricted to a frontage of 300 to 800 meters in urban
areas. The density o f building in the urban area, building sizes and heights,
construction materials, rubble, and street patterns will dictate the actual
frontage o f units; however, for initial planning purposes, Table 20 provides
approximate frontages and depths for units defending in an urban area. (p. 89)

Table 20

Approximate Defensive Frontages and Depths (Urban Operations, 2006,
p. 8-10)

UNIT
Frontage (Blocks*)
Battalion
4 -8
3 -4
Company
1 -2
Platoon
‘Average block is 175 meters

Depth (Blocks*)
3 -6
2 -3
1

Furthermore, the intelligence preparation o f the battlefield (IPB) is a
methodology which allows commanders to develop the situational
understanding necessary to visualize, describe, and direct subordinates in
successfully accomplishing the mission especially when the complexity o f the
urban environment and increased number o f variables (and their infinite
combinations) increases the difficulty o f providing timely, relevant, and
effective intelligence support to urban operations), (p. B-l)
IPB is the systematic process o f analyzing the threat and environment in a
specific geographic area - the area o f operations (AO) and its associated area
o f interest (see Figure 37). It provides the basis for intelligence support to
current and future UO, drives the military decision-making process, and
supports targeting and battle damage assessment. The procedure is performed
continuously throughout the planning, preparation, and execution o f an urban
operation, (p. B -l)
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Figure 37

Steps of IPB (Urban Operations, 2006, p. B -l)
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APPENDIX D - MEASUREMENT OF BASIC CRITICALITY INDEX (BCI)
The BCI provides a relative score between 0 and 1. BCI, for each critical asset, is
obtained through the process of the formula which is included in the relevant key
sector/service row at Table 21.
Table 21

No

Basic Criticality Index (BCI) Assessment Matrix

Urban Area K ey Sectors/Services

BCI(i)

1

Governance, Homeland Security,
Law Public Order, Emergency Service

BCI1

SI x (SRW1 UEW 1)

2

Housing Accommodation

BCI2

52 x (EW2 U OW2)

3

Power Energy Service (Power plants,
nuclear reactors, dams, fitel supply
stations, etc.)

BCD

53 x (SRW3 U EW3)

4

Healthcare and Public Health

BCI4

S4 x (SRW4 U EW4)

5

Telecommunication (including
Information Technology)

BCD

S5 x (SRW5 U EW5)

6

Transportation Postal and Shipping
Service (including airports, major
transportation terminals)

BCI6

S6 x (SRW6 U EW6)

7

Food Water and Other Goods Service
(Shopping malls, major retail, etc.)

BCI7

S7 x (EW7 U SW7)

8

Banking and Finance (including
banks ATMs, etc.)

BCI8

S8 x (SRW8 U EW8)

9

Critical Manufacturing (including major
industrial facilities)

BCI9

S9 x (EW9 U IW9)

10

Training and Education Activities
(including schools)

BCI10

S10 x(EW10 U STW 10)

11

Worship Activities (Places of worship,
etc.)

BCI 11

S ll x (EW11 USCW11)

Variables: Si: Scaling Constant: SRW: Service Relativity Weight; EW: Employment Weight;

OW: Occupancy Weight; SW: Size Weight; IW: Investment Weight: STW: Student Capacity
Weight; SCW: Seating Capacity Weight
The combination rule for the formulas: A U B = (A+B) - (AxB)
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Measurement of the Variables43
1.

Scaling Constant (Si):
The Scaling Constant is a number between 0 and 1 which indicates the relative

importance o f each urban area key sector/service component with respect to each other
(Table 22). To ensure consistency throughout the assessment process, scaling constants
should be assigned by local, state or federal authorities centrally, and the assigned
weights should be applied for all assets located at the assessment area o f responsibility.

Table 22

Scaling Constant Matrix (Relative Importance o f Urban Area Key
Sectors/Services)

No

1

Urban Area Key Sectors/Services

Scaling
Constant (Si)

Governance, Homeland Security, Law/Public Order,
Emergency Service

2 Housing/Accommodation
PowerEnergy Service (Power plants, nuclear reactors,
3

dams, fuel supply stations, etc.)

4 Healthcare and Public Health
5

Telecommunication (including Information Technology)
Transportation/Postal and Shipping Service (including

6

airports, major transportation terminals)
Food/Water and Other Goods Service (Shopping malls,

7
major retail, etc.)
8

Banking and Finance (including banks/ATMs, etc.)
Critical Manufacturing (including major industrial

9

facilities)

10 Training and Education Activities (including schools)
11 Worship Activities (Places o f worship, etc.)

45 Measurement o f the variables should be performed by the subject matter experts and the scales assigned for each
assessment matrix should be optimized in future with further experimentation to produce more precise results.
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2.

Service Relativity Weight (SRW):
Service Relativity Weight is a number between 0 and 1 (see Table 23) that

indicates the relative importance o f the asset with respect to ones that perform similar
functions in that specific sector/service which is one of the 12 key urban area
sectors/services.

Table 23

Service Relativity Weight Assessment Matrix
Service Relativity Weight (SRW )
Seven-level linguistic scale

S
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Numerical scale

specific sector/service
0.01

3.
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£
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_

E
3
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Nom

o f the asset with respect

1

\

—

Very

CL

1

•m2

Relative importance

u-

Semantic Description

0.1

0.2-0.3

0.4

0.5-0.6

0.7

1
j
; 0.8-0.9

1

Employment Weight (EW ):
Employment Weight is a number between 0 and 1 (see Table 24) that indicates

the relative weight o f the asset with respect to employee occupancy during day and night.
Table 24

Employment Weight Assessment Matrix

Employment Weight (EW)
Approximate
Number of
Employees/Personnel

Q2

N

n
Occupancy
Time

o
in
-L
«*>

e©

o
®1

e
N1
o

oo

ir,

ee
SO
o1

oe
00
6
3
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e
2
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e
^o3
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Day (D)

0 .0 1

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

Night (N)

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

EW

(D+N)/2
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4.

Occupancy Weight (OW):
Occupancy Weight is a number between 0 and 1 (see Table 25) that indicates the

relative weight o f the asset with respect to approximate inhabitant/visitor occupancy
during day and night.

Table 25

Occupancy Weight Assessment Matrix

200-300

300-400

400-600

600-800

Above 800

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

10-25

©
o
i
ee

Below 10

001 -o s

N

Approximate
Number of
Inhabitants/Visitors
Day (D)

0.01

0.1

Night (N)

0.1

0.2

0.3

Occupancy
Time

OW

5.

25-50

Occupancy Weight (OW)

(D+N)/2

Size Weight (SW):
Size Weight is a number between 0 and 1 (see Table 26) that indicates the relative

weight o f the asset with respect to the size o f itself (the weight which locates at box of
intersection o f the matching story number row and size column gives the relative weight).
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Table 26

Size W eight A ssessm ent Matrix

0.3

0.4

0.5

Above 200.000

0.2

100.000- 200.000

4000-6000

1

Single Story

20.000 - 50.000

2000-4000

0.1

(Square Feet)

10.000-20.000

1000-2000

OOO'Ol -0009

0.01

Asset Size/Area

000 0 0 1 -ooo os

Below 1000

i

Size Weight (SW)
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0.7
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4-5

0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.75 0.85 0.95

6-10

0.075 0.175 0.275 0.375 0.475 0.575 0.675 0.775 0.875 0.975

Multistorey

6.

0.2

0.1

Above 10

0.4

0.3

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

Investment Weight (IW):
Investment Weight is a number between 0 and 1 (see Table 27) that indicates the

relative weight o f the asset with respect to the amount of the money invested for it.

Table 27

Investment Weight Assessment Matrix
In v estm e n t W eight (IW )
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7.

Student Capacity W eight (STW):

Student Capacity Weight is a number between 0 and 1 (see Table 28) that
indicates the relative weight o f the training and education related asset with respect to the
amount o f the student capacity that the asset offers.

Table 28

Student Capacity Weight Assessment Matrix
Student Capacity Weight (STW)
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Seating Capacity Weight (SCW)
Seating Capacity Weight is a number between 0 and 1 (see Table 29) that

indicates the relative weight of the worship related asset with respect to the amount o f the
seating capacity that the asset offers.

Table 29

Seating Capacity Weight Assessment Matrix
Seating Capacity' Weight (SCW7)
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APPENDIX E - MEASUREMENT OF INPUT VARIABLES
1.

Scaling Constants (sc):
The Scaling Constants (sc) are numbers between 0 and 1 which indicates the

relative importance o f each criterion in comparison with the others (Table 30). Scaling
Constants are assigned by subject matter experts.
Table 30

Scaling Constants per each Criterion

Criterion

2.

Scaling Constant
(0-1)

Physical Security

scl

Number o f Inhabitants/Visitors

sc2

Size/Area

sc3

Traffic Access/Mobility

sc4

Vulnerability Indexes of the Critical Asset per each Criterion:
a. V(C1): Vulnerability Index of the Critical Asset for Physical Security:
Physical Security Vulnerability Index V(C1) for each critical asset is obtained

through the utilization o f Table 31, 32, 33, 34. V(C1) provides a weight between 0 and
10 .

Table 31

Physical Security Vulnerability Index

Physical Security Vulnerability Index - V(C1)
l

Perimeter security index (Vp)

2

Building envelope wall type index (Vw)

3

Building envelope fenestration index (Vf)

V(C1) = (Vp+Vw+Vf) / 3

199
Table 32

Perimeter Security Index

Perimeter Security Index (Vp)
The overall efficiency o f p e rim ete r fences/w alls,
g a te s, access c o n tro l, o u td o o r barriers, e tc.

Semantic Description

£

00

o

X

__J

E

Seven-level linguistic scale

Ten-point numerical scale (V)

£

a)

o

10

8-9

>

3
a>
6-7

E

3

TJ
<L>

4-5

E

x
>*
ai

2-3

0.1

Vp

Table 33

Building Envelope Wall Type Index

Building Envelope Wall Type Index (Vw)*
M ean value o f

Normalized W all

standoff distances

Type Index

(M s) (ft)

V w = M s /M s m a x *1 0

Reinforced Concrete

29.5

1.2

Reinforced M asonry

38.5

1.6

Girts

53.3

2.2

W ood Studs - Brick Veneer

58.3

2.5

European Block

66.8

2.8

M etal Panels

88.5

3.7

Unreinforced Masonry

110.5

4 .6

M etal Studs - Brick Veneer

120.4

5.1

W ood Studs - EIFS

126.4

5.3

M etal Studs - EIFS

237.9

10

W all Type

* Wall Type Index values have been derived from the mean values of the
conventional construction standoff distances identified for each type of
the wall (Unified Facilities Criteria, 2012, p.51). The Wall Type Index
represent the weight of the asset s vulnerability in terms of the
protection degree of them.

op

3
-a
a»
2

>
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Table 34

Building Envelope Fenestration Index

Building Envelope Fenestration Index (Vf)
The percentage of the
area of glazed surface

5

5-10

10-15

15-30

30-45

4 5 -7 0

7 0-1 0 0

1

2

3

4

5-6

7-8

9 -1 0

in each facade (%)
Index Value*

2 V i * * / (Total number o f fagades+1)

Vf

Vi: U tility value for each facade/direction
* Index Value scale represent the general guidelines for windows and glazing
delineated in FEMA 426 (Reference M anual, 2003).
**U tility value for the primary facade (street side) is doubled while processing
the formula since it is exposed to potential threats directly.

b.

V(C2): Vulnerability Index of the Critical Asset for Number of
Inhabitants/Visitors:
Inhabitant/Visitor Number Vulnerability Index V(C2) for each critical asset

is obtained through the utilization o f Table 35. V(C2) provides a weight between 0 and
10 .

Table 35

Inhabitant/Visitor Number Vulnerability Index

Inhabitant/Visitor Number Vulnerability Index - V(C2)
Approximate Number
of Inhabitants/Visitors

H

3o
CO

Day (D)

t

i

o

o

CM

in

H

<N

o
o
in
I
o
m

o
LT>

fM
1
H

o
in

o
o
tH

o
o

fM

i

o
o

mI

o
in

r^■.

o
o
o
yH
■

8
o
H

o
in

o

s
n
<

0 .1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Occupancy
Time
Night (N)

V(C2)

(D+N)/2
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c.

V (C3): Vulnerability Index o f the Critical A sset for Size/Area:

Size/Area Vulnerability Index V(C3) for each critical asset is obtained
through the utilization o f Table 36. V(C3) provides a weight between 0 and 10.

Table 36

Size/Area Vulnerability Index

1000 - 2000

2000 - 4000

4000 - 6000

00001 - 0009

000 0Z - 000 01

20.000 - 50.000

000001 - OOO'OS

100.000 - 200.000

Above 200.000

V(C3)

Below 1000

S iz e /A re a V u ln e ra b ility In d ex

l

0.1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

2-3

0.25

1.25

2.25

3.25

4.25

5.25

6.25

7.25

8.25

9.25

4-5

0.5

1.5

2.5

3.5

4.5

5.5

6.5

7.5

8.5

9.5

6-10

0.75

1.75

2.75

3.75

4.75

5.75

6.75

7.75

8.75

9.75

Above 10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Asset Size/Area (sf)

Single Story

Multistorey

V(C3)

d.

V(C4): Vulnerability Index of the Critical Asset for Traffic Access/Mobility:
Traffic Access/Mobility Vulnerability Index V(C4) for each critical asset is

obtained through the utilization of Table 37, 38, 39, 40, 41. V(C4) provides a weight
between 0 and 10.
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Table 37

Traffic A ccess/M obility Vulnerability Index

T raffic A c c e s s /M o b ility V u ln e ra b ility Index - V(C4)
l

Periphery Road Width Index (Vp)

2

Adjacent Primary Roads Proximity Index (Va)

3

Bridge D ependency Index (Vb)

4

Transportation Terminals Proximity Index (Vt)

V(C4) = (Vp+Va+Vb+Vt) / 4

Table 38

Periphery Road Width Index

P e rip h e ry Road W id th Index (Vr)
Road surfacing w id th (including
m edian w id th )

No Road B elow 25

25-50

50-80

80-150

A b ove 150

6-7

4-5

2-3

1

(ft)*
Index V alue

The
roads/streets
encircling the
asset

10

8-9

North side (N i)
East side (Ei)
South side (Si)
W est side (W i)

Vr

(Ni+Ei+Si+Wi) / 4

• S treet patterns (and w idths) influence all w arfighting functions; how ever, th e y greatly
affec t m o v e m e n t and m aneuver, com m and and control, and sustainm ent (Urban
Operations, 2006, p. 6). S tre et w idths are grouped in to th re e m ajo r classes (Com bined Arms
O perations in Urban Terrain, 2011, p. A - l l ) ;
•

Seven to 15 m eters, located in o ld e r historical sections o f pre-industrial cities.

•
•

F ifteen to 25 m eters, located in n e w e r planned sections o f m ost cities.
T w e n ty -fiv e to 50 m eters, located along broad boulevards o r set far apart on large
parcels o f land.
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Table 39

Adjacent Primary Roads Proximity Index

500-1000 ft

1000-1500 ft

1500-2000 ft

2000 f t -0.5 mi

0.5 - 0.75 mi

0.75 -1 mi

1-1.25 mi

1.25-1.5 mi

Above 1.5 mi

Approximate distance
from the asset to access
primary roads
(ft/mi)

Below 500 ft

A d ja c e n t P rim ary R o ad s P ro x im ity In d e x (Va)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

E x p ressw ay s/In terstates
(w ith 4 o r m o re lanes)
(Eli)
A rterials/C ollectors (w ith
2 o r m o re lanes)
(ACi)

(Eli+ACi)/2

Va

Table 40

Bridge Dependency Index

B ridge D e p e n d e n c y Index (Vb)
The level o f d ep en d e n c y to bridges (one o r
m ore) fo r access to th e asset w ithin a circle
a ro u n d th e a sse t w ith 10 miles radius

Semantic Description

$o

.C

_J

E

Seven-level linguistic scale

0J
>
Ten-point numerical scale

£O

2

0)

Qi

2-3

0.1

*x

>•
k.
<D

-a
CD
2

T3

T3

>

6-7

4-5

8-9

10

Vb

Table 41

Transportation Terminals Proximity Index

T ransportation T erm inals Proxim ity Index (Vt)
Approximate distance to
the nearest transportation
terminals
(mi)

H
3
o
o>

in

H

H

Airport (APi)

1

W aterw ay Term inal (WTi)

Railway Term inal (RTi)

Vt

H

fM

IN

m

m

vH
tH

VO
tH

tH
fM

ID
fM

tH

ID

m

ID

m

o
«a01
o
-Q
<

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

CO

o

(APi+WTi+RTi) / 3
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3.
Vulnerability Index Modifiers of the Critical Asset per each Possible System
State:
a.

M(S1): Vulnerability Index Modifier o f the Critical Asset for Offences against
Property:
Vulnerability Index Modifier for Offences against Property (M(S1) for each

critical asset is obtained through the utilization o f Table 42. M(S1) provides a weight
between 0 and 1.

Table 42

Vulnerability Index Modifier for Offences against Property

V u ln e r a b ility In d e x M o d if ie r f o r O f f e n c e s a g a in s t P r o p e r t y - M (S 1 )
Offences Against Property (like looting,larceny/theft,
burglary, arson, motor vehicle th e ft etc.)

Semantic Description

Seven-level linguistic scale

Very High

Medium

Medium

Low
Medium

High

having 'Offences Against
Property' during post
disaster environment.

Very Lew

Since the asset has
substantial
m aterial/property which
could attract criminals, it
h a s ........... probability of

High

System State (S I)

0.8-0.9

1

Numerical Scale
0.1

0.2-0.3

0 .4

0.5-0.6

0.7

M(S1)

b.

M(S2): Vulnerability Index Modifier o f the Critical Asset for Offences against
Persons:
Vulnerability Index Modifier for Offences against Persons (M(S2) for each

critical asset is obtained through the utilization o f Table 43. M(S2) provides a weight
between 0 and 1.
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Table 43

Vulnerability Index M odifier for O ffences against Persons

V u ln e ra b ility Index M o d ifier fo r O ffe n c e s a g a in s t P e rso n s - M (S2)
System State (S2)

O ffences Against Persons [like murder, sexual assault,
robbery, etc.]

Semantic Description

Seven-level linguistic sca le

Since th e a sse t is to have
isolated charateristics in
terms of location and building
structure which exp oses an
attractive target for roving
criminals, it h a s ..........
probability of having O ffences
Against Persons during post
d isaster environment.

00

X

I
<D

>

E

2
I

<V

5

£
<u
2

op
X
>
<u

E

D
T03>
5

k_

>

Numerical Scale
0.1

0.2-0.3

0 .4

0.5-0.6

0.7

0.8-0.9

M(S2)

c.

M(S3): Vulnerability Index Modifier o f the Critical Asset for Terrorist
Attacks/ Warfare Threats:
Vulnerability Index Modifier for Terrorist Attacks/ Warfare Threats (M(S3)

for each critical asset is obtained through the utilization o f Table 44. M(S3) provides a
weight between 0 and 1.
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Table 44

Vulnerability Index Modifier for Terrorist Attacks/ Warfare Threats
V ulnerability Index M odifier fo r T e rro rist A tta c k s / C onventional W arfare
T h reats - M(S3)

Sem antic D escription

Seven-level linguistic sca le

Very High

Medium

Low

High

T h rea ts' during p o st d isa ste r
environm ent w hich could m ake a

5
o

Me di um

local authorities, it h a s .......
probability of having "Terrorist
A ttacks/C onventional W arfare

Medium

Since th e a s s e t is a potential high
value ta rg e t having e ith e r high
occupancy o r any sym bolic value for

High

T errorist A ttac k s/ C onventional W arfare T hreats
(a g g re g a te d a ssa u lts , sa b o tag e s, etc.)

Very Low

System S tate (S3)

0.8-0.9

1

Num erical Scale
0.1

0.2-0.3

0.4

0.5-0.6

0.7

se v e re im pact on th e political scen e.

M(S3)

4.

Generalizability Grades of Membership per each Criterion:
a. G(C1): Generalizability Grades o f Membership for Physical Security:
G(C1) could be weighted in the city level and applied for all the other sub-

level asset estimations. It is obtained through the utilization o f Table 45, 46, 47, 48, and
provides a weight between 0 and 1.

Table 45

Generalizability Grades of Membership for Physical Security

G e n e ra liz a b ility G ra d e s o f M e m b e rs h ip fo r P hysical
S e c u rity - G(C1)
l

S e is m ic ity V u ln e ra b ility In d ex (Si)

2

H u rric a n e V u ln e ra b ility In d e x (H i)

3

Flood V u ln e ra b ility In d ex (Fi)
G (C 1) = (S i + H i + Fi) / 3
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Table 46

Seism icity Vulnerability Index

S e ism ic ity V u ln e ra b ility In d ex (Si)
Region o f S eism icity*

High

M o d e ra te

Low

N u m erical scale

0 .8 -1

0 .4 -0 .7

0 .1 - 0 . 3

Si
* See Figure 38

Region of Seismicity
*

High
Moderate
Low

1 J

d

Note:
(1) Based on NEHRP B-C soil type.
(2 ) The seismicity at any site is calculated based on the
highest seismicity at any point in a county. More
accurate information on any site can be obtained from
the USGS site, (http://geohazards.cr.usgs.gov/eq/)

Figure 38 Seismicity Regions o f the Conterminous United States (Rapid Visual
Screening, 2002, p. 66)
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Table 47

Hurricane Vulnerability Index

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

Numerical scale

Agree

Five-level linguistic scale

Strongly Agree

H u rrica n e V u ln e ra b ility In d e x (Hi)

1

0.75

0.5

0.25

0.01

The region stays on th e historical tracks
and seriously vulnerable to recurrent
hurricanes
Hi

Table 48

Flood Vulnerability Index

Flood V u ln e ra b ility In d ex (Fi)
<u
u.
DO

<D
(D
L_
Five-level linguistic scale

Numerical scale

The region is close to water m asses and
seriously vulnerable to potential floods
Fi

DO

<
>*
DO
C
4-»
CO

1

0<>v

(O
L.

a;
QJ
t.

DO

CO
CO
Q
>*
DO
C

<

0)

z

</)
Q

CO

0.75

0.5

0.25

0.01

DO

w
4-»
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b.

G (C 2 ):

Generalizability Grades o f Membership for Number o f

Inhabitants/V isi tors:
G(C2) could be weighted at least in the level o f police patrol divisions' area of
responsibility and applied for all the other sub-level asset estimations. It is obtained
through the utilization o f Table 49 and provides a weight between 0 and 1.

Table 49

Generalizability Grades o f Membership for Number o f Inhabitants/Visitors

G en eralizab ility G rad es of M e m b e rsh ip fo r N u m b er o f
In h a b ita n ts/V isito rs - G(C2)
Ns: Approximate number of available security agents serving in the sector
Pk: Approximate number of population inhabiting in the key a ssets in the
sector (day/night)
Pa: Approximate population in the sector
G(C2 )=

(Ns x Pk)/Pa

Gmax(C2): Highest Generalizability Grades o f Membership for Number of
Inhabitants/Visitors estim ated within the all area o f responsibility in the
sector level.
Gn(C2): Normalized Generalizability Grades of Membership for Number of
Inhabitants/Visitors which address vulnerability index.
Gn(C2)= 1 - G(C2 )/Gmax(C2)
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c.

G(C3): Generalizability Grades o f Membership for Size/Area:
G(C3) could be weighted at least in the level of police patrol divisions' area of

responsibility and applied for all the other sub-level asset estimations. It is obtained
through the utilization o f Table 50 and provides a weight between 0 and 1.

Table 50

Generalizability Grades of Membership for Size/Area

G en eralizab ility G rades o f M e m b e rsh ip fo r S ize/A rea - G(C3)

Ns: Approximate number of available security agents serving in the sector
Ak: Approximate sum of the key a s s e t areas in the sector (sq ft)
As: Approximate area of the sector (sq ft)
G(C3)= (N s x Ak)/A s

Gmax(C3): Highest Generalizability Grades of Membership for Size/Area
estim ated within the all area of responsibility in the sector level.
Gn(C3): Normalized Generalizability Grades of Membership for Size/Area
which address vulnerability index.
Gn(C3)= 1 - G(C3 )/Gmax(C3)

d.

G(C4): Generalizability Grades o f Membership for Traffic Access/Mobility:
G(C4) is obtained through the utilization of Table 51, 52, 53, 54, and provides

a weight between 0 and 1.
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Table 51

Generalizability Grades o f Membership for Traffic A ccess/M obility

G eneralizability G rades of M em bership
for Traffic A ccess/M obility - G(C4)
l

Road Length Index (Ri)

2

Transportation Lines Index (Ti)

3

Bridges Index (Bi)

G(C4) = (Ri + Ti + Bi) / 3

Table 52

Road Length Index

Road Length Index (Ri)
Es: Approximate sum of the length of Expressways/Interstates (with 4 or more lanes) in
the sector (mi)
As: Approximate sum of the length of Arterials/Collectors (with 2 or more lanes) in the
sector (mi)
Es(max): Highest length of Expressways/Interstates (with 4 or more lanes) in sector
level estimated within the all area of responsibility (mi)
As(max): Highest length of Arterials (with 2 or more lanes) in sector level estim ated
within the all area of responsibility (mi)
Ri = 1 - ( Es/Es(max) + As/As(m ax) ) / 2

Table 53

Transportation Lines Index

Transportation Lines Index (Ti)
The N u m b er o f Transpo rtatio n
T erm in als in th e Sector

No
T erm in al

1

2

3 and
abo ve

N um erical Scale

1

0 .7 - 0 .9

0 .3 - 0 .6

0 .1 - 0 .2

A irport (Ai)
W a te rw a y T erm in al (W i)
R ailw ay T erm in al (Ri)

Ti= (Ai+Wi+Ri)/3
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Table 54

Bridges Index

B ridges Index (Bi)
The Number of Bridges
in the Sector
Numerical Scale

No Bridge

1

2

3

0.01

0.1 - 0.3

0.4 - 0.6

0.7 - 0.9

4 and
above
1

Bi

5.

Generalizability Grades of Membership per each Possible System State:
G(S1): Generalizability Grades o f Membership for Offences against Property:

a.

G(S1) is obtained through the utilization o f Table 55 and provides a weight
between 0 and 1.
Table 55

Generalizability Grades of Membership for Offences against Property

G e n e ra liz a b ility G ra d e s o f M e m b e rs h ip f o r
O ffe n c e s a g a in s t P ro p e rty - G(S1)
Rep: Property Crime Rate in th e se cto r (yearly total num ber of
incidents)
Rcp(max): M aximum Property Crime R ate in th e se cto r level
(yearly total num ber of incidents)

G(S1)= Rep / Rcp(max)

G(S2): Generalizability Grades o f Membership for Offences against Persons:

b.

G(S2) is obtained through the utilization o f Table 56 and provides a weight
between 0 and 1.

213

Table 56

Generalizability Grades o f Membership for O ffences against Persons

G eneralizability G rades of M em bership
for O ffences against Persons - G(S2)
Rev: Violent Crime Rate in the sector (yearly total number of
incidents)
Rcv(max): Maximum Violent Crime Rate in the sector level
(yearly total number of incidents)
G(S2)= Rev / Rcv(max)

c.

G(S3): Generalizability Grades o f Membership for Terrorist Attacks/ Warfare
Threats:
G(S3) is obtained through the utilization o f Table 57 and provides a weight

between 0 and 1.

Table 57

Generalizability Grades o f Membership for Terrorist Attacks/
Warfare Threats

Generalizability Grades of Membership
for Terrorist Attacks/Conventional Warfare Threats - G(S3)
Terrorist Attacks/ Conventional Warfare Threats

System State (S3)

(aggregated assaults, sabotages, etc.)

Semantic Description

With respect to historical
records/statistics and existing social
and political spectrum, the level of
security and stability in the city

Seven-level linguistic scale

§
0>

>

$o

G(S3)

0)

-C

E

E

T3

TJ
<D

3

GO

X

3

CD

00

X

Numerical Scale

considering the potential terrorist
attacks/conventional warfare threats

§
_I
E
3
TJ

0.1

0.2-0.3

0.4

0.5-0.6

0.7

0.8-0.9

<D

>
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APPENDIX F - SAMPLE MEASUREMENT
1.

Identify Boundaries
For the implementation of the PDSI Model, the City o f Delta territory is divided

into small parts in line with the City Police Districts plan, and further into smaller parts of
patrol division sectors and sub-sectors. Later, the Operations Bureau planning team
decides to test the PDSI Model on a pilot area first. They identify the boundary o f Alfa
sub-sector (Figure 39) to proceed through the model algorithm.

Figure 39

2.

Boundaries o f Alfa Subsector

Identify Critical Assets
The subject matter expert team assigned by the Operations Bureau roughly

identifies and enumerates the critical assets (Figure 40) in Alfa sub-sector according to
the set o f criteria provided by the Mayor o f Delta City, which defines general indices for
the critical asset selection The three critical assets within the Alfa subsector have been
virtually generated to sample the assessment process;
•

Blue Shopping Center (BSC)

•

Delta City Hospital (DCH)

•

City o f Delta Department (CDD)
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Figure 40

3.

Critical Assets Identified in Alfa Subsector

Measure Basic Criticality Value (BCV)
The Scaling Constants (relative importance o f the urban area key sectors/services)

are assigned by the City Council in advance (see Table 58).
Table 58

No
1

Scaling Constant Matrix

Urban Area Key Sectors/Services
Governance, Homeland Security, Law/Public Order,
Emergency Service

2 Housing/Accommodation
3

Power/Energy Service (Power plants, nuclear reactors,
dams, fuel supply stations, etc.)

Scaling
Constant (Si)
1
0.8
0.9

4 Healthcare and Public Health

0.9

5 Telecommunication (including Information Technology)

0.8

Transportation/Postal and Shipping Service (including
airports, major transportation terminals)
Food/Water and Other Goods Service (Shopping malls,
7
major retail, etc.)

6

8 Banking and Finance (including banks/ATMs, etc.)

0.6
0.8
0.7

Critical Manufacturing (including major industrial
facilities)

0.7

10 Training and Education Activities (including schools)

0.6

11 Worship Activities (Places o f worship, etc.)

0.5

9
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Basic Criticality Values (BCV) for each critical asset are calculated in Table 59
with the weights generated randomly.

Table 59

No

Basic Criticality Values

Urban Area Key Sectors/Services

BCI(i)

City of Delta Department (CDD)
Governance, Homeland Security,
BCI1
Law/Public Order, Emergency Service
BCI1= lx(0.9 U 0.5)= 0.950

SI x(SR W l U EW 1)

Delta City Hospital (DCH)
Healthcare and Public Health

BCI4

S4 x (SRW4 U EW4)

BCI4= 0.9x(0.8 U 0.4)= 0.792

Blue Shopping Center (BSC)
Food/Water and Other Goods Service
(Shopping malls, major retail, etc.)

BCI7

S7 x (EW7 U SW7)

BCI7=0.8x(0.1 U 0.65)= 0.548

Variables: Si: Scaling Constant; SRW: Service Relativity Weight; EW:
Employment Weight; OW: Occupancy Weight; SW: Size Weight; IW:
Investment Weight; STW: Student Capacity Weight; SCW: Seating Capacity
Weight
The combination rule for the equations: A U B = (A+B) - (AxB)
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4.

Measure Post-Disaster Security Fuzzy Index (PDSFI)

Measurement o f Input Variables
a.

Scaling Constant per each Criterion is assigned by the Subject Matter Expert

team employed by the Police Department (see Table 60).
Table 60

Scaling Constants per each Criterion
S calin g C o n s ta n t
(0-1)

C rite rio n
Physical Security
N um ber o f Inhabitants/V isitors

scl
sc2

0 .8
0 .8

Size/A rea

sc3
sc4

1

Traffic A ccess/M obility

b.

0 .9

Vulnerability Indexes of the Critical Assets per each Criterion are measured in

Table 61 with the weights generated randomly.
Table 61

Vulnerability Indexes
CRITICAL ASSETS

VULNERABILITY INDEXES

Vp

V(C1)

Physical Security
(Vp+Vw+Vf) / 3

Vw
Vf

Perimeter Security
Index
Building Envelope Wall
Type Index
Building Envelope
Fenestration Index

V(C2)

Approximate number of inhabitants/visitors

V(C3)

Asset size/area
Vr
Traffic

V(C4)

Va

Access/Mobility
(Vr+Va+Vb+Vt) / 4

Vb
Vt

Periphery Road Width
Index
Adjacent Primary
Roads Proximity Index
Bridge Dependency
Index
Transportation
Terminals Proximitv

Blue Shopping
Center

7

8
4.6

Delta City
Hospital

6.87

8

1.6

City of Delta
Departm ent
3

3.87

3

2.8

3.6

5

6

7.5

5.5

6.25

6.75

4.5

7

3

4

5

6

5.25

3

4.5

4.75

4

5

4

6

4

7
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c.

Vulnerability Index Modifiers of the Critical Assets per each Possible System

State are listed in Table 62 with the weights generated randomly.

Table 62

Vulnerability Index Modifiers
CRITICAL ASSETS

VULNERABILITY INDEX MODIFIERS

Blue S hopping
C enter

Delta Q ty
H ospital

G ty o f D elta
D e p a rtm e n t

M(S1)

O ffences A gainst Property

0.8

0.4

0.2

M(S2)

Offences Against Persons

0.6

0.3

0.1

0.7

0.4

0.6

M(S3)

Terrorist A ttacks/ Conventional
W a rfare Threats

d.

Generalizability Grades o f Membership per each Criterion is measured in

Table 63 with the weights generated randomly.

Table 63

Generalizability Grades of Membership per each Criterion

Generalizability Grades of Membership per each
Criterion
Generalizability

Si

Grades of

G(C1)

Membership for

Hi

Physical Security
(Si+Hi+Fi) / 3

G(C2)
G(C3)

Index
Hurricane Vulnerability
Index
Flood Vulnerability
Index

0.6

0.75

Number of Inhabitants/Visitors
Generalizability Grades of Membership for
Size/Area
Grades of
Membership for
Traffic
Access/Mobility
(Ri+Ti+Bi) / 3

Ri
Ti
Bi

Road Length Index
Transportation Lines
Index
Bridges Index

0.6

0.62

0.5

Generalizability Grades of Membership for

Generalizability

G(C4)

Fi

Seismicity Vulnerability

CRITICALASSETS
Blue Shopping Delta City City of Delta
Center
Hospital
Department

0.25

0.62

0.5

0.75

0.62

0.5

0.45

0.45

0.45

0.58

0.58

0.58

0.72
0.34

0.75

0.6

0.72

0.44

0.34
0.25

0.72

0.44

0.34
0.25

0.44
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e.

Generalizability Grades of Membership per each Possible System State is

listed in Table 64 with the weights generated randomly.

Table 64

Generalizability Grades o f Membership per each Possible System State

Generalizability Grades of Membership
per each Possible System State

CRfTICAL ASSETS
Blue Shopping Delta City City of Delta
Center
Hospital
Department

G(S1)

Offences Against Property

0.35

0.35

0.35

G(S2)

Offences Against Persons

0.20

0.20

0.20

0.05

0.05

0.05

G(S3)

Terrorist Attacks/ Conventional
Warfare Threats

Measurement o f Fuzzy Matrix Variables
a.

The PDSFI Matrix o f Blue Shopping Center (BSC) is shown in Table 65

with the variables measured according to equations discussed in Chapter 4.5.5.

Table 65

PDSFI Matrix o f BSC

Post-Disaster Security Fuzzy Index (PDSFI) Matrix

1

(sc4) 0.9

V(C4)

6

6.25

C2: Number of Inhabitants/
Visitors
C3: She/Area

5.25

C4: Traffic Access/Mobility

Generalizability Grades o f Membership

S2: Offences against Persons

G(C1)

CHC2)

G(C3)

G(C4)

0.62

0.4S

0.58

0 .4 4

(0.728,5)

(0336,3.78)

0.35 G(S1)

(0.696,33) (0.560,238) (0.664,3.75) (0.5S2, 234)

0.20 G(S2)

(0.639,3.85) (0378,336) (0.601,438) (0368,331)

0.05 G(S3)

(0.753,4.39) (0.643,334)

Fuzzy Matrix

SI: Offences against Property

S3: Terrorist Attacks/Conventional
W arfare Threats
|

(sc3)

V(C3)

I

6.87
(sc2) 0.8

V(C2)

Cl: Physical Security

Vulnerability

0.8

Index Modifiers

V(C1)
(scl)

Possible System States

Vulnerab|lity Indexes

Generalizability
Grades of Membership

Scaling Constant (sc)

Ambient Criteria of Merit

0 .8 0 M<S1)

0 .6

M(S2)

0 .7

M(S3)
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b.

The PDSFI Matrix of Delta City Hospital (DHC) is shown in Table 66 with

the variables measured according to equations discussed in Chapter 4.5.5.

Table 66

PDSFI Matrix o f DHC

Post-Disaster Security Fu?zy Index (PDSFI) Matrix

a : Physical Security

<sc2) 0.8

C2: Number of Inhabitants/
Visitors
Q : Size/Area

(sc3»

1

(scA) 0.9

C4: Traffic Access/Mobaty

V ia)

via)

V (0 )

V|C4)

3.87

75

6.75

4.5

c.

52: Offences against Persons

Generalizability G rades of M em bership
6 (0 )

6 (0 )

6 (0 )

6(C4)

0.62

0.45

0.58

0.44

(0.7S3,1.24) (0.643,2.4)

Fuzzy Matrix

51: Offences against Property

S3: Terrorist Attacks/Conventionai
W arfare Threats

(0.728,2.7) (0.636,1.62)

0.35 6(S1)

(0.696,0.93) (0.560,14) (0.664,2.03) (0.552,1.22)

0.20 6(S2)

(0.639,1-24) (0.478,2.4)

0.05 6(S3)

(0.601,2.7) (0468,1.62)

0.40 M(S1)

0.30 M(S2)

Vulnerability
Index Modifiers

(SCI) 0.8

Possible System States

Vulnerability Indexes

Generalizability
Grades of M embership

Scaling Constant (sc)

Ambient Criteria of Merit

0.40 M(S3)

The PDSFI Matrix of City of Delta Department (CDD) is shown in Table 67

with the variables measured according to equations discussed in Chapter 4.5.5.

Table 67

PDSFI Matrix o f CDD

Post-Disaster Security Fuzzy Index (PDSFI) Matrix

(sc2) 0.8

Cl: Physical Security

a:

<sc3)

1

Number of Inhabitants/
Visitors
C3: Size/Area

(se4)

0.9

C4: Traffic Access/MobWty

via)

via)

via)

V|C4)

3.6

s.s

45

4.75

G eneralizability G rad es of M e m b ersh ip

6(a)

6(a)

6(0)

6(C4)

0.62

0.45

0.58

0.44

(0.753,0.58) (0.643,0.88) (0.728,0.9)

Fuzzy Matrix

SI: Offences against Property
S2: Offences against Persons
S3: Terrorist Attacks/Conventional
Warfare Threats

(0.636,0.86)

0 3 5 6(S1)

(0.696,0.29) (0460,0.44) (0.664,0.45} (0.552,0.43)

0.20 6(S2)

(0.639,1.73) (0.478,2.64) (0.601,2.7)

0.05 6(S3)

(0.468,2.57)

0 3 0 M(S1)

0.10 M(S2)

0.6 M(S3)

Vulnerability
Index Modifiers

(9Cl) 0.8

Possible System States

V ulnerability Indexes

Generalizability
Grades of Membership

Scaling Constant (sc)

Ambient Criteria of Merit
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Aggregation
In this step, PDSFI for each critical asset is obtained through the aggregation of
the variables provided in the fuzzy matrix (of each asset) using the Equation 2.
a. Blue Shopping Center (BSC)

PDSFI (BSC) = 2.334
b. Delta City Hospital (DCH)

PDSFI (DCH) = 1.121
c. City o f Delta Department (CDD)

PDSFI (CDD) = 0.699

5.

Measure Post-Disaster Security Index (PDSI)
PDSI for each critical asset is obtained through Equation 3 as listed in Table 68.

Table 68

PDSI o f the Critical Assets

BCV

PDSFI

PDSI

Blue Shopping Center (BSC)

0.548

2.334

1279

Delta City Hospital (DCH)

0.792

1.121

887

City o f Delta Department (CDD)

0.950

0.699

664

Critical Asset
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APPENDIX G - POST-DISASTER SECURITY INDEX (PDSI) MODEL FACE
VALIDITY QUESTIONNAIRE

Totally Agree

Somewhat
Agree

Neither Agree
or Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

SEMANTIC DESCRIPTION

Totally
Disagree

Linguistic Scale

Numeric Scale
1
1

Overall framework o f the PDSI Model is congruent
with the notion o f the urban security operations.

2

Measurement process roadmap proposed by the
PDSI Model provides indexes in higher precision
since its algorithm incorporates both multiple
criterions and different system states.

3

Embedded Criteria of Merit incorporated in the
PDSFI Matrix are relevant to the expected outcomes
o f the model.

4

5

6

7

Possible System States incorporated in the PDSFI
Matrix represent the relevant threat spectrum and
crime classifications to most extent.
Generalizability Grades o f Membership
incorporated in the PDSFI Matrix enhance the
applicability o f the model in higher scales.
Measurement matrix for each PDSI Model variables
includes sufficient numbers o f sub-criterions that
enhance the reliability o f the outputs.
PDSI provides realistic scores for the security
planning process in terms o f force tailoring, unit
positioning and identification of the security
operations techniques to be executed in the area o f
operations.

2

3

4

5

223

APPENDIX H - BASIC REALITY FACE-OFF DECISION TREE

The 'Basic Reality Face-off Decision Tree,' illustrated in Figure 41, was
developed to validate the incorporation of'A m bient Criteria o f Merit' in the PDSFI
Matrix. The design o f the decision tree is based on the following scenario:

Scenario: A special firefighter team named Bravo under the command o f Fire
Captain Brown has been tasked to deploy to Compound Charlie as soon as
possible by the immediate release of a fragmentary order (FRAGO). However, the
only information provided to Captain Brown are the coordinates o f the compound
and a note, which says “There are three critical facility buildings (A, B and C).
They are the only structures in the compound, and they are densely populated.
Furthermore, all the personnel in the compound are stuck and vulnerable to
upcoming emergent threats.”

Mission: The mission o f the team is to secure the critical buildings from an
imminent collateral fire threat and evacuate/rescue people as necessary. Time is
very critical and decisions should be made quickly and revised later after the
initial action. Captain Brown has a single responsibility with an important caveat
notified by the superior command.

Responsibility: Once the team arrives in the compound, Captain Brown will
tailor the force structure, dividing the team into separate groups, and deploy
(position) each group to vulnerable assets, and reassess his force tailoring and unit
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positioning decisions, as the feedback report regarding the situation is sent to him
by the troops deployed to first assignment positions.

Caveat: For any course of action, Captain Brown cannot reserve any inert units.
All the troops have to be assigned and deployed.

Access
Route 2

Route 1

Route 3

M ovem ent
com pleted

M ovem ent
halted

Size/Area
Control B

Control A

Action
failed

Mission
accomplished

Support other

Number of
people
Control A and
Support B

Action
failed

Control C

Mission
accomplished

Control A and
Support C

Control A and
Support B&C

Support other

Physical
Security

Figure 41

Q

OR gate

| |

Decision gate

Basic Reality Face-off Decision Tree
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From the simple tactical perspective o f military security operations, the following
assumptions have been generated to visualize the response continuum o f the team Bravo:
Having received the FRAGO, Captain Brown's initial decision should be to start
his team's movement towards the compound as a prompt action since he has the
coordinates. However, he would need more information to decide the best route to ensure
his team arrives in the compound quickly and safely. The requirement for this decision
point is depicted with the square numbered ' 1' in the decision tree (Figure 39).
Once the team reaches the compound, the Captain faces another decision point,
depicted with the square numbered '2 ' in the decision tree (Figure 39). As a matter o f his
responsibility, Captain Brown has to make decision on the force tailoring and unit
positioning to deploy his troops. However, he only knows that all the three assets are
critical and populated with personnel. While he has no idea about the criticality weights
o f the assets, he has to take action very quickly. So, he should make a decision to tailor
his team into groups considering the sizes/areas of the assets, since he can only see the
assets and their sizes/areas in that time.
When the troops are initially deployed to their first positions, regarding the
causality principle, the three potential results could be:
•

Troops may fail.

•

Troops may accomplish.

•

Troops may need to support other groups while they continue to perform their
initial task.
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Once the groups are deployed to critical assets, they would first report the number
o f the people trapped in the assets. Then the Captain would likely revise his previous
decision to adjust the number o f the assigned troops in accordance with the number o f the
people trapped in the assets. This decision point is depicted with the square numbered '3'
in the decision tree (Figure 39).
While personnel are evacuated and preemptive actions are being taken to protect
assets from imminent threat of fire, the troops could provide further information
regarding the physical security characteristics o f the assets (e.g. the features that make the
assets more or less vulnerable to fire), and the Captain would think to revise his previous
decision to optimize the force tailoring as appropriate. This decision point is depicted
with the square numbered '4 ' in the decision tree (Figure 39).
In summary, although the decision tree could be extended further to the more
specific branches in similar approach, the criteria that the Captain must consider in the
first four decision points - best route selection (Traffic Access/Mobility), tailoring the
team into groups considering the sizes/areas o f the assets (Size/Area), adjusting the
number o f the assigned troops in accordance with the number of the people stuck in the
assets (Number o f Inhabitants/Visitors), and revising the previous decision to optimize
the force tailoring according to the information about the physical security characteristics
o f the assets (Physical Security) - constitute the basic criteria set to complete the
criticality and vulnerability assessments during the implementation o f the PDSI Model.
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APPENDIX I - A ROADMAP FOR COMPLETE COMPLEX
ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEM ANALYSIS

1.

Establishment of Core Analysis Team (CAT)
The CAT to be established (which is isolated from any potential structural,

organizational and hierarchical pressure) should directly report to highest level decision
makers.46 It should initially be manned by enough number o f qualified subject matter
experts who have already had a holistic perspective for the organization with necessary
content knowledge and experience. Following the establishment o f the CAT, the mission
and desired end state is delivered with a brief direction and guidance.

2.

Development of the CAT Terms of Reference (ToR)
The CAT is allowed for an ample incubation period to discuss the way ahead and

draft a flexible ToR for its own operation principles, and the ToR is approved by the
decision making committee.

3.

Establishment of Analysis Working Group (AWG)
At the end o f the incubation period, due to information to be provided by the CAT,

the CAT is reinforced with necessary staff to ensure all major organizational system
components are represented at least by one subject matter expert. Pursuant to
participation o f other representatives, the AWG is established to be governed by CAT

46 A decision making committee, which is to include the optimal mix o f decision makers who fairly represent the
relevant system stakeholders/entities at the highest level, should be assigned to oversee the whole analysis process and
navigate the CAT.
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and the CAT ToR is modified to cover the AWG, and the changes approved by the
decision making committee.

4.

Development of the Analysis Methodology
Since every organization has unique characteristics, its analysis methodology

should be an optimal blend of the available methods. In this sense, AWG is allowed to
develop a draft analysis methodology (which could be as outlined in the next bullet - #5),
and the analysis methodology approved by the decision making committee.

5.

Conducting Analysis
a.

Major problem domains in the system are identified by AWG, and

approved by the decision making committee.
b.

Main problem areas in each major problem domain are identified by AWG,

and approved by the decision making committee.
c.

Sub-problems in each main problem area are identified, and approved by

the decision making committee (Sub-problem identification continues until the AWG
agrees that required granularity has been obtained to make each specified problem
handled by any subject matter expert sub-committee that would be assigned afterwards).
d.

The major problem domains, main problem areas and sub-problems are

analyzed in a sequential order or in a non-linear approach as necessary, and the courses of
action are developed for possible solutions, to be approved by the decision making
committee.
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e.

The personnel and logistic plans that will support the courses o f action

identified are developed and the coordination requirements completed.

6.

Implementation
a.

The implementation plan including the detailed timeline is developed and

approved.
b.

Execution.

c.

Feedback mechanism is facilitated and course corrections are applied as

required until the systems reaches full operational capability.
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APPENDIX J - RESPONSIBLE CONDUCT OF RESEARCH FOR ENGINEERS
CURRICULUM COMPLETION REPORT

CITI Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative (CITI)
Learner: Mehmet Secilmis
Institution: Old Dominion University
Responsible Conduct of Research for Engineers
Stage 1. Basic Coarse Passed on 03/28/11 (Ref ? 5487038)
Elective Modules

Date
Completed Score

Introduction to RCR for Engineers

02 13 11

Research Misconduct

02 13 11 5 5 (100%)

Whistleblowing and the Obligation to Protect the PubKc

02 16 11 11 (100%)

Responsible Authorship in Engineering

03 07 11

3 4 (75%)

Ethical Issues in Peer Resiew and Publication in Engineering
Research

03 15 11

3 4(75%)

: 03 15 11

4 5 (80%)

Ensironmental Ethics

03 16 11

34 (75%)

The Ethics of Mentoring

03 16 11 7 7(100%)

Human Subjects Research in Engineering Fields.

03 16 11 5 5 (100%)

The Use of Live Animals in Research

03 28 11

Ethical Issues in the Management of Data in Engineering Research

03 28 11 9 9 (100%)

Conflicts of Interest in Engineering Research

Collaborative Research in Engineering Fields
Completing the RCR for Engineers Course

; 03 28 11
03 28 11

no quiz

5 8 (63%)
4 7 (57%)
no quiz

For this Completion Report to be valid, the learner listed above mnst be affiliated with
a CITI participating institution. Falsified information and unauthorized use of the CITI
coarse site is anethical, and may be considered scientific misconduct by yonr institution
Paul Braunschweiger Ph.D.
Professor, University of Miami
Director Office of Research Education
CITI Course Coordinator
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